We investigate the relationship between political networks, weak institutions, and election fraud during the 2010 parliamentary election in Afghanistan combining: (i) data on political connections between candidates and election officials; (ii) a nationwide controlled evaluation of a novel monitoring technology; and (iii) direct measurements of aggregation fraud. We find considerable evidence of aggregation fraud in favor of connected candidates and that the announcement of a new monitoring technology reduced theft of election materials by about 60 percent and vote counts for connected candidates by about 25 percent. The results have implications for electoral competition and are potentially actionable for policymakers.

We analyze the optimal policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and firms choose among alternative mergers. In our model, the optimal policy of an antitrust authority that seeks to maximize expected consumer surplus imposes a tougher standard on “larger” mergers, i.e., those involving firms with a larger pre-merger market share. The optimal policy is a response to a bias in firms' proposal incentives: firms always propose a larger merger when it is better for consumers than a smaller one, but sometimes will propose the larger one even when it is worse for consumers.

In the presence of imperfect information, voluntary certification can provide an important complement to mandatory inspections as a basis for environmental regulation in low income countries. Using data from Mexico's Clean Industry Program, we show that patterns of compliance and certification by sector are consistent with a model in which selection into the voluntary program permits more efficient targeting of regulator effort. As expected given the informational role played by certification in the model, we also find evidence, for a sample of publicly traded firms, of positive stock price deviations linked to the announcement of certification.

A striking fact about pricing is the prevalence of “sales”: large temporary price cuts followed by prices returning to exactly their former levels. This paper builds a macroeconomic model with a rationale for sales based on firms facing customers with different price sensitivities. Even if firms can adjust sales without cost, monetary policy has large real effects owing to sales being strategic substitutes: a firm's incentive to have a sale is decreasing in the number of other firms having sales. Thus the flexibility seen in individual prices due to sales does not translate into flexibility of the aggregate price level.

In an effort to bolster economic performance in light of a looming downturn in economic activity, on February 13, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008. More than two-thirds of the $152 billion bill consisted of economic stimulus payments to be sent beginning in May to approximately 130 million households. To qualify, recipients had to have a valid Social Security number, an income tax liability, or at least $3,000 of “qualifying income” that included earned income and some benefits from Social Security, Veterans Affairs, or Railroad Retirement, and have filed a 2007 federal tax return. For the most part those who filed as single individuals received between $300 and $600, while those who filed jointly received between $600 and $1,200. Additionally, parents with children under 17 who were eligible for a Child Tax Credit and had a Social Security number received an extra $300 per child. The tax rebate phased out at higher levels of income, as the payment was reduced by 5 percent of the amount of adjusted gross income over $75,000 for singles, or over $150,000 for married couples. The Treasury remitted payments either by direct deposit, mainly in the first half of May, or by mail, mainly from mid-May through mid-July. The effect of these stimulus payments depends on how much was spent. This paper reports new survey evidence on the propensity of consumers to spend the 2008 rebate. It also relates the survey evidence to aggregate data and to evidence about spending from the 2001 tax rebate.

The past 20 years have seen important changes in public policy with the potential for significant impacts on health insurance for children. These changes included both those explicitly intended to expand access to public insurance for children, including expansions in eligibility for Medicaid and the introduction of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), and other changes in antipoverty policy. Since health insurance coverage among children is entwined with parental welfare participation and employment, shifts in policy designed to encourage work in place of welfare participation--such as welfare reform and the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)--may have secondary impacts on children's health insurance coverage. As parents leave welfare, with its guaranteed health insurance through Medicaid, for jobs that may or may not have health insurance coverage offered as a benefit, children may experience a change in the source of their health insurance coverage or may become uninsured. Similarly, changes in health care markets and economic conditions such as rising health care prices and cyclicality in the availability of employment may also affect children's coverage. Despite the potential importance of these factors for coverage, the fraction of children who are uninsured has remained largely constant, particularly through the 1990s. However, this relatively constant level of uninsurance may mask changes in the underlying dynamics of health insurance among children. In this paper, we use monthly data from the 1986–1996 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to examine patterns of health insurance coverage among children during the period 1986–1999, focusing on transitions between public coverage, private coverage, and no coverage. Using these data, we find that over the 1990s the rate of transitions among all three insurance states--public insurance, private insurance, and no insurance--increased, with a particular increase in transitions involving public coverage. We investigate whether there is evidence of a relationship between insurance transitions and various policy and economic variables, focusing on the impacts of expansions in public coverage availability, the effects of other policies directed at the poor that affect employment and insurance coverage, and economic conditions. We find that several of the policy changes that took place over the 1990s had important effects on health insurance transitions for children.

We study the effects of antitrust policy in industries with continual innovation. Antitrust policies that restrict incumbent behavior toward new entrants may have conflicting effects on innovation incentives, raising the profits of new entrants, but lowering those of continuing incumbents. We show that the direction of the net effect can be determined by analyzing shifts in innovation benefit and supply, holding the innovation rate fixed. We apply this framework to analyze several specific antitrust policies. We also show that, in some cases, the tension does not arise, and policies that protect entrants necessarily raise the rate of innovation.

We analyze a general equilibrium model in which there is both adverse selection of, and moral hazard by, banks. The regulator can screen banks prior to giving them a licence, audit them ex post to learn the success probability of their projects, and impose capital adequacy requirements. Capital requirements combat moral hazard when the regulator has a strong screening reputation, and they otherwise substitute for screening ability. Crises of confidence can occur only in the latter case, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the appropriate policy response may be to tighten capital requirements to improve the quality of surviving banks.

The Metropolitan Council for Educational Opportunity (Metco) is a desegregation program that sends students from Boston schools to more affluent suburbs. Metco increases the number of blacks and reduces test scores in receiving districts. School-level data for Massachusetts and micro data from a large district show no impact of Metco on the scores of white non-Metco students. But the micro estimates show some evidence of an effect on minority third graders, especially girls. Instrumental variables estimates for third graders are imprecise but generally in line with ordinary least squares estimates. Given the localized nature of these results, we conclude that peer effects from Metco are modest and short lived.

Many households received income tax rebates in 2001 of $300 or $600. These rebates represented advance payments of the tax cut from the new 10 percent tax bracket. Based on a survey of a representative sample of households, this paper finds that only 22 percent of households receiving the rebate would spent it. Instead, they would either save it or use it to pay off debt. This very low rate of spending represents a striking break with past behavior, which would have suggested a much higher rate of spending. The low spending rate implies that the tax rebate provided a very limited stimulus to aggregate demand.