Knowledge that Transforms

Because products are rarely described completely, consumers often form inferences that go beyond the information given. We review research on the processes, bases, and the judgment contexts in which inferences are formed. The most basic processes are induction (inferences from specific instances to general principles) versus deduction (inferences from general principles to specific instances). Stimulus‐based inferences are formed on‐line (as information is encountered) using situationally available information, whereas memory‐based (or theory‐based) inferences are formed using prior knowledge and experience. Inferences can pertain to a single product judged in isolation (a singular judgment context) or to multiple products considered in relation to one another (a comparative judgment context). This 2x2x2 (Induction vs. Deduction x Stimulus‐Based vs. Memory‐Based x Singular vs. Comparative Judgment) theoretical framework suggests that there are 8 different types of inferences that consumers may form. Based on this framework, we identify gaps in the literature and suggest directions for future research.

We investigate how consumers manage stressful emotional experiences in purchase‐related situations. Eight coping strategies that consumers may use to deal with stressful incidents are distinguished and hypotheses are formulated about which coping strategies are linked to each of four different negative emotions (anger, disappointment, regret, and worry). The findings indicate that distinct strategies are employed by consumers to cope with different emotions, or the problem that caused these emotions, and that the emotion‐coping relations are generalizable across two samples of respondents.

This article discusses the need for more satisfactory implicit measures in consumer psychology and assesses the theoretical foundations, validity, and value of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) as a measure of implicit consumer social cognition. Study 1 demonstrates the IAT's sensitivity to explicit individual differences in brand attitudes, ownership, and usage frequency, and shows their correlations with lAT‐based measures of implicit brand attitudes and brand relationship strength. In Study 2, the contrast between explicit and implicit measures of attitude toward the ad for sportswear advertisements portraying African American (Black) and European American (White) athlete–spokespersons revealed different patterns of responses to explicit and implicit measures in Black and White respondents. These were explained in terms of self‐presentation biases and system justification theory. Overall, the results demonstrate that the IAT enhances our understanding of consumer responses, particularly when consumers are either unable or unwilling to identify the sources of influence on their behaviors or opinions.

The contribution of the feelings‐as‐information hypothesis to our understanding of the role of affect in judgment and decision making is discussed. Basic principles and regularities in how affective feelings guide judgments and decisions are then identified. Based on these principles and regularities, it is argued that the role of feelings in judgment and decision making may be more adaptive than has been assumed in most academic circles. This adaptivity transpires (a) in the variety of goal‐relevant signals that feelings convey, (b) the flexibility with which feelings are interpreted, (c) the judgmental properties of feelings, and (d) the selectivity with which feelings are invoked. It is speculated that affective feelings may tap into a separate system of judgment and decision making with its unique strengths and weaknesses.

Human reasoning is accompanied by metacognitive experiences, most notably the ease or difficulty of recall and thought generation and the fluency with which new information can be processed. These experiences are informative in their own right. They can serve as a basis of judgment in addition to, or at the expense of, declarative information and can qualify the conclusions drawn from recalled content. What exactly people conclude from a given metacognitive experience depends on the naive theory of mental processes they bring to bear, rendering the outcomes highly variable. The obtained judgments cannot be predicted on the basis of accessible declarative information alone; we cannot understand human judgment without taking into account the interplay of declarative and experiential information.