Knowledge that Transforms

We examine competition for Andersen’s public clients during and after its failure in 2002. This setting provides a natural experiment to examine audit market dynamics at the local level. We construct a database documenting Big4 purchases of local Andersen offices. After exploring the factors associated with office purchases, we examine the impact of office purchases on public client market share gains and changes in audit fees. We find that three Big4 firms – Deloitte, Ernst & Young, and KPMG – purchased approximately 60% of Andersen’s offices while PricewaterhouseCoopers did not purchase any. The probability that a firm purchased a specific office is greater in markets where the acquiring firm: 1) already had a presence, 2) had a lower ratio of local Andersen clients to the purchaser’s clients, and 3) had already acquired relatively more local former Andersen public clients than other firms prior to the purchase. Our fee analysis expands the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) post-Andersen audit market study by documenting that the former Andersen clients’ change in audit fees is associated with the differences in client acquisition method.

We examine the association between chief executive officer (CEO) reputation (proxied by the extent of press coverage) and the quality of the firm's earnings (proxied by two accruals-based measures). We test three explanations for an association between these constructs: the efficient contracting hypothesis suggests that reputed CEOs are associated with good earnings quality, while the rent extraction and matching explanations argue that reputed CEOs are associated with poor earnings quality. Using a simultaneous equations system to capture the endogeneity of the constructs, we find (consistent with the rent extraction and matching arguments) that more reputed CEOs are associated with poorer earnings quality than are less reputed CEOs. Further tests find little support for the rent extraction hypothesis. We conclude that the reason more reputed CEOs are associated with poor earnings quality firms is that such firms require more talented managers and, therefore, employ more reputed CEOs. © CAAA.

This study investigates whether incentive-based compensation for audit committee members is associated with accounting restatements. We use an agency framework to predict that short-term (long-term) incentive compensation for audit committee members will increase (decrease) the likelihood of accounting restatements due to error or fraud. Using a matched-sample logistic regression with 153 restatement and 153 nonrestatement companies, we find the predicted positive relation between short-term incentive compensation (short-term stock option grants) for audit committee members and likelihood of restatement. However, the long-term incentive compensation results contradict prediction and indicate a significant positive relation between audit committee member long-term incentive compensation {long-term stock option grants) and restatement likelihood. Supplemental testing provides evidence that the findings generally are robust to numerous alternative measures and models. The results raise questions about stock option grants for audit committee members and suggest the need for additional theoretical and empirical research to clarify the audit committee's role and incentives in agency frameworks.

In this paper, we first develop a model in which national legal environments play a crucial role in determining auditor effort and audit fees. Our model predicts that: (1) audit fees increase monotonically with the strength or strictness of a country’s legal liability regime; (2) given a legal liability regime, Big 4 auditors charge higher audit fees than non-Big 4 auditors; and (3) the Big 4 fee premium decreases as a country’s legal regime shifts from a weak to a strong regime. We then test the model’s predictions using a large sample of audit clients from 15 countries with different legal regimes where audit fee data are publicly available. The results of our cross-country regressions strongly support the above three predictions, and are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks. Furthermore, we find that the effects of a legal regime on audit pricing and the Big 4 premium are more salient for the small client segment than for the large client segment. Overall, our regression results indicate that a country’s legal environment plays an important role in determining both audit fees and the fee spread between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors.

Screening potential investments involves dividing a set of companies into those that are suitable to consider for investment and those that are less desirable (Kinder 2005). In this paper, I document that nonprofessional investors (represented by MBA students) are susceptible to scale compatibility effects when implementing an investment screen using non-financial measures. Such effects occur when investors rely more on a scale compatible non-financial measure whose values directly map into investors' judgments than on an equally relevant but scale incompatible measure whose values do not map into their judgments. Results from an experiment indicate that investors reduce their susceptibility to scale compatibility effects when they simultaneously screen several companies for potential investment. Because screening investments involves screening several companies, simultaneous screening represents an efficient mechanism to de-bias scale compatibility effects.

The article discusses the study of determining whether audit risk model is descriptive of what occurs in the auditing practice or if the relationship between fees and internal control deficiencies (ICDs) suggest that audit enterprises exert more effort in auditing firms that impart ICDs. The study examines the internal controls over financial reporting (ICOFR), generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), audit risk model, audit fees and sections of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The study found out that audit fees are significantly higher for firms disclosing material weakness.