Knowledge that Transforms

This paper concludes the connotation and the extension of monetary policy ,on the basis of these,research the particularity to the tools?middle-targets?conduction and the interference of China.Especially,this paper gives a demonstrable research on Chinese practice with mathematical statistics model.

ABSTRACT This paper proposes and tests a quadratic‐loos utility function for modeling corporate earnings forecasting, where financial analysts trade off bias to improve management access and forecast accuracy. Optimal forecasts with minimum expected error are optimistically biased and exhibit predictable cross‐sectional variation related to analyst and company characteristics. Empirical evidence from individual analyst forecasts is consistent with the model's predictions. These results suggest that positive and predictable bias may be a rational property of optimal earnings forecasts. Prior studies using classical notions of unbiasedness may have prematurely dismissed analysts' forecasts as being irrational or inaccurate.

ABSTRACT Most structural models of default preclude the firm from altering its capital structure. In practice, firms adjust outstanding debt levels in response to changes in firm value, thus generating mean‐reverting leverage ratios. We propose a structural model of default with stochastic interest rates that captures this mean reversion. Our model generates credit spreads that are larger for low‐leverage firms, and less sensitive to changes in firm value, both of which are more consistent with empirical findings than predictions of extant models. Further, the term structure of credit spreads can be upward sloping for speculative‐grade debt, consistent with recent empirical findings.

ABSTRACT Investors in hedge funds and commodity trading advisors (CTAs) are concerned with risk as well as return. We investigate the volatility of hedge funds and CTAs in light of managerial career concerns. We find an association between past performance and risk levels consistent with previous findings for mutual fund managers. Variance shifts depend upon relative rather than absolute fund performance. The importance of relative rankings points to the importance of reputation costs in the investment industry. Our analysis of factors contributing to fund disappearance shows that survival depends on absolute and relative performance, excess volatility, and on fund age.

We study the properties of unconditional minimum‐variance portfolios in the presence of conditioning information. Such portfolios attain the smallest variance for a given mean among all possible portfolios formed using the conditioning information. We provide explicit solutions for n risky assets, either with or without a riskless asset. Our solutions provide insights into portfolio management problems and issues in conditional asset pricing.

ABSTRACT We report evidence on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover during the 1971 to 1994 period. We find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has changed over time. The frequencies of forced CEO turnover and outside succession both increased. However, the relation between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and firm performance did not change significantly from the beginning to the end of the period we examine, despite substantial changes in internal governance mechanisms. The evidence also indicates that changes in the intensity of the takeover market are not associated with changes in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.

This paper empirically investigates two issues largely unexplored by the literature on market discipline. We evaluate the interaction between market discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market discipline. We focus on the experiences of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s. We find that depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates. Deposit insurance does not appear to diminish the extent of market discipline. Aggregate shocks affect deposits and interest rates during crises, regardless of bank fundamentals, and investors' responsiveness to bank risk taking increases in the aftermath of crises.