Knowledge that Transforms

Should optimal income taxation change when firms have market power? We analyze how the planner can optimally tax labor income of workers and profits of entrepreneurs. We derive optimal tax rates that depend on markups and identify four distinct components: the Mirrleesian incentive effect, the Pigouvian tax correction of the negative externality of market power, redistribution through altered factor prices, and reallocation of output toward the most productive firms. We quantify the optimal tax for the US economy and provide concrete proposals how to use income taxation to redistribute income while incentivizing production in the presence of market power. (JEL D24, D31, D43, H21, H23, H24, H25)

Preschool-aged children get sick frequently and spread disease to other family members. Despite the universality of this experience, there is limited causal evidence on the magnitudes and consequences of these externalities, especially for infant siblings with developing immune systems and brains. We show in Danish administrative data that during infancy, younger siblings have two to three times higher hospitalization rates for respiratory conditions than older siblings. We combine birth order and within-municipality variation in respiratory disease prevalence among young children, finding lasting differential impacts of early-life respiratory disease exposure on younger siblings' earnings, educational attainment, chronic respiratory health, and mental health-related outcomes. (JEL D13, D62, I12, J12, J13, J24, J31)

The implementation of evidence-based policies hinges on the dissemination of evidence to policymakers, a process influenced by the attributes of the sender. We conduct a country-wide RCT in which two ideologically opposite prominent think tanks, two major newspapers, and a research institution with nonsalient ideology communicate identical information about a low-cost, non-ideological, and effective policy based on published research findings to a large sample of Spanish local policymakers. We measure the impact of information directly on policy adoption and find heterogeneous effects. When the informing institution aligns ideologically with policymakers, communicating research results leads to a more than 65% increase in policy adoption compared to an uninformed control group, while informing from an opposite ideology does not lead to policy adoption. Our design also allows us to compare the impact of knowledge brokers, such as think tanks, and coverage in leading newspapers in adopting public policies. We find that, when ideologically aligned with policymakers, both are equally effective in increasing policy adoption. We propose a three-stage conceptual framework of policy adoption processes - selective exposure to information, belief updating, and policy implementation- and show that ideological alignment does not influence selective exposure to information. However, evidence from a post-intervention online experiment shows that ideological alignment affects belief updating regarding a recommended policy's effectiveness. Finally, we discuss the trade-offs between effectiveness and outreach when using ideologically aligned and nonsalient institutions to disseminate research evidence and comment on the economic impact of ideological alignment for policy implementation.

Why do health facilities in developing countries do so poorly? This paper examines the role of financial constraints. I describe an experiment in which we surprised health workers in randomly selected public health clinics in Nigeria with a N600,000 grant paid out in installments over one year. Its administration was left entirely to health workers. I show that the award led to large productivity gains. Using expenditure data combined with novel textual data I provide an explanation for these effects. I show that the award increased investments in physical and human capital, led to lower prices for patients and inspired health workers to do better.

Why is workplace sexual harassment chronically underreported? We hypothesize that employers coerce victims into silence through the threat of a retaliatory firing, and test this theory by estimating whether external shocks that reduce the value of a worker's outside options exacerbate underreporting. Under mild assumptions, a rise in the severity of formal complaints is indicative of increased underreporting. Combining this insight with an objective measure of the quality of charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), we perform two analyses. First, we assess whether workers report sexual harassment more selectively during recessions, when outside labor market options are limited. We estimate the fraction of sexual harassment charges deemed to have merit by the EEOC increases by 0.5-0.7% for each one percentage point increase in a state-industry's monthly unemployment rate. The effect is amplified in industries employing a larger fraction of men and in establishments with a higher share of male managers. Second, we test whether less generous UI benefits create economic incentives for victims of workplace sexual harassment to remain silent. We find the selectivity of sexual harassment charges increases by more than 30% in response to a 50% cut to North Carolina's Unemployment Insurance (UI) program following the Great Recession.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Many employers link wages at establishments outside of the home region to the level at headquarters. We show this using new data on 1,200 multinationals’ establishments across the world and linked employee-level data on their establishments in Brazil. Headquarters wage changes arising from minimum wage and exchange rate shocks are partially transmitted to workers employed in the same position abroad. Wage change transmission appears to be direct and results from firm-wide wage-setting procedures rather than associated technology or employment changes. “Anchored” wage setting is somewhat associated with particular characteristics of the job × employer × headquarters-establishment country-pair. (JEL F23, F31, J24, J31, J38, M16, O15)

This paper studies the implications of central bank credibility for long-run inflation and inflation dynamics. We introduce central bank lack of commitment into a standard nonlinear New Keynesian economy with sticky-price monopolistically competitive firms. Inflation is driven by the interaction of lack of commitment and the economic environment. We show that long-run inflation increases following an unanticipated permanent increase in the labor wedge or decrease in the elasticity of substitution across varieties. In the transition, inflation overshoots and then gradually declines. Quantitatively, inflation overshooting is persistent, and the welfare loss from lack of commitment relative to inflation targeting is large. (JEL D43, E12, E23, E24, E31, E52, E58)

This paper examines the effects of privatizing social health insurance in the United States. We study this question in the context of the Medicaid program, the largest health insurer in the US and the largest means-tested program in the nation -serving over 90 million low-income families and individuals with disabilities. Exploiting a natural experiment wherein nearly 100,000 Medicaid enrollees were randomly assigned between a state-administered fee-for-service system and private managed care, we find that spending was nearly 10% lower for enrollees assigned to managed care plans. These savings were concentrated in prescription drugs, where we show that prior authorization was the key mechanism plans used to reduce overuse and encourage substitution to lower-cost alternatives without reducing quality. This was distinct from the effects of privatization on medical benefits, where private plans lowered quality and abraded consumers without achieving savings. In contrast to what our findings imply for an efficient public-private division of services, Medicaid has historically favored the public provision of prescription drugs and private outsourcing of medical care.

We show that, depending on how the impact of omitted variables is measured, it can be substantially easier for omitted variables to flip coefficient signs than to drive them to zero. This behavior occurs with “Oster's delta” (Oster 2019a), a widely reported robustness measure. Consequently, any time this measure is large—suggesting omitted variables may be unimportant—a much smaller value reverses the sign of the parameter of interest. We propose a modified measure of robustness to address this concern. We illustrate our results in four empirical applications and two meta-analyses. We implement our methods in the companion Stata module “regsensitivity.” (JEL C18, C21, C52)

We propose a novel identification strategy to isolate exogenous immigration shocks across US counties, by interacting quasi-random variations in the composition of ancestry across counties with the contemporaneous inflow of migrants from different countries. We show a positive causal impact of immigration on local innovation and wages at the five-year horizon. The positive dynamic impact of immigration on innovation and wages dominates the short-run negative impact of increased labor supply. A structural estimation of a model of endogenous growth and migrations suggests the increased immigration to the United States since 1965 may have increased innovation and wages by 5 percent. (JEL J15, J22, J31, J61, O31, R11, R23)