We examine shareholders' perceptions about how external tax advisors contribute to corporate tax planning. As residual claimants of corporate tax planning, shareholders benefit from lower corporate taxes, but also bear the financial and reputational costs of subsequent tax enforcement. Despite the influential advisory role of external tax advisors in corporate tax planning, existing research on how shareholders perceive this role is limited. Using event study methods and exploiting the heightened regulation of tax advice through the covered opinion rules as a setting, we observe average and cross‐sectional stock returns consistent with shareholders perceiving external tax advisors as contributing unfavorably to tax planning by promoting excessively risky strategies. We further find that risky and overall tax planning declined across firms after the enactment of the rules, consistent with shareholders' perceptions about tax advisors' contributions to firms' tax planning. Overall, our findings contribute to research on shareholder perceptions and valuation of tax planning, and have important implications for practice, where regulatory oversight of external tax advisors remains a significant concern.

This study examines the effect of shareholder scrutiny of corporate tax avoidance behavior and its related financial reporting. Specifically, we explore the factors associated with shareholder tax litigation and its effect on the future tax behavior of the sued firm and its peers. We find that sued firms have lower cash and GAAP effective tax rates (ETRs) and engage in extreme tax avoidance before litigation. After litigation, they decrease tax avoidance activities, relative to matched control firms. Peer firms in the same industry as sued firms similarly reduce their level of tax avoidance and the likelihood of extreme tax avoidance after the litigation, relative to control firms. Additional analyses suggest that sued firms change their tax avoidance behavior, rather than merely their tax financial reporting. Finally, the spillover results are strongest for peer firms with the most tax avoidance (i.e., the lowest cash ETRs) when the sued firm's alleged misconduct is revealed.

In response to the extended audit report regulations implemented in the United States and internationally, both audit firms and regulators have increased scrutiny over critical audit matters/key audit matters (collectively referred to as CAMs) through internal and external inspections. At the same time, auditors and audit committees (ACs) have altered the content and timing of CAM‐related discussions by communicating specific planned audit procedures earlier in the audit process. This study explores the effect of early communication of CAM‐related audit procedures to the AC and increased scrutiny from inspections on auditors' propensity to adjust planned audit procedures in the presence of newly identified audit risks. Based on self‐justification theory, we predict and find that early communication of planned audit procedures to the AC causes auditors to be less likely to adjust planned audit procedures even when additional risks arise that necessitate change, especially when inspection is likely. This has the potential for diminished audit quality. Interviews with audit partners provide context for how these findings relate to the current auditing environment.

Distributed, rather than co‐located, teams increasingly perform audit work, raising regulator concerns that distributed team communication issues may affect audit quality. We investigate upward communication (i.e., raising issues to supervisors), a key communication dimension related to audit quality. In Study 1, we survey 69 senior auditors to establish that distributed team upward communication suffers. Furthermore, distributed team auditors identify less with their teams and struggle to know when and how to speak up. Because both are linked to inhibited upward communication, we next experimentally test firm practices with the potential to attenuate these problems. Study 2, an experiment with 128 staff auditors and interns, reveals that making auditors' professional identities salient improves upward communication on co‐located teams with strong team identities but not on distributed teams with weak team identities. Study 3, an experiment with 58 staff auditors, replicates a key Study 2 finding with a design that makes no reference to team identity strength. Specifically, in the presence of a salient professional identity, upward communication is significantly higher for co‐located relative to distributed team auditors. Study 4, an experiment with 69 staff auditors, focuses solely on distributed teams. It indicates that several distributed team management practices, including one‐on‐one and standing daily meetings, encourage upward communication. Finally, Study 5, informal interviews with eight audit seniors, corroborates key survey and experimental findings. Combined, our results provide insights into why distributed team communication suffers, refine audit voice theory, and provide regulators, practitioners, and researchers with multiple paths to improve audit quality.