Before the IPO bubble burst, the first day return for IPOs backed by top VC firms was double that of non-top VC IPOs. Top VC IPOs were also twice as likely to receive all-star analyst coverage and suffered twice as large negative returns upon lockup expiration. We argue that this was not a coincidence. Underwriters benefited from underpricing vis-à-vis allocation strategies whereas VCs gain from information momentum which allows them to cash-out at higher prices at lockup expiration. All-stars are a scarce resource underwriters allocate to their best clients (top VCs) who bring them repeat business. Post-bubble, regulatory shocks restricted preferential IPO allocations and reduced the value of all-star coverage. Consequently, these relations disappeared indicating that regulatory changes likely had the desired effect.

When do multinational corporations (MNCs) derive the most from internalizing the transfer of proprietary technological knowhow? We revisit this question, which lies at the core of theories on multinationality and performance, from the perspective of corporate strategy involving a mix of green versus nongreen innovation effort and foreign operations focusing on countries with high versus low environmental standards. We find that high exposure to foreign markets with more stringent environmental regulations stimulates MNCs' green patent applications. Predictably, the pursuit of green innovation is positively associated with firm value in the long run. This long-run advantage produces higher economic rents when MNCs' home countries rely on more clean energy for power generation, have a more developed economy and have a more effective government. We further show that this long-run value enhancement effect is more pronounced in Mining & Oil and energy sectors (i.e., more polluting) than sales and service sectors (i.e., less polluting). In addition, MNCs' environmental competitive advantage obtained through green innovation activities is coupled with exposure to MNCs' host countries with high long-term and femininity orientations. Overall, our study highlights that green technology development is a main source of value creation for multinationals.

This paper examines the effect of local religiosity on employee treatment, proxied by workplace safety incidents. Using the establishment-level data compiling on the incidents of work-related injuries, we find that employees of the establishments in more religious counties get less injured than those in less religious counties. We further find that a reduction in occupational accidents is more evident for establishments in counties dominated by one religious denomination, strengthening our argument on community solidarity and homophily stemming from religious networks. Firms whose establishments are located in high religiosity counties are less likely to violate workplace conduct and more likely to take workplace safety measures. Moreover, firms with more work-related injuries exhibit poorer firm performance. Overall, our findings suggest that local religiosity has a value implication through human capital protection.

This paper studies the drivers behind the monitoring effectiveness of institutional investors in curbing earnings management in an international setting. We identify three distinct drivers and propose two competing hypotheses: the hometown advantage hypothesis predicts that because of proximity to monitoring information, domestic institutions have a comparative advantage over foreign institutions in deterring earnings management, whereas the global investor hypothesis predicts that foreign institutions have a comparative advantage because of their proclivity toward activism and ability to deploy superior monitoring technologies. Consistent with the hometown advantage hypothesis, in aggregate, domestic, but not foreign, institutional ownership is associated with less earnings management; the monitoring effectiveness of foreign institutions improves as they gain proximity to monitoring information. Consistent with the global investor hypothesis, the monitoring effectiveness of foreign institutions improves in environments of greater agency conflicts or weaker governance controls or when the gap in monitoring technology between foreign and domestic institutions widens.