Beginning with Banz (1981), I review 30years of research on the size effect in equity returns. Since Fama and French (1992), there has been a vigorous, ongoing debate on whether the size premium is a compensation for systematic risk. Since the late 1990s, research on the size effect has been characterized by two developments that are seemingly contradictory. At last, theoretical models have emerged in which the size effect arises endogenously as a result of systematic risk. However, recent empirical studies assert that the size effect has disappeared after the early 1980s. In this review, I address this disconnect between recent theoretical and empirical research.

We examine the role played by the parent’s motive in undertaking a carve-out; the parent’s post-IPO influence over the carved-out subsidiary; and anti-takeover provisions and industry structure of a carve-out on its acquisition likelihood and its acquisition premium. We find that the probability and hazard of a carve-out acquisition increase when the parent’s objective is to unlock the value of a subsidiary and when the parent and the subsidiary are tied with a product-market relationship. We also find that the post-IPO parent ownership significantly affects the acquisition likelihood and the level of acquisition premium. Additional analyses examining the post-IPO carve-out status suggest that the product-market relationship and post-IPO parent ownership increase the probability of re-acquisition.

We propose a citation-based framework for the assessment of journal influence and demonstrate its application with the Journal of Banking and Finance. The framework assesses the current position of the journal, its trends and the reasons behind the trends. The Journal of Banking and Finance is found to be one of the leading journals in the field of finance and its influence is increasing. In fact, it appears to be part of a group of leading journals that is separating itself from the other journals that are generally regarded as peers. Finally, the Journal of Banking and Finance is found to be the only leading finance journal with a high concentration of banking articles, making it a primary outlet for influential articles in this area.

This study provides a comparative analysis of the long-run investment performance of founder and non-founder CEO led IPO firms in high and low technology environments. We find weak evidence of superior long-run investment performance on the part of founder CEO led IPO firms, since the significance of the results are sensitive to choice of benchmark, portfolio weighting method, and factor regression model. However, in the context of high technology IPO firms, we find consistent evidence to indicate that founder CEO led firms provide significantly higher long-run returns relative to non-founder CEO led firms. Our results suggest that the unique nature of founder CEO leadership is particularly beneficial to IPO firms in high technology environments.

We examine whether firms utilize governance systems and increased monitoring mechanisms when information asymmetry and managerial discretion are limited. Given that such monitoring is costly, we expect regulated firms to use less monitoring if regulation substitutes for governance. Using data from initial public offerings, we document that regulated firms have greater proportions of monitoring directors and larger boards as well as use similar amounts of equity-based compensation as non-regulated firms. Further, regulated and unregulated firms are analogous in terms of observed trade-offs between traditional monitoring mechanisms and insider ownership. Finally, regulated firms appear to decrease monitoring following a period of deregulation. These findings support the hypothesis that regulation and governance are complements and are consistent with the notion that regulators pressure firms to adopt effective monitoring structures.

We examine the effect on expected flotation costs of including co-managers in the underwriting syndicate. We consider five components of SEO flotation costs: announcement returns, underpricing, the probability of withdrawals, offering delays, and underwriting spreads. The results show that the characteristics of co-managers participating in syndicates have significant effects on flotation costs, while the effect of the number of co-managers is largely insignificant. Our results are consistent with the notion that highly reputable underwriters and commercial banks serving as co-managers serve a certification role, reducing information asymmetries and, as a result, lowering SEO flotation costs.

Cross hedging price risk in an incomplete financial market creates basis risk. We propose a new way of modeling basis risk where price risk and basis risk are combined in a multiplicative way. Under this specification, positive prudence is a necessary and sufficient condition for underhedging in an unbiased market. Using the example of cross hedging jet fuel price risk with crude oil futures, we show that the new specification is superior in describing the price series and that optimal cross hedges differ significantly from those derived under the traditional additive cross hedging model.

This paper analyzes the productivity and efficiency of Shinkin banks and the various prefectures in Japan, over the period from 2000 to 2006. We obtain estimates of efficiency growth and productivity growth, using the bootstrapped Malmquist index, and estimates of efficiency using the Bayesian distance frontier approach. We confirm that the efficiency growth and productivity growth of Shinkin banks did not improve significantly over the period of this study. In addition, we show that the efficiency of Shinkin banks is homogenous, with little variation across the banks analyzed. Methodologically, we also prove that a failure to impose theoretical regularity on the distance function could lead to false conclusions about the average efficiency or efficiency ranking of Shinkin banks. The study also includes an analysis of the correlates of productivity and efficiency growth, and provides efficiency and productivity estimates of the prefectures in which the banks are located.

The Australian banking system emerged from the global crisis virtually unhurt, with most banks still profitable, adequately capitalized, and with AA credit ratings. Are there any risks or vulnerabilities in this success story? This paper analyzes Australia’s systemic banking risk and attempts to determine if this risk increased with the recent global crisis and whether this risk is related to the downturn experienced in the real estate market. We use extreme value theory to measure banks’ and property firms’ univariate Value at Risk, as well as multivariate intra-sector and inter-sector contagion risks. Of the 13 sectors analyzed, we find that the property sector exhibits the highest level of extremal dependence with the banking sector. The credit crisis significantly increased the probability of a bank or property firm crashing. Moreover, contagion risks significantly increased not only within the banking and property sectors, but also between those sectors.

This study examines how the introduction of deposit insurance affects depositors and banks, using the deposit-insurance scheme introduced into the Russian banking system as a natural experiment. The fundamental research question is whether the introduction of deposit insurance leads to a more effective banking system as evidenced by increased deposit-taking and decreased reliance upon State-owned banks as custodians of retail deposits. We find that banks entering the new deposit-insurance system increase both their level of retail deposits and their ratios of retail deposits to total assets relative to banks that do not enter the new deposit insurance system. These results hold up in a multivariate panel-data analysis that controls for bank- and time-random effects. The longer a bank has been entered into the deposit insurance system, the greater is its level of deposits and its ratio of deposits to assets. Moreover, this effect is stronger for regional banks and for smaller banks. We also find that implementation of the new deposit-insurance system has the effect of “leveling the playing field” between State-owned banks and privately owned banks. Finally, we find strong evidence of moral hazard following implementation of deposit insurance in the form of increased bank risk-taking. Financial risk and, to a lesser degree, operating risk increase following implementation.