We take up Cochrane’s (2011) challenge to identify the firm characteristics that provide independent information about average U.S. monthly stock returns by simultaneously including 94 characteristics in Fama-MacBeth regressions that avoid overweighting microcaps and adjust for data-snooping bias. We find that while 12 characteristics are reliably independent determinants in non-microcap stocks from 1980 to 2014 as a whole, return predictability sharply fell in 2003 such that just two characteristics have been independent determinants since then. Outside of microcaps, the hedge returns to exploiting characteristics-based predictability also have been insignificantly different from zero since 2003.

We provide evidence that the documented weakening of the accrual–cash flow association results not from a loss of accrual accounting usefulness per se, but from the deviation from accrual accounting as it relates to intangible investments. More specifically, the weakening of the negative association is driven by the combined effects of (1) increasing intangible investments, (2) the practice of expensing rather than capitalizing intangible investments, and (3) scaling accruals and cash flows by book value of assets, which are understated for intangible‐intensive firms. Treating intangible expenditures as capitalized investments and scaling accruals and cash flows by market value of equity, which reflects the value of intangible investments, (1) substantially strengthens the negative association between accruals and cash flows and (2) practically eliminates the apparent weakening trend in the association.

Analysts ask managers for forward-looking information in one-third of quarterly conference calls; most frequently, seeking earnings per share guidance. In this study, we examine the long-term consequences of analysts' questions on future manager disclosure choices. Using six types of commonly provided guidance, we find that when analysts request new guidance or ask about prior guidance, managers are more likely to provide similar guidance in future quarters. When analysts do not ask about prior guidance, managers are less likely to provide that type of guidance in the future. This effect is long-lasting, spills over into earnings announcements, and is strongest for firms with the most severe information problems. Our results provide evidence that analysts shape managers' disclosure choices in meaningful ways.

We study individual investors’ paid news subscriptions. Among individual investors, only 4% of individual-quarters include a news subscription, and 1.2% include a financial news subscription. These low rates mask substantial variation across news sources and over time. Within financial news, approximately 30% of aggregate subscription dollars are spent on crowdsourced news, with the remaining 70% spent on traditional financial news. Subscription dollars vary over time, with crowdsourced news at times matching or exceeding traditional financial news. We also find that subscriptions are correlated with capital market activity. Aggregated payments for subscriptions, particularly for crowdsourced news, are correlated with stock market valuation, trading volume, and investment. Similarly, within individuals, the association between subscriptions and investment is driven primarily by crowdsourced news: subscribing is associated with a $280 increase in quarterly investment. Overall, our findings highlight variation in individual investors’ news subscriptions and their correlated investment activities.

We study the mispricing information present in the target prices of US and international analysts. We hypothesize that asymmetry in the value-relevance of the information that managers supply to analysts, combined with asymmetry in the incentives facing analysts to curry favor with managers, leads to analyst-claimed undervaluation being more predictive of future stock returns than analyst-claimed overvaluation. Our empirical tests isolate analyst-claimed mispricing by first removing analysts’ estimates of the cost of equity from the returns implied by target prices and then separating analyst-claimed undervaluation from overvaluation. We find that target prices only predict future returns (at 16 cents to 18 cents on the dollar) when analysts claim undervaluation, not when they claim overvaluation. We also observe that analyst-claimed undervaluation predicts future returns more strongly after firms experience low returns and when macro-driven valuation uncertainty is low.

We investigate whether increased investor demand for financial information arising from higher market uncertainty leads to greater media coverage of earnings announcements. We also investigate whether greater coverage during times of higher uncertainty further destabilizes financial markets because of greater attention-based trading or, alternatively, improves trading and pricing by lowering investor acquisition and interpretation costs. When uncertainty is higher, we find evidence of greater media coverage of earnings announcements and that the greater coverage leads to improvements in investor informedness, information asymmetry, and intraperiod price timeliness, and greater trade by both retail and institutional investors. In contrast to the media serving an expanded role in improving capital markets during more uncertain times, we fail to find that changes in firm-initiated disclosures lead to similar improvements and find that less frequent analyst forecast revisions exacerbate problems in capital markets during earnings announcements.

We take up Cochrane’s (2011) challenge to identify the firm characteristics that provide independent information about average U.S. monthly stock returns by simultaneously including 94 characteristics in Fama-MacBeth regressions that avoid overweighting microcaps and adjust for data-snooping bias. We find that while 12 characteristics are reliably independent determinants in non-microcap stocks from 1980 to 2014 as a whole, return predictability sharply fell in 2003 such that just two characteristics have been independent determinants since then. Outside of microcaps, the hedge returns to exploiting characteristics-based predictability also have been insignificantly different from zero since 2003. Received January 28, 2015; editorial decision November 28, 2016 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

We study how business press coverage can discipline credit rating agency actions. Because of their greater prominence and visibility to market participants, more widely covered firms can pose greater reputational costs for rating agencies. Consistent with rating agencies limiting such risk, we find that ratings for more widely covered firms are more timely and accurate, downgraded earlier and systematically lower in the year prior to default, and better predictors of default and non-default. We also find that the recent tightening of credit rating standards is largely explained by growing business press coverage of public debt issuers. Additionally, we find that credit rating agencies take explicit actions to improve their ratings by assigning better educated and more experienced analysts to widely covered firms. Moreover, we document that missed defaults of more visible firms create greater negative economic consequences for rating agencies, and that rating improvements following the financial crisis were greater for more visible firms. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.