We show that inflation risk is priced in international asset returns. We analyze inflation risk in a framework that encompasses the International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) of Adler and Dumas (1983). In contrast to the extant empirical literature on the ICAPM, we relax the assumption that inflation rates are constant. We estimate and test a conditional version of the model for the G5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US) over the period 1975–1998 and find evidence of statistically and economically significant prices of inflation risk (in addition to priced nominal exchange rate risk). Our results imply a rejection of the restrictions imposed by the ICAPM. In an extension of our analysis to 2003, we show that even after the termination of nominal exchange rate fluctuations in the euro area in 1999, differences in inflation rates across countries entail non-trivial real exchange rate risk premia.

I estimate the extent to which mutual fund portfolio trading of securities is triggered by investor flows into and out of the funds, and find that this liquidity-induced portfolio trading activity is smaller than previously estimated by Edelen (1999). I obtain estimates from a much larger and broader sample of funds than Edelen’s (1999) sample. Portfolio managers of international funds trade a smaller fraction of investor flow than do those of domestic funds. Index funds invest a larger fraction. A funds’ usage of futures contracts does not have a statistically significant effect on how it trades in response to investor flows, but the unpredictability of investor flow weakly affects the trading response to flow.

With the advent of the new Basel Capital Accord, banking organizations are invited to estimate credit risk capital requirements using an internal ratings based approach. In order to be compliant with this approach, institutions must estimate the loss-given-default, the fraction of the credit exposure that is lost if the borrower defaults. This study evaluates the ability of a parametric fractional response regression and a nonparametric regression tree model to forecast bank loan credit losses. The out-of-sample predictive ability of these models is evaluated at several recovery horizons after the default event. The out-of-time predictive ability is also estimated for a recovery horizon of 1 year. The performance of the models is benchmarked against recovery estimates given by historical averages. The results suggest that regression trees are an interesting alternative to parametric models in modeling and forecasting loss-given-default.

We decompose realized market returns into expected return, unexpected cash-flow news and unexpected discount rate news to test the relation between aggregate market returns and aggregate insider trading. We find that (1) the predictive ability of aggregate insider trading is much stronger than what was reported in earlier studies, (2) aggregate insider trading is strongly related to unexpected cash-flow news, (3) market expectations do not cause insider trading contrary to what others have documented, and (4) aggregate insider trading in firms with high information uncertainty is more likely to be associated with contrarian investment strategy. These results strongly suggest that the predictive ability of aggregate insider trading is because of insider’s ability to predict future cash-flow news rather than from adopting a contrarian investment strategy. These results hold even after we control for non-informative trades and information uncertainty.

Grouping does not produce a wide range of betas. Consequently, cross-sectional tests of the CAPM are bound to lack power. This paper provides a simple way to alleviate the problem by repackaging the data with zero-weight portfolios. When the CAPM is true and the data are repackaged, simulation shows that the average values of the intercept and slope converge to their true values more rapidly and there are striking increases in R2 and the power of the tests. Empirical results are dramatically different in datasets with and without the zero-weight portfolios.

This paper addresses two questions related to the ongoing consolidation of the US banking industry and its effect on small firm financing. First, are conventional measures of market structure (e.g. geographic market size and deposit concentration) related to bank competition for small firm financial business? Second, does an increase in bank competition produce an improvement in bank services irrespective of market structure? To answer these questions we use a survey of small firm owners that asks them to report on changes in bank competition for their business. Our findings show that reports of increased competition by small firm owners are negatively related to the level of and change in deposit concentration. In addition, we find a significant positive association between changes in bank competition reported by small firms and their reports of changes in banking outcomes (e.g. service quality) that is independent of deposit concentration, firm risk, and credit usage.

This paper analyses the UK interest rate term structure over the period since October 1992, when the United Kingdom adopted an explicit inflation target, using an affine term structure model estimated using both government bond yields and survey data. The model imposes no-arbitrage restrictions across nominal and real yields, which enables interest rates to be decomposed into expected real policy rates, expected inflation, real term premia and inflation risk premia. The model is used to shed light on major developments over the period, including the impact of Bank of England independence and the low real bond yield ‘conundrum’.

Regulatory separation theory indicates that a system with multiple regulators leads to less forbearance and limits producer gains while a model of banking regulation developed by Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) predicts the opposite. Fragmented regulation of the US life insurance industry provides an especially rich environment for testing the effects of regulatory competition. We find positive relations between regulatory competition and profitability measures for this industry, which is consistent with the Dell’Ariccia and Marquez model. Our results have practical implications for the debate over federal versus state regulation of insurance and financial services in the US.

This paper takes an option-theoretic approach to explain why pricing anomalies are observed when traditional CAPM is used. By extending CAPM to incorporate the option-risk factor of stocks, we show that stockholders’ limited liability can explain Fama and French’s size and value effects. We use bonds’ excess credit spread as a proxy for stocks’ default risk to control for the changing non-diversifiable option-risk characteristic of stocks. Because sensitivity to the excess credit spread becomes smaller as size increases and as value decreases, excess credit spread explains the CAPM anomalies in a fashion similar to the Fama–French factors. While the excess credit spread is significant in explaining Fama and French’s size and value effects, adding the Fama–French factors does not improve the performance of our model. Our revised model resembles conditional CAPM, but it offers a more intuitive explanation for the size and value effects.

This paper investigates economies of scope in the US insurance industry over the period 1993–2006. We test the conglomeration hypothesis, which holds that firms can optimize by diversifying across businesses, versus the strategic focus hypothesis, which holds that firms optimize by focusing on core businesses. We analyze whether it is advantageous for insurers to offer both life-health and property-liability insurance or to specialize in one major industry segment. We estimate cost, revenue, and profit efficiency utilizing data envelopment analysis (DEA) and test for scope economies by regressing efficiency scores on control variables and an indicator for strategic focus. Property-liability insurers realize cost scope economies, but they are more than offset by revenue scope diseconomies. Life-health insurers realize both cost and revenue scope diseconomies. Hence, strategic focus is superior to conglomeration in the insurance industry.