Knowledge that Transforms

We exploit two regulatory shocks to examine the informational effects of tightening preexisting mandatory disclosure rules. Canadian National Instrument 51‐101 in 2003 and the U.S. rule “Modernization of Oil and Gas Reporting” in 2009 introduced quasi‐identical amendments which effectively tightened the rules governing oil and gas reserve disclosures in both countries. We document significant changes in firms' reporting outcomes when the new regulations are introduced. We also find that the reserve disclosures filed under the new regulations are more closely associated with stock price changes and with decreases in bid‐ask spreads. Our findings are robust to controlling for other confounding factors such as time trends, other information disclosed simultaneously, financial reporting incentives, mispricing, and monitoring efforts.

This study examines whether the volatility of interim estimates of the annual effective tax rate (ETR) provides ex ante information about the quality of firms' internal control environments. Recent research suggests that some firms selectively disclose internal control weaknesses (ICWs). Given the negative consequences associated with ICWs, it is important for capital market participants to be able to identify firms with ineffective internal controls in a timely manner. We find that firms with more volatile annual ETR estimates are more likely to report both tax‐ and nontax‐related ICWs in the current year. Our results also indicate that the volatility of annual ETR estimates declines following the remediation of tax‐related ICWs, but not following the remediation of nontax‐related ICWs. In addition, we find that ETR volatility in the current year is associated with the likelihood that a firm will report an ICW in the following year. Finally, we provide evidence that the volatility of annual ETR estimates is associated with the likelihood that a firm has an undisclosed ICW. In combination, our results suggest that the volatility of interim estimates of the annual ETR provides an ex ante signal of the likelihood that a firm's internal controls are ineffective.

Employer‐sponsored opportunities for altruism outside the workplace can improve employee engagement and passion within the firm, enhance the firm's corporate visibility, and improve its recruitment. There is limited understanding of whether and how a firm's management control system on employees' daily tasks can influence employee willingness to engage in altruism outside the workplace. In this study, we investigate via an experiment how the incentive scheme (tournament vs. piece rate) on employees' daily tasks interacts with the difficulty level of these tasks (low vs. high) to affect employees' altruistic behavior outside the firm. Our results indicate that, compared to a piece‐rate scheme, a tournament scheme leads to a greater decrease in non‐winning participants' altruistic behavior outside the firm when the original, incentivized task is more difficult compared to when it is less difficult. Consistent with our theory, participants' feelings of excessive entitlement partially mediate the interaction effect of incentive scheme and task difficulty on participants' altruistic behavior outside the firm. This study informs firms about how the design of its incentive scheme on employees' daily task inside the firm and the nature of that task can influence employee willingness to act altruistically outside the firm.

We exploit an influential 1991 Delaware court ruling to examine simultaneously two types of conservatism that play important roles in resolving creditor–owner agency conflicts: contracting conservatism and reporting conservatism. The ruling expanded managerial fiduciary duties in favor of creditors for Delaware‐incorporated firms in the vicinity of insolvency. In those firms, following the ruling, debt contracts are less likely to include conservative adjustments to accounting numbers used for covenant compliance (i.e., contracting conservatism decreases), while public financial reporting becomes more conservative (i.e., reporting conservatism increases). The decrease in contracting conservatism is concentrated in firms that exhibit a greater increase in reporting conservatism, suggesting that reporting conservatism is more cost‐effective in resolving agency conflicts. In addition, the substitution effect is more pronounced in firms facing greater business uncertainty and firms with greater board independence.

We study whether the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms varies depending on the characteristics of the executives subject to these mechanisms, namely their “psychological type,” as proxied by their history of legal infractions. In particular, we examine insider trading, where we can compare the trading behavior of different types of executives in the same firm. We find that “recordholder” executives, that is, those with prior legal infractions, earn significantly higher profits from purchases and sales than nonrecordholder executives. Furthermore, the profitability of both purchases and sales is significantly increasing in the severity of the infraction. Governance mechanisms, such as blackout policies, lower profits of executives with only traffic infractions; however, profits for executives with serious infractions appear insensitive to blackout policies. Insiders with serious infractions are also more likely to trade during blackout periods and before large information events and are more likely to report their trades to the SEC after the filing deadline. Collectively, our evidence suggests that while governance mechanisms can discipline executives with minor offenses, they appear largely ineffective for those with more serious infractions.

We examine the stock market consequences of disclosing accounting irregularities for U.S.‐listed foreign firms. After controlling for the severity of the irregularity and other firm characteristics, we find that foreign firms experience significantly more negative short‐window stock market reactions following irregularity announcements than do U.S. firms. Moreover, for a subsample of 64 irregularities of foreign firms that are listed on both a U.S. and home country stock exchange, we find evidence that restating firms' U.S. investors react more negatively to the same irregularity than their home country investors. This differential market reaction appears related to firm‐specific information risks that are greater for foreign firms than U.S. firms. Collectively, consistent with the reputational bonding hypothesis in prior literature, our results suggest that accounting irregularities cause U.S. investors to reassess the information risk associated with foreign firms.

In a globalized audit environment, regulators and researchers have expressed concerns about inconsistent audit quality across nations, with a particular emphasis on Chinese audit quality. Prior research suggests Chinese audit quality may be lower than U.S. audit quality due to a weaker institutional environment (e.g., lower litigation and inspection risk) or cultural value differences (e.g., greater deference to authority). In this study, we propose that lower Chinese audit quality could also be due to Chinese auditors' different cognitive processing styles (i.e., cultural mindsets). We find U.S. auditors are more likely to engage in an analytic mindset approach, focusing on a subset of disconfirming information, whereas Chinese auditors are more likely to take a holistic mindset approach, focusing on a balanced set of confirming and disconfirming information. As a result, Chinese auditors make less skeptical judgments compared to U.S. auditors. We then propose an intervention in which we explicitly instruct auditors to consider using both a holistic and an analytic mindset approach when evaluating evidence. We find this intervention minimizes differences between Chinese and U.S. auditors' judgments by shifting Chinese auditors' attention more towards disconfirming evidence, improving their professional skepticism, while not causing U.S. auditors to become less skeptical. Our study contributes to the auditing literature by identifying cultural mindset differences as a causal mechanism underlying lower professional skepticism levels among Chinese auditors compared to U.S. auditors and providing standard setters and firms with a potential solution that can be adapted to improve Chinese auditors' professional skepticism and reduce cross‐national auditor judgment differences.

We examine whether prior findings on the market pricing of accruals quality (AQ) can be attributed to other forms of accounting‐based anomalies. Using hedge portfolio analysis and cross‐sectional regressions, we find that the return predictive power of AQ overlaps with several other accounting signals. We also find that, similar to other accounting‐based anomalies, especially the accruals anomaly, the AQ pricing effect (i) is likely due to mispricing instead of risk pricing, (ii) is attenuated in recent years, and (iii) disappears among firms with cash flow forecasts or long‐term growth forecasts. Our findings highlight the importance of controlling for existing return predictive signals when evaluating the market pricing of AQ.

We examine how accounting‐based compensation plans influence a firm's contracts with its creditors. After granting long‐term accounting‐based compensation plans (LTAPs) to CEOs, firms pay lower spreads and have fewer restrictive covenants in new bank loans. Mechanisms leading to lower borrowing cost include improvements in debt repayment ability, reduced shareholder‐debtholder conflicts, and reduced risk‐taking incentives. Creditors view LTAPs as a substitute for monitoring, adjust covenant design based on LTAP features, and value plans with concave performance‐payout functions and reasonable performance targets. A firm's credit rating improves and CDS spread declines after LTAP grants, suggesting that LTAPs help reduce firms' credit risk.

This paper reports the results of three studies (archival, experimental, and qualitative) designed to examine the effects of auditor narcissism on auditor‐client negotiations in China. We contend that narcissistic characteristics fuel auditors' competitiveness and embolden them to stand firm in negotiations, potentially lengthening the negotiation process but leading to more conservative negotiation outcomes. As predicted, our archival results suggest that auditor narcissism is positively associated with audit delay and negatively associated with clients' absolute and positive discretionary accruals. Our experimental results document that narcissistic auditors are more likely to be involved in negotiations that reach an impasse or take longer to resolve and that narcissistic auditors negotiate reported asset values that reflect less aggressive reporting choices. Our qualitative results from field interviews with practicing audit partners corroborate our archival and experimental findings. Overall, the data collected using three different research methods yield consistent results in support of our theory. Our findings shed light on factors that influence audit efficiency and quality in China. We discuss the key cultural and contextual differences between China and the West as well as the implications of these differences for future research.