Abstract Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”), some management privately guided analyst earnings estimates, often through detailed reviews of analysts' earnings models. In this paper I use proprietary survey data from the National Investor Relations Institute to identify firms that reviewed analysts' earnings models prior to Reg FD and those that did not. Under the maintained assumption that firms conducting reviews guided analysts' earnings forecasts, I document firm characteristics associated with the decision to provide private earnings guidance. Then I document the characteristics of “guided” versus “unguided” analyst earnings forecasts. Findings demonstrate an association between several firm characteristics and guidance practices: managers are more likely to review analyst earnings models when the firm's stock is highly followed by analysts and largely held by institutions, when the firm's market‐to‐book ratio is high, and its earnings are important to valuation but hard to predict because its business is complex. A comparison of guided and unguided quarterly forecasts indicates that guided analyst estimates are more accurate, but also more frequently pessimistic. An examination of analysts' annual earnings forecasts over the fiscal year does not distinguish between guidance and no‐guidance firms; both experience a “walk‐down” in annual estimates. To distinguish between guidance and no‐guidance firms, one must examine quarterly earnings news: unguided analysts walk down their annual estimates when the majority of the quarterly earnings news is negative; guided analysts walk down their annual estimates even though the majority of the quarterly earnings news is positive.

Abstract. This paper deals with the accounting for equity investments by a life insurance company. Various procedures for recognizing unrealized changes in market values of securities in its investment portfolio are analyzed. These range from direct recognition of market values to the method currently employed by Canadian life insurance companies which involves extensive smoothing. Summary statistics are suggested that describe the properties of the resulting accounting numbers obtained from various smoothing procedures. These summary statistics are viewed as compact, cost effective ways of summarizing the effects of the procedures for financial statement readers. The second part of the paper describes how a particular user group can obtain a ranking among various accounting alternatives. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (Saaty 1980) is proposed for combining the judgments of different individuals into a group preference. The feasibility of the method is illustrated using a small pilot study to rank various proposals concerning the accounting treatment of life insurance companies' equity investments.

Résumé. Cet article traite de la comptabilité pour les investissements en actions d'une compagnie d'assurance‐vie. On y analyse différentes procédures permettant de comptabiliser des changements non réalisés dans les valeurs du marché des titres de son portefeuille d'investissements. Ces procédures s'échelonnent de la comptabilisation directe des valeurs du marché à la méthode couramment utilisée par les compagnies canadiennes d'assurance‐vie et qui consiste en un lissage complet. On propose des statistiques sommaires qui décrivent les propriétés des chiffres comptables obtenus à partir des diverses procédures de lissage. On considère ces statistiques sommaires comme étant des moyens compacts et économiques de résumer les effets des procédures pour des lecteurs d'états financiers. La deuxième partie de l'article décrit comment un groupe d'utilisateurs particulier peut obtenir une classification des possibilités comptables. On suggère le processus analytique de hiérarchie (Saaty 1980) pour combiner les jugements de différentes personnes dans un groupe de préférence. On illustre par une petite étude‐pilote la faisabilité de la méthode pour classifier diverses propositions concernant le traitement comptable des investissements en actions des compagnies d'assurance‐vie.

Abstract Discretionary income smoothing has been argued to increase bank opacity and degrade financial system stability by making banks more difficult to monitor. However, no direct empirical association between discretionary smoothing and opacity has been established to date. We argue that smoothing could reflect either the opportunistic exercise of discretion that disconnects loan loss provisions (LLPs) from changes in underlying credit quality, consistent with smoothing increasing opacity, or an informative exercise of discretion to communicate forward‐looking information about loan losses. We examine the association between discretionary smoothing and the informativeness of LLPs for a sample of banks from 1994 to 2019 and find that discretionary smoothing is, on average, associated with more informative LLPs. However, this association is nuanced, with cross‐sectional differences and changes over time. We find evidence that an intervention by the SEC into bank LLP practices in the late 1990s curbed opportunistic smoothing via provisioning for homogeneous loans. Subsequently, smoothing is associated with more informative provisions, including for banks with both more homogeneous and more heterogeneous loan portfolios. Our findings are inconsistent with the notion that smoothing may be associated with greater opacity.

We evaluate whether, and under what circumstances, corporate tax aggressiveness influences audit pricing. Using a compound measure of two long-run effective tax rates, we find that tax-aggressive firms pay higher fees for external audit services after controlling for factors related to earnings management. The fee premium increases with management’s uncertainty about the sustainability of tax positions if audited by tax authorities (i.e., disclosed tax reserves). Further, the provision of auditor-provided tax services may create knowledge spillovers that alleviate the fee premium for tax aggressiveness, unless tax uncertainty is high. Finally, an accounting firm’s industry expertise in auditing is associated with higher audit fees independent of tax aggressiveness, whereas industry expertise in taxation leads to a fee premium only for tax-aggressive clients. Overall, the evidence implies firms’ aggressive tax behavior, tax services provider, and auditor expertise interact to influence the pricing of audit engagements.

This paper examines the effects of disclosure and recognition requirements on investment decisions when shareholders have limited liability. Firms' investment projects have either high initial pollution prevention costs or high subsequent clean-up costs, and their liability for clean-up costs may be either individual or joint and several. Even with individual liability for clean-up costs, shareholders' limited liability creates an incentive to select the latter project type and to impose costs on the rest of the economy. This tendency is exacerbated when clean-up liability is joint and several. We show that a disclosure requirement cannot have an unambiguous effect on the selection of the “cleaner” project. However, an accrual requirement, together with an accounting-based dividend restriction, is shown to promote choice of the project that imposes lower expected costs on the rest of the economy. Moreover, we find that it is possible for a recognition requirement to have a greater impact in a joint-and-several liability regime than in an individual liability regime.

Abstract. Issues surrounding the allocation of sunk capacity costs to products are among the oldest in managerial accounting. On the one hand, such costs are generally deemed to be irrelevant, but on the other hand, actual accounting systems commonly make these allocations. This paper examines a decision maker who incurs costs to acquire capacity and then uses an opportunity cost to allocate that capacity among a sequence of product proposals. Under specified circumstances, the sunk cost of capacity is shown to approximate the optimal opportunity cost of capacity. As the number of product proposals grows, the expected opportunity loss from using a simple sunk cost based capacity allocation rule goes to zero. The model is extended to consider different types of products and a multiperiod setting. Résumé. Les questions qui entourent la répartition des coûts irrécupérables relatifs à la capacité entre les différents produits comptent parmi les plus vieux problèmes en comptabilité de gestion. D'une part, ces coûts sont généralement réputés n'être pas pertinents, tandis que d'autre part, en réalité, les systèmes de comptabilité assurent couramment ces répartitions. Les auteurs examinent le cas d'un décideur qui engage des frais pour acquérir une certaine capacité et utilise ensuite un coût d'option pour répartir cette capacité entre une série de projets de fabrication de produits. Dans des circonstances données, les auteurs démontrent que les coûts irrécupérables de la capacité acquise se rapprochent du coût d'option optimal de cette capacité. À mesure que croît le nombre de projets de fabrication de produits, la perte d'option prévue, si l'on utilise une règle de répartition simple de la capacité fondée sur les coûts irrécupérables, se rapproche de zéro. Le modèle est élargi de façon à englober différents types de produits et plusieurs périodes.

Abstract. This study develops and tests the hypothesis that the quality and quantity of municipal financial information are positively associated with increased competition in the primary market for new issues of general obligation bonds. A measure of market competition, the number of underwriter bids tendered, is regressed on several market‐related and issue‐specific control variables and a group of financial reporting test variables. A sample of 224 new issues of municipal general obligation bonds sold by competitive bid between 1978 and 1983 is examined. The results generally support the hypothesis. Employment of an independent CPA firm auditor and more extensive disclosure increase competition, as expected. However, no support was found for the argument that holding a Government Finance Officers Association Certificate of Conformance increases the level of underwriter competition. Résumé. Les auteurs établissent et vérifient l'hypothèse selon laquelle la qualité et la quantité d'information financière municipale sont en relation positive avec l'augmentation de la concurrence sur le marché primaire pour les nouvelles émissions d'obligations générales. Une mesure de la concurrence sur le marché, soit le nombre d'offres de preneurs ferme, est soumise à une analyse de régression basée sur plusieurs variables de contrôle reliées au marché et particulières à l'émission et sur un groupe de variables‐tests reliées à l'information financière. Les auteurs examinent un échantillon de 224 nouvelles émissions d'obligations municipales générales vendues par soumission concurrentielle entre 1978 et 1983. Les résultats obtenus corroborent de façon générale l'hypothèse posée. Le recours à un vérificateur d'un cabinet de CPA indépendant et la publication d'informations plus étendues accentuent la concurrence, comme prévu. Cependant, rien ne confirme l'hypothèse selon laquelle la détention d'un Government Finance Officers Association Certificate of Conformance intensifie le degré de concurrence chez les preneurs ferme.

Abstract. We hypothesize that a mandated accounting change (MAC) that disallows the deferral of revenues or capitalization of expenditures causes the aggregate deferred revenue and capitalized expenditure flows to fall below their levels prior to the change. In addition, the deferred revenue or capitalized expenditure flows after a MAC will exceed the pre‐MAC levels that would have resulted from formerly capitalizing or deferring these items. We discuss using deferred tax flows as a proxy for a firm's level of capitalization and deferral. Finally, we test our hypothesis by examining changes in deferred tax flows for a sample of firms that capitalized research and development costs prior to the promulgation of FAS2. The test results indicate that managers actively restored revenue flows and capitalized expenditures for the period immediately following FAS2. Second, smaller firms appear to be more active in this restoration process than larger firms. Finally, the decline in the rate of growth of depreciation for capitalizing firms suggests that managers may have influenced the capitalization of costs to restore earnings to pre‐FAS2 levels. Résumé. Les auteurs posent l'hypothèse selon laquelle une modification comptable non discrétionnaire (MCND) par suite de l'interdiction du report de produits ou de la capitalisation de dépenses fait en sorte que les flux globaux des produits reportés et des dépenses capitalisées diminuent au‐dessous des niveaux qu'ils affichaient avant la modification. En outre, les flux de produits reportés ou de dépenses capitalisées après une MCND excéderont les niveaux qui auraient résulté de la capitalisation ou du report de ces éléments avant la MCND. Les auteurs traitent de l'utilisation des flux d'impôt reporté d'une entreprise à litre de substitut du niveau de capitalisation et de report. Enfin, ils vérifient leur hypothèse en examinant les changements des flux d'impôt reporté pour un échantillon d'entreprises qui ont capitalisé leurs frais de recherche et de développement avant la promulgation par le FASB de la Norme n o 2. Les résultats du test indiquent que les gestionnaires ont activement rétabli les flux de produits reportés et de dépenses capitalisées pendant la période suivant immédiatement la Norme n o 2. Deuxièmement, les entreprises plus petites semblent plus enclines à opérer ce processus de rétablissement que les entreprises plus grandes. Enfin, le déclin du taux de croissance de l'amortissement pour les entreprises qui recourent à la capitalisation donne à penser que les gestionnaires peuvent avoir joué sur la capitalisation des coûts pour ramener les bénéfices à leurs niveaux antérieurs à la Norme n o 2.