I present a model of optimal learning for creativity generation in a field. The field is defined as a knowledge structure. A creative contribution is based on combining two previously unconnected elements, generating a new element. Individuals may possess private information/intuition about new combinations. Individuals contribute the maximum creative contribution they are able to produce based on the set of elements they have learned. In equilibrium individuals learn different elements, with some degree of overlap, effectively pursuing distinct creative interests. The model illustrates a general approach for analyzing the creative development of fields and, in a broader sense, cultural innovation.

We study simultaneous security-bid second-price auctions with competition among sellers for potential bidders. The sellers compete by designing ordered sets of securities that the bidders can offer as payment for the assets. Upon observing auction designs, potential bidders decide which auctions to enter. We characterize all symmetric equilibria and show that there always exist equilibria in which auctions are in standard securities or their combinations. In large markets the unique equilibrium is auctions in pure cash. We extend the model for competition in reserve prices and show that binding reserve prices never constitute equilibrium as long as equilibrium security designs are not call options.

Most indexes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) use a form of the “matched-model” approach. It is frequently assumed that this approach accurately reflects inflation for items that have no major trend in quality. In this paper we investigate that hypothesis using CPI data for retail food items. We find that CPI analysts may be correct on average when they decide that new and replacement items are similar in quality. We also find, however, that when sample items are replaced by items of significantly different quality the CPI imputation procedures may underestimate price change and overstate quality change.

Today's financial system is dominated by markets with institutions connected by short-term financing, securitization, derivatives, and other means. Yet regulations have focused on depositories, leaving regulators unprepared for the 2008 crisis. We suggest two key principles for regulatory reform. First, some changes in the financial system came as institutions lowered the burden of regulations through “regulatory arbitrage.” Reform needs to avoid driving businesses “into the shadows,” where risks may accumulate and sow seeds of future crises. Second, reform ought to improve transparency to reduce uncertainty and inter-linkages between players. We evaluate some of Dodd-Frank Act in light of these principles.

Using Current Population Survey and US Army administrative data, we document that between 2000 and 2010, the employment rate of Vietnam era veterans fell markedly relative to non-veterans of the same cohorts while simultaneously their enrollment increased steeply in the Veterans Disability Compensation (DC) program, which provides healthcare and transfer payments to veterans with service-connected disabilities. Thirty percent of Vietnam era Army veterans enrolled in DC in 2006 received benefits for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, with median annual payments of $25,500. The declining employment and rising transfer payments to Vietnam era veterans underscore the long-term private and public costs of wartime service, potentially stemming from both adverse health consequences and policies that have expanded benefits eligibility.

We consider estimation of population averages when data are missing at random. If some cells contain few observations, there can be substantial gains from imposing parametric restrictions on the cell means, but there is also a danger of misspecification. We develop a simple empirical Bayes estimator, which combines parametric and unadjusted estimates of cell means in a data-driven way. We also consider ways to use knowledge of the form of the propensity score to increase robustness. We develop an empirical Bayes extension of a double robust estimator. In a small simulation study, the empirical Bayes estimators perform well. They are similar to fully nonparametric methods and robust to misspecification when cells are moderate to large in size, and when cells are small they maintain the benefits of parametric methods and can have lower sampling variance.

Newly developed historical time series on public debt, along with data on external debts, allow a deeper analysis of the debt cycles underlying serial debt and banking crises. We test three related hypotheses at both “world” aggregate levels and on an individual country basis. First, external debt surges are an antecedent to banking crises. Second, banking crises (domestic and those in financial centers) often precede or accompany sovereign debt crises; we find they help predict them. Third, public borrowing surges ahead of external sovereign default, as governments have “hidden domestic debts” that exceed the better documented levels of external debt.

Major League Baseball umpires express their racial/ethnic prefer ences when they evaluate pitchers. Strikes are called less often if the umpire and pitcher do not match race/ethnicity, but mainly where there is little scrutiny of umpires. Pitchers understand the incentives and throw pitches that allow umpires less subjective judgment (e.g., fastballs over home plate) when they anticipate bias. These direct and indirect effects bias performance measures of minorities downward. The results suggest how discrimination alters discriminated groups' behavior generally. They imply that biases in measured productivity must be accounted for in generating measures of wage discrimination.

This paper presents a list of the top 20 articles published in the American Economic Review during its first 100 years. This list was assembled in honor of the AER's one-hundredth anniversary by a group of distinguished economists at the request of AER's editor. A brief description accompanies the citations of each article.