Knowledge that Transforms

Captive finance subsidiaries create a channel for trade policy to affect consumer credit. Examining the impact of the Trump administration’s metal tariffs on captive automobile lenders, we find that consumers received higher interest rates from captive lenders after the tariffs relative to unaffected noncaptive lenders. Further, we document a disparate impact on low-income borrowers and in areas with less lending competition. Our results suggest that tariffs may impact not only the price of goods but also the financing terms of purchases. Thus, focusing solely on directly affected product prices may underestimate tariff pass-through significantly. (JEL F13, F14, G21, L22, L61, L62)

Principal-agent problems often extend beyond what can be directly addressed through conventional incentive arrangements. We examine a context where physicians are likely under-incentivized to minimize total medical costs until their private financial interests align with those of patients. Leveraging novel data on physician ownership of ambulatory surgery centers——that is, same-day facilities——we show that these equity holdings cause a substitution away from higher cost, rival settings that lowers Medicare spending by 10–40 percent per physician. We find no clear evidence of perverse behavior following these investments. Instead, our findings demonstrate how entrepreneurial activity can indirectly limit principal-agent problems and improve efficiency. (JEL D82, D91, G51, I11, I18, L84)

This paper studies which misspecified models are likely to persist when decision-makers compare them with competing models. The main result characterizes such models based on two features that can be derived from primitives: The model’s asymptotic accuracy in predicting the equilibrium distribution of observed outcomes and the “tightness” of the prior around such equilibria. Misspecified models can be robust, persisting against any arbitrary competing model—including the true model—despite decision-makers observing an infinite amount of data. Moreover, simple misspecified models equipped with entrenched priors can be more robust than complex correctly specified models. (JEL C11, C52, D11, L82)

We assess whether men and women are treated differently when presenting their economics research. We collected data across thousands of seminars, job market talks, and conference presentations, leveraging human judgment and audio-processing algorithms to measure the number, tone, and type of interruptions. Within a seminar series, women are interrupted more than men. This holds when controlling for characteristics of the presenter, paper, and audience. Interruptions that are negative in tenor or tone or cut off the presenter mid-sentence increase for women presenters. We also find greater engagement of female audience members with female presenters, suggesting a potential role model effect. (JEL A11, C45, J16, J44)

We argue that consumer credit spreads matter for household choices and that time-varying spreads have important distributional consequences. Studying Danish household data, we show that consumer credit spreads have heterogeneous impact on asset dynamics and consumption choices across the wealth distribution and that time-varying spreads induce a countercyclical marginal propensity to consume. We study a HANK model where banks provide consumer credit and corporate loans. Through countercyclical credit spreads, frictional finance amplifies aggregate shocks and induces consumption inequality. Economies with less leveraged banks experience reduced aggregate volatility but may face higher volatility and lower welfare at the household level. (JEL D12, D31, E12, E21, E32, E52, G51)

We show that bank shocks to firms propagate along the production network with stronger upstream than downstream effects. Our identification relies on (i) administrative datasets from Spain covering supplier-customer transactions and bank loans, (ii) bank credit supply shocks from the global financial crisis, and (iii) a general equilibrium model of a production network with financial frictions, estimated structurally. We find network propagation amplifies the impact of bank shocks on GDP growth by nearly 50 percent. Moreover, bank shocks to firms’ distant suppliers and customers contribute similarly to this aggregate effect as bank shocks to firms’ direct customers and suppliers. (JEL D22, D85, E23, G01, G21, G32, L14)

We provide a model to explain how the interaction between the spot and lending markets for stocks can lead to abrupt changes in short selling activity. Furthermore, rational short sellers may choose to abandon the market even as mispricing widens. We document empirically that the dynamics of short selling are fat tailed and subject to abrupt changes, especially for the stocks that the model identifies as susceptible to such dynamics. (JEL G11, G12, G14, G41)

Modern theories of aggregate supply are built on the foundation that firms set prices and commit to producing whatever the market demands. We remove this strategic restriction and allow firms to choose supply functions, mappings that describe the prices charged at each quantity of production. Theoretically, we characterize firms’ optimal supply function choices in general equilibrium and study the resulting implications for aggregate supply. Aggregate supply flattens under lower inflation uncertainty, higher idiosyncratic demand uncertainty, and less elastic demand. Quantitatively, our theory can rationalize the flattening of aggregate supply during the Great Moderation and steepening during the 1970s and 2020s. (JEL D21, D43, E13, E23, E31, E32)

We study the effects of intensifying competition for contracts in the context of US Defense procurement. Leveraging a discontinuous regulation that mandates agencies to publicize certain contract opportunities, we document that expanding the set of bidders reduces award prices but deteriorates post-award performance in terms of cost overruns and delays. We develop and estimate an auction model with endogenous entry and stochastic execution performance, in which the buyer endogenously chooses the intensity of competition. Model estimates indicate substantial heterogeneity in performance across contractors and show that simple adjustments to the current regulation could provide significant savings in procurement spending. (JEL D22, D24, D44, D82, D86, H56, H57)

Do elite colleges help talented students join the social elite or help incumbent elites retain their positions? We combine intergenerationally linked data from Chile with a regression discontinuity design to show that, looking across generations, elite colleges do both. Lower-status individuals who gain admission to elite college programs transform their children’s social environment. Children become more likely to attend high-status private schools and colleges and to live near and befriend high-status peers. In contrast, academic achievement is unaffected. Simulations combining descriptive and quasi-experimental findings show that elite colleges tighten the link between social and human capital while decreasing intergenerational social mobility. (JEL I23, I26, J24, J62, O15, Z13)