Luck, skill and labor markets all have empirical support as determinants of managerial compensation. We examine the relative importance of pay for luck, managerial skill and labor market opportunities in determining compensation. We measure luck as the predictable component of firm performance, measure skill using managerial fixed effects and measure labor market opportunities as the compensation of executives at matched firms. Our results imply that managerial skill is the most important determinant of managers' compensation, followed by firm size and labor market opportunities, and that luck is not an important determinant of managerial compensation.

Pending changes in lease accounting standards will require firms to recognize obligations that have historically been kept off-balance-sheet (OBS). We examine the implications of this accounting treatment for a host of common risk and performance metrics. Conventional leverage, Z-Score, levered beta, return on capital and other asset utilization measures underestimate risk and overstate performance of firms relying heavily on OBS leasing. The distortion affects relative rankings as well as average levels and has increased over time. Proposed changes in reporting standards aim to mitigate future distortion, but necessitate adjustments for time-series comparisons. Under current reporting standards, investors, analysts, and researchers can estimate leased asset value and adjust accounting-based metrics to better reflect these fixed costs.

Using the executive stock option (ESO) backdating scandal as a backdrop, this paper examines whether compensation committees can effectively set executive compensation contracts in the presence of a founding CEO. Analyzing a sample of firms accused of backdating ESO grant dates and a control sample of non-backdating firms, we find evidence suggesting that managerial power influences the decision to backdate. Specifically, our analysis indicates the presence of a founder CEO increases the likelihood that ESOs are backdated by 22%. We further find that founder-led firms strongly underperform a matched sample of non-backdating firms. This finding contrasts a number of studies that document superior operating and stock return performance for founder-led firms.