Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate how the introduction of market-based pricing, the practice of tying loan interest rates to credit default swaps, has affected bank financing. We find that market-based pricing is associated with lower interest rates, both at origination and during the life of the loan. Our results also indicate that banks simplify the covenant structure of market-based pricing loans, suggesting that the decline in the cost of bank debt is explained, at least in part, by a reduction in monitoring costs. Market-based pricing, therefore, besides reducing the cost of bank debt, may also have adverse consequences resulting from the decline in bank monitoring.

Contrary to existing theory, even in perfect markets (with symmetric information, no taxes, and competitive, transaction costless capital markets) callable debt can induce investment incentives that are inferior (as well as superior) to those induced by non-callable debt, the outcome depending on cash flow and interest rate distributions. We derive necessary conditions for callable debt to induce inferior investment decisions, and define the “Call-Default Condition” as the cash flow distortion where calling prevents default that would have occurred with non-callable debt. These results complicate the argument that investment incentives explain the presence of the call provision in debt contracts.

A long regulative process exists between the initial announcement and execution of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in China. Although the initial announcement of an SEO is associated with a significant reduction in the stock price, the regulator (China Securities Regulatory Commission) finally approves it after a significant run up in the price of the stock. Chinese managers execute SEOs after additional stock price increases. As a result, the stock price at issuance is not significantly different from the price on announcement, and is significantly higher than the price three months before the announcement. We also find stock prices decline following the execution. These results suggest that regulative screenings for market stabilization are beneficial for SEO market timing, and that Chinese managers successfully time the market, even with a prolonged regulative process.

Equity offerings are usually characterized by large information asymmetries between issuers and investors. Using a sample of repeat equity issues, I examine whether investors form beliefs of corporate intentions based on the outcomes of past offerings by the same firm. I document a robust negative relationship between post-issue returns and underpricing in a follow-on offering. The evidence is most consistent with the idea that market feedback influences investor beliefs of a firm's investment opportunities in a subsequent offering. Feedback is particularly important when it contains information about investment opportunities that managers do not possess. The results also provide insights into the impact of market feedback on the cost of issuing further equity.

Debt-financed share buybacks generate positive short-term and long-run abnormal stock returns. Leveraged buyback firms have more debt capacity, higher marginal tax rate, lower excess cash and lower growth prospects ex ante, increase leverage and reduce investments more sharply ex post than cash-financed buyback firms. Firms that are over-levered ex-ante are associated with lower returns and real investments following leveraged buybacks. The lower announcement returns of over-levered firms are concentrated on firms with weaker corporate governance. The evidence is consistent with leveraged buybacks enabling firms to optimize their leverage, on average benefiting shareholders. The benefits decrease with a firm's leverage ex ante.

The economic impact of corporate self-dealing and the regulation against such activity both vary across countries. In this work, we examine the influence of trust on shareholder protection. We hypothesize that anonymous trust can affect self-dealing through two channels. First, trust may complement existing formal regulation. Alternatively, trust and formal regulation can act as substitutes. To test these hypotheses, we examine the association between a country's anti-self-dealing index and anonymous trust. We find that anonymous trust inversely relates to formal self-dealing regulation. We further find that anonymous trust positively relates to financial market development. Collectively, this evidence suggests that trust substitutes for formal self-dealing regulation, providing an alternative mechanism for shareholder protection.

This paper exploits shocks to the value of real estate collateral to study how exogenous changes in firms' external financing capacity affect their competitive performance and industry dynamics. Firms with appreciating collateral tend to gain market share relative to their product market rivals. Shocks to collateral lead to less competitive product markets. The effects of collateral are stronger in markets where firms compete in strategic substitutes or face competitors with restricted access to external financing, and when real estate prices are instrumented with the interaction between housing supply constraints and mortgage rates. These results highlight the strategic importance of collateral.

Recent U.S. policy encourages anchor investments to facilitate initial public offerings (IPOs) and increase companies' access to external finance. As access to external funds relies on stocks remaining listed, we study anchor investors' impact on how long IPOs stay listed. We examine two types of anchor investors in Hong Kong: strategic and cornerstone investors, that are similar to U.S. anchor investors, but show varying levels of commitment to the IPO. We find that IPOs backed by more committed investors, with longer post-IPO commitments (lockups), stay listed longer. This suggests that the success of U.S. policies may require investors' commitment.

Prior research shows that companies repurchase stock during quarters with low returns, presumably because the stock is undervalued. We focus on repurchase increases and investigate another motive: Are repurchases increased to provide price support for a stock that, despite recent low returns, remains overvalued? Using an increase in short selling to indicate overvaluation, we regress quarterly changes in share repurchases on quarterly changes in short interest. Consistent with price support, the association is positive and statistically significant each year from 2003 to 2014. We find that the price support quarter is followed by a sharp multi-quarter decline in ROA (return on assets), but the corresponding decline in EPS (earnings per share) is modest due to the reduction in outstanding shares. Abnormal returns after the price support quarter are positive, indicating that price support is effective. We also examine trading by insiders. While insiders generally sell when shorts sell, they hold onto shares during the price support quarter. This indicates that insiders are confident that they can maintain the current stock price.

Why do the reported effects of privatization on firm performance vary so much? This paper provides new estimates of these effects and tests potential explanations for heterogeneity using comprehensive, long-panel data for 70,000 firms in five East European economies. We estimate that privatization raises measures of profitability, productivity, and growth by about 5–12% on average, but with substantial variation across countries and time periods. Analyzing heterogeneity in privatization effectiveness, we find little systematic role for firm size, financial dependence, exchange listing, or technological complexity, but important variation by fraction privatized, ownership concentration, firm quality, and the macroeconomic and institutional environment.