Knowledge that Transforms

We analyze two noncontributory Mexican pension programs for the elderly. Both paid similar amounts, but one paid monthly while the other paid every two months. The Life Cycle Hypothesis suggests frequency of benefits payments should not affect consumption smoothing, but we find the monthly program was more effective in smoothing food expenditure. It also increased doctor visits and reduced the incidence of hunger spells. Under the bimonthly program, expenditures on food significantly decline between paychecks but ownership of durable goods increased. This suggests the importance of payment frequency in social programs.

We investigate the importance of job-to-job (JJ) transitions for cyclical wage dynamics. By exploiting cross-state variation, we find that wage growth is tightly linked to variation in the JJ transition probability, and conditional on this, the job finding probability of the unemployed has no explanatory power. We investigate the robustness of our results to several caveats and find the result to hold. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for competing theories of wage dynamics.

Examining the most heavily cited publications in labor economics from the early 1990s, I show that few of over 3,000 articles, citing them directly, replicates them. They are replicated more frequently using data from other time periods and economies, so that the validity of their central ideas has typically been verified. This pattern of scholarship suggests, beyond the currently required depositing of data and code upon publication, that there is little need for formal mechanisms for replication. The market for scholarship already produces replications of non-laboratory applied research.

We study how agents respond to performance incentives according to key personality traits (conscientiousness and neuroticism) through a field experiment offering financial incentives for improving maternal and neonatal health outcomes to rural Indian doctors. More conscientious providers performed better--but improved less--under performance incentives. The effect of the performance incentives was also smaller for providers with higher levels of neuroticism. Our results contribute to a growing body of empirical research on heterogeneous responses to incentives and have implications for worker selection.

We report on the centralization of a two-sided matching-with-contracts market, in which pre-existing choice functions violate the substitutes condition. The ability to accommodate these choice functions was critical for the success of our design. The new mechanism is stable and strategy-proof for applicants. It is well accepted by both sides of the market. Our study provides a strong empirical validation for the practical relevance of recent theoretical advances on matching without substitutes.

We track high-growth ventures from the idea stage to commercialization and investigate the nature of the gender gap early in the venture lifecycle. Using data on 651 venture ideas that collectively attracted over $700 million in venture financing, we find a significant gender gap among ventures without documented intellectual assets at the earliest stage of founding but not among ventures that already possess intellectual assets. We also find a gender gap in entrepreneurs' readiness to commit to their venture ideas full-time. Conditional on such commitment, there are no significant differences in ventures' access to venture financing or rate of commercialization.

Security trading now fragments into more than ten almost identical stock exchanges in the United States. We show that discrete pricing is one economic force that prevents the consolidation of trading volume. The uniform one-cent tick size (minimum price variation), imposed by the SEC's Rule 612, leads to more dispersed trading for lower priced securities. When a security reverse splits, its price increases and relative tick size (one cent divided by the price) decreases. We find that reverse splits consolidate trading of securities, using securities with identical underlying fundamentals that do not reverse split as the control group.

We make a two-pronged proposal to (i) strengthen the incentives for replication work and (ii) better organize and draw attention to the replications that are conducted. First we propose that top journals publish short “replication reports.” These reports could summarize novel work replicating an existing high-impact paper, or they could highlight a replication result embedded in a wider-scope published paper. Second, we suggest incentivizing replications with the currency of our profession: citations. Enforcing a norm of citing replication work alongside the original would provide incentives for replications to both authors and journals.

Maternal mortality remains very high in many parts of the developing world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. While maternal deaths are observable, it may not be straightforward for individuals to learn about risk factors. This paper utilizes novel data on male and female perceptions of maternal risk in Zambia to document that superstitions about causes of maternal mortality are pervasive and to uncover evidence that such beliefs impede learning about maternal health risk levels and correlates. In our data, people who hold traditional beliefs disregard past birth complications completely in assessing future risk, unlike those who hold modern beliefs.

Economics journals with reproducibility policies are cited more often than others. For the minority of journals with a mandatory and enforced policy, this is significant when controlling for time and journal effects. To cope with the large variety of software used and to develop standards for replicability, joint efforts of journals could ensure each empirical study is published with data, code, and instructions on how to use them together. Individual reviewers could take initiative by asking for replicable empirical results. The American Journal of Political Science sets an example by having all empirical studies externally check for replicability prior to publication.