Knowledge that Transforms

In markets for retail financial products and health services, consumers often rely on the advice of intermediaries to decide which specialized offering best fits their needs. Product providers, in turn, compete to influence the intermediaries' advice through hidden kickbacks or disclosed commissions. Motivated by the controversial role of these widespread practices, we formulate a model to analyze competition through commissions from a positive and normative standpoint. The model highlights the role of commissions in making the advisor responsive to supply-side incentives. We characterize situations when commonly adopted policies such as mandatory disclosure and caps on commissions have unintended welfare consequences. (JEL D21, D82, D83, G21, L15, L25)

The cost-effectiveness of cap-and-trade emissions regulations has become widely accepted. A 2009 proposal by Muller and Mendelsohn would replace conventional ton-for-ton trading with trading based on estimates of marginal damages by pollutant and by source. This proposal faces difficulties arising from the negative marginal damage estimates—neglected in Muller and Mendelsohn (2009)—for nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from many urban counties. Such estimates imply nonconvexities in air chemistry that complicate trading and could result in trades that increase emissions by both buyer and seller. Uncertainty in source-specific damages also creates rent-seeking opportunities and the potential for costly litigation. JEL: H53, Q53, Q58

During the age of mass migration (1850-1913), one of the largest migration episodes in history, the United States maintained a nearly open border, allowing the study of migrant decisions unhindered by entry restrictions. We estimate the return to migration while accounting for migrant selection by comparing Norway-to-US migrants with their brothers who stayed in Norway in the late nineteenth century. We also compare fathers of migrants and nonmigrants by wealth and occupation. We find that the return to migration was relatively low (70 percent) and that migrants from urban areas were negatively selected from the sending population. "Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!" cries she With silent lips. "Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door!"--Emma Lazarus (1883).

We use experimental measures of time discounting and risk aversion for villagers in south India to highlight behavioral features of microcredit, a financial tool designed to reduce poverty and fix credit market imperfections. The evidence suggests that microcredit contracts may do more than reduce moral hazard and adverse selection by imposing new forms of discipline on borrowers. We find that, conditional on borrowing from any source, women with present-biased preferences are more likely than others to borrow through microcredit institutions. Another particular contribution of microcredit may thus be to provide helpful structure for borrowers seeking self-discipline. JEL: G21, I38, O15, O16, O18

Can government policies that increase the monopoly power of firms and the militancy of unions increase output? This paper shows that the answer is yes under certain “emergency” conditions. These emergency conditions—zero interest rates and deflation—were satisfied during the Great Depression in the United States. The New Deal, which facilitated monopolies and union militancy, was therefore expansionary in the model presented. This conclusion is contrary to a large previous literature. The main reason for this divergence is that this paper incorporates rigid prices and the zero bound on the short-term interest rate. JEL: E23, E32, E52, E62, J51, N12, N42

We propose a framework to create village economic and balance of payments accounts from a micro-level household survey. Using the Townsend Thai data, we create the accounts for villages in rural and semi-urban areas of Thailand. We then study these village economies as small open countries, exploring in particular the relationship between the real and financial variables. We examine cross-village risk-sharing and the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. Our results suggest that within-village risk-sharing is better than across-village and, while there is smoothing in both, the mechanisms are different. We also find that, unlike countries, the cross-village capital markets are highly integrated.

I use bilateral import data to test for and quantify the importance of trade costs and asset market frictions in explaining the failure of perfect international consumption risk sharing. I find that while frictions in international asset markets significantly impede optimal consumption risk sharing between developed and developing countries over the period 1970–2000, developed countries are close to optimal risk sharing with each other. Trade costs, in contrast, significantly impede risk sharing for all countries. (JEL E21, E44, F14, F41, G15)

The technological constraints on sustaining production chains have been discussed extensively by development economists, but the role of financial linkages has received less attention. In a model of recursive moral hazard for a manufacturing supply chain, we show that the structure of interlocking receivables and payables serve as the glue for the production chain that sustains complex manufacturing output. The inefficiency associated with recursive moral hazard can be mitigated through optimal delays in payments along the chain. However, efficiency requires large stocks of working capital, and invoice prices are high due to implicit amortization costs of inter-firm credit.

That the employment rate appears to respond to changes in trend growth is an enduring macroeconomic puzzle. This paper shows that, in the presence of a return to experience, a slowdown in productivity growth raises reservation wages, thereby lowering aggregate employment. The paper develops new evidence that shows this mechanism is important for explaining the growth-employment puzzle. The combined effects of changes in aggregate wage growth and returns to experience account for all the increase from 1968 to 2006 in nonemployment among low-skilled men and for approximately half the increase in nonemployment among all men. (JEL E24, J24, J31)

Purchasing power–adjusted incomes applied in cross-country comparisons are measured with bias. This paper estimates the purchasing power parity (PPP) bias in Penn World Table incomes and provides corrected incomes. The bias is substantial and systematic: the poorer a country, the more its income tends to be overestimated. Consequently, international income inequality is substantially underestimated. The methodological contribution is to exploit the analogies between PPP bias and the bias in consumer price index (CPI) numbers. The PPP bias and subsequent corrected incomes are measured by estimating Engel curves for food, an established method of measuring CPI bias. JEL: C43, D31, E31, O11, O12