Knowledge that Transforms

Previous authors have raised the concern that there could be serious survival bias in the observed U.S. equity premium. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we argue that the survival bias in the U.S. data is unlikely to be significant. To reach this conclusion, we introduce a general framework for modeling survival and derive a mathematical relationship between the ex ante survival probability and the average survival bias. This relationship reveals the fundamental difficulty facing the survival argument: High survival bias requires an ex ante probability of market failure, which seems unrealistically high given the history of world financial markets.

We study the effects of alternative halt and reopening procedures on prices, transaction costs, and trading activity for a sample of news‐related trading halts on Nasdaq. For intraday halts that reopen after only a five‐minute quotation period, inside quoted spreads more than double following halts and volatility increases to more than nine times normal levels. In contrast, halts that reopen the following day with a longer 90‐minute quotation period are associated with insignificant spread effects and significantly dampened volatility effects. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that increased information transmission during the halt results in reduced posthalt uncertainty.

We develop a term structure model where the short interest rate and the market price of risks are subject to discrete regime shifts. Empirical evidence from efficient method of moments estimation provides considerable support for the regime shifts model. Standard models, which include affine specifications with up to three factors, are sharply rejected in the data. Our diagnostics show that only the regime shifts model can account for the well‐documented violations of the expectations hypothesis, the observed conditional volatility, and the conditional correlation across yields. We find that regimes are intimately related to business cycles.

Personal projects, such as a private business or the purchase of a home, influence individuals portfolio choice. We conduct a theoretical analysis of this influence when financial assets are required to provide liquidity to personal projects. Due to this liquidity consideration, individuals behave in a more riskaverse fashion when there is a large penalty for discontinuing or underinvesting in the final stages of the projects. In addition, using data from the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances, we find that households that are saving to invest in their own businesses or in their own homes indeed have significantly safer financial portfolios.

This paper compares the quality of quotes submitted by electronic communication networks (ECNs) and by traditional market makers to the Nasdaq quote montage. An analysis of the most active Nasdaq stocks shows that ECNs not only post informative quotes, but also, compared to market makers, ECNs post quotes rapidly and are more often at the inside. Additionally, ECN quoted spreads are smaller than dealer quoted spreads. The evidence suggests that the proliferation of alternative trading venues, such as ECNs, may promote quote quality rather than fragmenting markets. Moreover, the results suggest that a more open book contributes to quote quality.

In recent years, the trading accounts at large commercial banks have grown substantially and become progressively more diverse and complex. We provide descriptive statistics on the trading revenues from such activities and on the associated Value‐at‐Risk (VaR) forecasts internally estimated by banks. For a sample of large bank holding companies, we evaluate the performance of banks trading risk models by examining the statistical accuracy of the VaR forecasts. Although a substantial literature has examined the statistical and economic meaning of Value‐at‐Risk models, this article is the first to provide a detailed analysis of the performance of models actually in use.

Using plant‐level observations from the Longitudinal Research Database I show that conglomerates are more productive than stand‐alone firms at a given point in time. Dynamically, however, firms that diversify experience a net reduction in productivity. While the acquired plants increase productivity, incumbent plants suffer. Moreover, stock prices track firm productivity and this tracking is equally strong for diversified and stand‐alone firms. Therefore, lower transparency of conglomerates is unlikely to explain the discrepancy between productivity and stock prices on average. Finally, I offer some evidence that this discrepancy may arise because conglomerates dissipate rents in the form of higher wages.

I use a vector autoregressive model (VAR) to decompose an individual firm's stock return into two components: changes in cash‐flow expectations (i.e., cash‐flow news) and changes in discount rates (i.e., expected‐return news). The VAR yields three main results. First, firm‐level stock returns are mainly driven by cash‐flow news. For a typical stock, the variance of cash‐flow news is more than twice that of expected‐return news. Second, shocks to expected returns and cash flows are positively correlated for a typical small stock. Third, expected‐return‐news series are highly correlated across firms, while cash‐flow news can largely be diversified away in aggregate portfolios.

We document the equity trading practices of approximately 1,200 institutions from the third quarter of 1987 through the third quarter of 1995. We decompose trading by institutions into the initiation of new positions (entry), the termination of previous positions (exit), and adjustments to ongoing holdings. Institutions act as momentum traders when they enter stocks but as contrarian traders when they exit or make adjustments to ongoing holdings. We find significant differences in trading practices among different types of institutions.

We present evidence that fund managers inflate quarter‐end portfolio prices with last‐minute purchases of stocks already held. The magnitude of price inflation ranges from 0.5 percent per year for large‐cap funds to well over 2 percent for small‐cap funds. We find that the cross section of inflation matches the cross section of incentives from the flow/performance relation, that a surge of trading in the quarter's last minutes coincides with a surge in equity prices, and that the inflation is greatest for the stocks held by funds with the most incentive to inflate, controlling for the stocks' size and performance.