Knowledge that Transforms

Wage rigidity is an important explanation for unemployment fluctuations. In benchmark models wages for new hires are key, but there is limited evidence on this margin. We use wages posted on vacancies, with job and establishment information, to measure the wage for new hires. We show that our measure of the wage for new hires is rigid downward and flexible upward, in two steps. First, wages change infrequently at the job level, and fall especially rarely. Second, wages do not respond to rises in unemployment, but respond strongly to falls in unemployment. Job information is crucial for detecting downward rigidity. (JEL E24, E32, J23, J31, J63, M51)

Common values auction models, where bidder decisions depend on noisy signals of common values, provide predictions about Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) outcomes. In settings where these common values can be estimated, these predictions can be tested. We propose a series of tests, robust to assumptions about the signal structure, to determine whether the observed data could have been generated by a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In the setting of oil and gas lease auctions in New Mexico, we find evidence that participation decisions are correlated and that participants systematically underbid in light of ex post outcomes. (JEL D44, D82, L12, L71, Q35)

We show that administrative hourly wage data exhibit considerable bunching at round numbers. We run two experiments randomizing wages around $0.10 and $1.00 to experimentally measure left-digit bias for identical tasks on Amazon Mechanical Turk; we fail to find any evidence of discontinuity in the labor supply function at round numbers despite estimating a considerable degree of monopsony. We replicate these results in administrative worker-firm hourly wage data from Oregon. We can rule out inattention estimates found in the behavioral product market literature. We provide evidence that firms “misoptimize” wage setting. More monopsony requires less employer misoptimization to explain bunching. (JEL D22, J22, J31, J42)

We present five facts from an experiment on the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of transitory transfers: (1) the one-month MPC on a cash-like transfer is 23 percent; (2) it is substantially higher (61 percent) on a transfer administered via a card where remaining funds expire after three weeks, inconsistent with money fungibility; (3) the consumption response is concentrated in the first three weeks; (4) MPCs vary with household characteristics but are high even for the liquid wealthy; (5) unconditional MPC distribution exhibits large variation. Our findings inform the design of stimulus policies and pose challenges to existing macroeconomic models. (JEL D12, D91, E21, G51, I38)

We provide a model connecting the global saving glut to productivity growth. The key feature is that the tradable sector is the engine of growth of the economy. Capital flows from developing countries to the United States boost demand for US nontradable goods, inducing a reallocation of US economic activity from the tradable sector to the nontradable one. In turn, lower profits in the tradable sector lead firms to cut back investment in innovation. Since innovation in the United States determines the evolution of the world technological frontier, the result is a drop in global productivity growth. (JEL E21, E22, E23, E44, F32, F43, O31)

We conducted a randomized trial among 14,545 households in rural Burkina Faso to test the oft-cited hypothesis that limited access to contraception is an important driver of high fertility rates in West Africa. We do not find support for this hypothesis. Women who were given free access to modern contraception for three years did not have lower birth rates; we can reject even modest effects. We cross-randomized additional interventions to address inefficiencies that might depress demand for free contraception, specifically misperceptions about the child mortality rate and social norms. Free contraception did not significantly influence fertility even in combination with these interventions. (JEL D12, J13, J16, J18, O12)

We measure how cuts to public procurement propagate through the banking system in a financial crisis. During the European sovereign debt crisis, the Portuguese government cut procurement spending by 4.3 percent of GDP. We find that this cut saddled banks with nonperforming loans from government contractors, which led to a persistent reduction in credit supply to other firms. We estimate a bank-level elasticity of credit supply with respect to procurement demand of 2.5. In a general equilibrium model, our findings point to large effects of fiscal policy on credit supply and output in a crisis. (JEL E23, E44, E62, G01, G21, H57)

Coasts contain a disproportionate share of the world's population, reflecting historical advantages, but environmental change threatens a reversal of coastal fortune in the coming decades as natural disasters intensify and sea levels rise. This paper considers whether large infrastructure investments should continue to favor coastal areas. I estimate a dynamic spatial equilibrium framework using detailed geo-referenced data on road investments in Vietnam from 2000 to 2010 and find evidence that coastal favoritism has significant costs. The results highlight the importance of accounting for the dynamic effects of environmental change in deciding where to allocate infrastructure today. (JEL H54, O18, P25, Q54, R11, R42, R58)

This paper identifies a credit-supply contraction that arises endogenously after trade liberalization. Banks with loan portfolios concentrated in sectors exposed to competition from China face an increase in nonperforming loans after China’s entry into the World Trade Organization. As a result, they reduce the supply of credit to firms, irrespective of the firm’s sector of operation. This cut in credit translates into lower employment, investment, and output. Through this mechanism, the financial channel amplifies the shock to firms already hit by import competition from China and passes it on to firms in sectors expected to expand upon trade liberalization. (JEL D22, F14, G21, G31, G32, L25, P33)

This paper examines how central bank policies influence mortgage pricing in the United Kingdom. It shows that lenders price discriminate by offering two-part tariffs of interest rates and origination fees, and during unconventional monetary policies like the Funding for Lending Scheme, lenders reduced interest rates while increasing fees. Using a model of mortgage demand and lender competition, we find that central bank policies increased mortgage lending. Additionally, banning origination fees would reduce lending, as fees help lenders capture surplus while allowing them to price discriminate across borrowers with different sensitivities to rates and fees. (JEL E43, E52, E58, G21, G28, R31)