We investigate the interaction of mandatory disclosure and the gathering of decision‐relevant information in a setting in which a competitor may enter the market. Gathering detailed information allows for an efficient allocation of resources, but eventually attracts competition by revealing beneficial information to competitors. In contrast, refraining from generating detailed information implies inefficient decisions, but eventually prevents competitors from entering the market. Our results show that an incentive not to generate internal information arises for two reasons: If the incumbent's cost advantage is sufficiently large, disclosing aggregated information can be an instrument to avoid competition by reducing the likelihood of market entry. If the incumbent's cost advantage is small, disclosing aggregated information attracts competition by increasing the likelihood of market entry. In this case, imprecise cost information serves as a commitment device to reduce the intensity of competition by forcing the competitor to take into account his efficiency disadvantage in making his production decision.

Verrecchia (1983) investigates a manager's incentives for costly, discretionary disclosure of his information to risk‐averse traders when the functional form of prices is exogenously specified. We extend Verrecchia (1983) by deriving the endogenously determined functional form of prices that would arise when all traders have constant risk tolerance. We show that these endogenously determined prices are inconsistent with the assumed prices in Verrecchia (1983) when the manager elects to not disclose. We derive the manager's disclosure strategy for our setting and extend the comparative static results in Verrecchia (1990) for risk‐neutral traders to a setting where traders have constant risk tolerance and prices are endogenously derived. Further, in our setting, discretionary disclosure does not affect how traders price risk of different outcomes. Also, we offer a representation of risk‐averse traders' prices using risk‐adjusted distributions. Finally, these results provide implications for empirical‐archival discretionary disclosure studies.

The above article has been retracted at the request of authors Robert Libby and Hun‐Tong Tan, in agreement with the Editor‐in‐Chief, Patricia C. O'Brien, the copyright holder, the Canadian Academic Accounting Association (CAAA), and Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Bentley University conducted an investigation confirming that Dr. J. E. Hunton, while a faculty member at Bentley University and without the knowledge of his co‐authors, engaged in research misconduct, specifically data fabrication. Dr. Hunton provided the data used in the above study, and did not respond to a request for comment. Based on Bentley's initial report and further investigation into details specific to this paper, we conclude that the validity of the data cannot be confirmed. To correct the academic literature and maintain standards of academic integrity, we therefore retract the paper. The article was published online in Contemporary Accounting Research on 13 May 2010, in Wiley Online ( wileyonlinelibrary.com ). Reference Tan , H.‐T. , R. Libby , and J. E. Hunton . 2010 . . Contemporary Accounting Research 27 (): 187 – 208 . doi: 10.1111/j.1911‐3846.2010.01006.x

This paper compares the value of political ties and market credibility in China by examining the consequence of corporate scandals. We categorize Chinese corporate scandals by whether the scandal is primarily associated with the destruction of (i) the firm's political networks (political scandals), (ii) the firm's market credibility (market scandals), or (iii) both (mixed scandals). Consistent with our hypothesis that scandals signaling the destruction of political ties are associated with greater losses in firm value than scandals signaling the destruction of market credibility, we find that the stock market reacts more negatively to political and mixed scandals than to market scandals. In addition, the greater negative market reactions associated with political and mixed scandals are primarily driven by firms that rely more on political networks. We also find that, compared to market scandals, political and mixed scandals lead to larger decreases in operating performance, greater reduction in loans from state‐owned banks, and higher departure of political directors.

Recent research suggests that adopting imprecise accounting standards elevates audit firm litigation exposure and could undermine auditor objectivity if audit firms respond by herding to industry norms. This paper reports the results of two experiments that demonstrate how audit firms can effectively mitigate the elevated litigation exposure without herding to industry norms by staffing engagements with recognized technical experts, using judgment frameworks and automated decision aids, and providing persuasive evidence of adherence to auditing standards. We find that judgment frameworks are particularly well‐suited for defending judgments under imprecise standards, and represent a cost‐effective alternative to using technical experts. However, our results also indicate that judgment frameworks may provide a safe harbor for relatively low‐quality judgments when those frameworks are used under precise standards. We discuss implications for audit firms, courts, and regulators that currently conduct or evaluate audits within and across jurisdictions where the precision of accounting standards varies considerably.

Using a novel data set that tracks all web traffic on the SEC 's EDGAR servers from 2008 to 2011, we examine the determinants and capital market consequences of investor information acquisition of SEC filings. The average user employs the database very few times per quarter and most users target specific filing types such as periodic accounting reports; a small subset of users employ EDGAR almost daily and access many filings. EDGAR activity is positively related with corporate events (particularly restatements, earnings announcements, and acquisition announcements), poor stock performance, and the strength of a firm's information environment. EDGAR activity is related to, but distinct from, other proxies of investor interest such as trading volume, business press articles, and Google searches. Finally, information acquisition via EDGAR , both to obtain earnings news and to provide context for it, has a positive influence on market efficiency with respect to earnings news. Overall, our results are important because they provide a unique, user‐based perspective on investor access of mandatory disclosures and its impact on price formation.

The objective of this study is to examine managerial involvement in auditor selection decisions when audit committees are “directly responsible” for auditor relationships, including selection of the audit firm. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) of (2002) requires fully independent audit committees to be “directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any registered public accounting firm” (Section 301). This statutory requirement is a regulatory attempt to eliminate management influence over the external auditor and align auditor incentives with those of the board and shareholders.1 While regulators largely assume that audit committees take responsibility for auditor selection in the post‐SOX period (Doty 2011), there exists no archival analysis testing this assumption. Therefore, the effectiveness of this regulation (SOX Section 301) remains uncertain. In this paper, we examine (a) whether contrary to the intent of SOX, managers continue to influence auditor selection decisions in the post‐SOX period, and (b) whether this influence subsequently impairs auditor independence as presumed in the legislation.