Knowledge that Transforms

We study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with correlated assets owned by privately informed sellers. In the model, a trade of one asset can provide information about the value of other assets. Importantly, the information content of trading behavior is endogenously determined. We show that this endogeneity leads to multiple equilibria when assets are sufficiently correlated. The equilibria are ranked in terms of both trade volume and efficiency. The model has implications for policies targeting post-trade transparency. We show that introducing post-trade transparency can increase or decrease welfare and trading volume depending on the asset correlation, equilibrium being played, and the composition of market participants.

To generate big responses of unemployment to productivity changes, researchers have reconfigured matching models in various ways: by elevating the utility of leisure, by making wages sticky, by assuming alternating-offer wage bargaining, by introducing costly acquisition of credit, by assuming fixed matching costs, or by positing government-mandated unemployment compensation and layoff costs. All of these redesigned matching models increase responses of unemployment to movements in productivity by diminishing the fundamental surplus fraction, an upper bound on the fraction of a job's output that the invisible hand can allocate to vacancy creation. Business cycles and welfare state dynamics of an entire class of reconfigured matching models all operate through this common channel.

We track the geographic and temporal propagation of local economic shocks from new oil and gas production generated by hydrofracturing. Each million dollars of new production produces $80,000 in wage income and $132,000 in royalty and business income within a county. Within 100 miles, one million dollars of new production generates $257,000 in wages and $286,000 in royalty and business income. Roughly two-thirds of the wage income increase persists for two years. Assuming no general equilibrium effects, new extraction increased aggregate US employment by as many as 640,000, and decreased the unemployment rate by 0.43 during the Great Recession.

Child stunting in India exceeds that in poorer regions like sub-Saharan Africa. Data on over 168,000 children show that, relative to Africa, India's height disadvantage increases sharply with birth order. We posit that India’s steep birth order gradient is due to favoritism toward eldest sons, which affects parents' fertility decisions and resource allocation across children. We show that, within India, the gradient is steeper for high-son-preference regions and religions. The gradient also varies with sibling gender as predicted. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that India's steeper birth order gradient can explain over one-half of the India-Africa gap in average child height.

We study the impact of large exchange rate devaluations on the cost of living at different points on the income distribution. Poor households spend relatively more on tradeable product categories and consume lower-priced varieties within categories. Changes in the relative price of tradeables and of lower-priced varieties affect the cost of living of low-income relative to high-income households. We quantify these effects following the 1994 Mexican devaluation and show that they can have large distributional consequences. Two years post-devaluation, the cost of living for the bottom income decile rose 1.48 to 1.62 times more than for the top income decile.

We construct a model of household decision-making in which agents consume a private and a public good, interpreted as children's welfare. Children's utility depends on their human capital, which depends on the time their parents spend with them and on the parents' human capital. We first show that as returns to human capital increase, couples at the top of the income distribution should spend more time with their children. This in turn should reinforce assortative matching, in a sense that we precisely define. We then embed the model into a transferable utility matching framework with random preferences, à la Choo and Siow (2006), which we estimate using US marriage data for individuals born between 1943 and 1972. We find that the preference for partners of the same education has significantly increased for white individuals, particularly for the highly educated. We find no evidence of such an increase for black individuals. Moreover, in line with theoretical predictions, we find that the “marital college-plus premium” has increased for women but not for men.

Two identical firms who start exporting in different months, one each in January and December, will report dramatically different exports for the first calendar year. This partial-year effect biases down first-year export levels and biases up first-year export growth rates. For Peruvian exporters, the partial-year bias is large: first-year export levels are understated by 54 percent and the first-year growth rate is overstated by 112 percentage points. Correcting the partial-year effect dramatically reduces first-year export growth rates, raises initial export levels, and almost doubles the contribution of net firm entry and exit to overall export growth.

Banks produce short-term debt for transactions and storing value. The value of this debt must not vary over time so agents can easily trade it at par like money. To produce money-like safe liquidity, banks keep detailed information about their loans secret, reducing liquidity if needed to prevent agents from producing costly private information about the banks' loans. Capital markets involve information revelation, so they produce risky liquidity. The trade-off between less safe liquidity and more risky liquidity determines which firms choose to fund projects through banks and which ones through capital markets.

We study how relational contracts mitigate Becker's classic problem of providing general human capital when training contracts are incomplete. The firm's profit-maximizing agreement is a multiperiod apprenticeship in which the novice is trained gradually over time and eventually receives all knowledge. The firm adopts a 1/e rule, whereby at the beginning of the relationship the novice is trained, for free, just enough to produce a fraction 1/e of the efficient output. After that, the novice earns all additional knowledge with labor. This rule causes inefficiently lengthy relationships that grow longer the more patient the players. A minimum wage is welfare enhancing.

We show that a number of noncognitive skills and preferences, including patience and identity, are malleable in adults, and that investments in them reduce crime and violence. We recruited criminally engaged men and randomized one-half to eight weeks of cognitive behavioral therapy designed to foster self-regulation, patience, and a noncriminal identity and lifestyle. We also randomized $200 grants. Cash alone and therapy alone initially reduced crime and violence, but effects dissipated over time. When cash followed therapy, crime and violence decreased dramatically for at least a year. We hypothesize that cash reinforced therapy's impacts by prolonging learning-by-doing, lifestyle changes, and self-investment.