Two trade-offs arise in an agency relationship when the same accounting signal is used for both performance evaluation and investment evaluation. Using the signal for performance evaluation, (1) directly influences the informativeness of the signal for investment evaluation, (2) induces manipulation, which, in turn, lowers the informativeness of the signal for investment evaluation. The principal can increase her welfare by delegating the investment decision to the agent, setting up multiple control systems, or using the outcome of the investment for performance evaluation. We show the implications of using each alternative on incentive contracts, equilibrium effort, and manipulation levels.

The wisdom of crowds suggests that groups with more diversely informed individuals reach more informed decisions because their members are collectively more knowledgeable. I study this idea in the context of the market's response to earnings announcements by examining how information diversity across investors affects the efficiency of the price response to earnings news. I measure investors' information diversity based on their geographic dispersion, which I estimate using the locations of the requests for firms' filings to EDGAR. Greater geographic dispersion is associated with greater trading during the announcement period; this supports the use of geographic dispersion as a measure of information diversity. Consistent with my predictions, the price response to a firm's earnings news is more efficient when the firm's investors have greater information diversity. In further analysis, I find that the initial heightened trading for firms with more diversely informed investors subsides quickly after the announcement period.

I study whether the demand for monitoring explains the scope for renegotiation in private debt contracts. Theory suggests that renegotiation trades off the benefits of enhanced monitoring with the costs of creditor intervention. Consistent with this tradeoff, I show that monitoring demand proxies bear a positive association with renegotiation intensity. In contrast, the costs of creditor intervention are associated with less frequent renegotiations. I also find that contractual monitoring mechanisms, such as covenants and concentrated syndicate structures, are positively related to renegotiation intensity. Furthermore, renegotiations transmit new information to the market, in line with private creditors discovering information during renegotiations.

One key challenge for the short selling literature is to identify the incremental contribution of various measures of short sale constraints. Although variables such as loan fee, loan supply and short interest are determined simultaneously in the market for borrowing stock, new incremental information may be found in each variable examined. Papers such as Beneish et al. (2015) attempt to disentangle the effect of one particular variable, and attempt to shed light on the parallel challenge faced by investors in determining which variables will make the most impact on returns as well as trading costs. We discuss a number of practical approaches to this challenge, and we also consider a potentially new take that considers accounting-data-driven anomalies as one of the possible exogenously determined variables in the equilibrium of the equity loan market.

Although managers’ green investments have no impact on future cash flows in our experimental markets, investors respond favorably when managers make and disclose an investment and highlight the societal benefits rather than the cost to the company. Managers anticipate investors’ reaction and therefore often disclose their investment and the associated societal benefits. Managers and other shareholders benefit from investors’ reaction, but the investment cost always exceeds this benefit, demonstrating that managers make green investments because they value the societal benefits. Collectively, our findings show that both investors and managers tradeoff wealth for societal benefits and help explain managers’ corporate social responsibilty disclosures.

This study examines the stock market reaction to the unprecedented leaks of confidential advance tax rulings between Luxembourg and multinational corporations—also known as the “LuxLeaks.” Contrary to the negative market reaction to tax shelter news documented in prior research, we find that investors responded positively to these leaks. This reaction is concentrated among U.S. firms. Furthermore, we document a positive association between abnormal returns and the reduction in firms' tax uncertainty, consistent with a downward revision in investors' perception of the tax uncertainty associated with the firms' Luxembourg operations. We also investigate other firm characteristics and find that, among U.S. firms, investors' reaction is weaker for those over-invested in tax avoidance. Among non-U.S. firms, the market response is muted by concerns about the quality of governance. In summary, our results suggest that investors' reaction to tax shelter news is conditional on their reassessment of the firms' tax uncertainty.

Do accruals-based earnings provide better information about future operating cash flows than do operating cash flows themselves, as predicted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's conceptual framework (FASB, 1978)? While this is a foundational issue in accounting, because it addresses the information added by accrual accounting methods, testing it remains unsettled. We show that when comparing the predictive ability of operating cash flows with that of an equivalent earnings measure calculated on an accrual basis, earnings outperform operating cash flows. The result becomes more pronounced when allowance is made for cross-sectional differences in the relation between firms' earnings and future cash flows. In fact, even “bottom line” earnings then have similar explanatory power as operating cash flows.

A CEO's short horizon and associated myopic actions are typically viewed as detrimental to the firm. In contrast, studying a voluntary disclosure model wherein capital market and product market strategic considerations are in play, we show that the CEO's myopic behavior can improve a firm's long-term value. In particular, the disclosures of a long-horizon CEO are seen as being entirely focused on the firm's interests and thus as being exploitative of customers. A short-horizon CEO myopically focused on short-term stock price is less aligned with the firm and, consequently, her disclosures are more customer friendly. As a corollary, when no disclosure is forthcoming, customers are less skeptical that the myopic CEO is withholding information to exploit them. This improves customers' willingness to pay with a myopic CEO, leading to higher firm profitability. The paper also layers in compensation design to derive the optimal degree of managerial short-term focus to induce.

We examine the factors underlying the presence of earnings announcement premia. We find that the premia persist beyond the sample period examined in prior studies (ending in 1988), although they decline in magnitude after 1988. Further, premia are lower on the expected than the actual earnings announcement dates. We document that increases in voluntary disclosures result in lower premia, despite the increase in return volatility over time. Finally, our evidence suggests that the premia are not completely eliminated because of the costs of arbitrage.