Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT We examine the contribution of cross‐listings to price discovery for a sample of Canadian stocks listed on both the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) and a U.S. exchange. We find that prices on the TSE and U.S. exchange are cointegrated and mutually adjusting. The U.S. share of price discovery ranges from 0.2 percent to 98.2 percent, with an average of 38.1 percent. The U.S. share is directly related to the U.S. share of trading and to the ratio of proportions of informative trades on the U.S. exchange and the TSE, and inversely related to the ratio of bid‐ask spreads.

ABSTRACT We test whether the frequency of feedback information about the performance of an investment portfolio and the flexibility with which the investor can change the portfolio influence her risk attitude in markets. In line with the prediction of myopic loss aversion ( Benartzi and Thaler (1995) ), we find that more information and more flexibility result in less risk taking. Market prices of risky assets are significantly higher if feedback frequency and decision flexibility are reduced. This result supports the findings from individual decision making, and shows that market interactions do not eliminate such behavior or its consequences for prices.

The literature documents a convex relation between past returns and fund flows of mutual funds. We show this to be consistent with fund incentives, because funds discard exactly those strategies which underperform. Past returns tell less about the future performance of funds which discard, so flows are less sensitive to them when they are poor. Our model predicts that strategy changes only occur after bad performance, and that bad performers who change strategy have dollar flow and future performance that are less sensitive to current performance than those that do not. Empirical tests support both predictions.

ABSTRACT Numerous studies document long‐run underperformance by firms following equity offerings. This paper shows that underperformance is very likely to be observed ex‐post in an efficient market. The premise is that more firms issue equity at higher stock prices even though they cannot predict future returns. Ex‐post , issuers seem to time the market because offerings cluster at market peaks. Simulations based on 1973 through 1997 data reveal that when ex‐ante expected abnormal returns are zero, median ex‐post underperformance for equity issuers will be significantly negative in event‐time. Using calendar‐time returns solves the problem.

By the end of January 2001, all NYSE stocks had converted their price quotations from 1/8s and 1/16s to decimals. This study examines the effect of this change in price quotations on ex‐dividend day activity. We find that abnormal ex‐dividend day returns increase in the 1/16 and decimal pricing eras, relative to the 1/8 era, which is inconsistent with microstructure explanations of ex‐day price movements. We also find that abnormal returns increase in conjunction with a May 1997 reduction in the capital gains tax rate, as they should if relative taxation of dividends and capital gains affects ex‐day pricing.

This paper examines how information becomes reflected in prices when investment decisions are delegated to fund managers whose tenure may be shorter than the time it takes for their private information to become public. We consider a sequence of managers, where each subsequent manager inherits the portfolio of their predecessor. We show that the inherited portfolio distorts the subsequent manager's incentive to trade on long‐term information. This allows erroneous past information to persist, causing mispricing similar to a bubble. We investigate the magnitude of the mispricing. In addition, we examine endogenous information quality. In some cases, information quality increases when the manager's expected tenure decreases.

ABSTRACT We decompose the cross‐sectional variance of firms' book‐to‐market ratios using both a long U.S. panel and a shorter international panel. In contrast to typical aggregate time‐series results, transitory cross‐sectional variation in expected 15‐year stock returns causes only a relatively small fraction (20 to 25 percent) of the total cross‐sectional variance. The remaining dispersion can be explained by expected 15‐year profitability and persistence of valuation levels. Furthermore, this fraction appears stable across time and across types of stocks. We also show that the expected return on value‐minus‐growth strategies is atypically high at times when their spread in book‐to‐market ratios is wide.

This paper proposes a new simulation‐based approach for optimal portfolio allocation in realistic environments with complex dynamics for the state variables and large numbers of factors and assets. A first illustration involves a choice between equity and cash with nonlinear interest rate and market price of risk dynamics. Intertemporal hedging demands significantly increase the demand for stocks and exhibit low volatility. We then analyze settings where stock returns are also predicted by dividend yields and where investors have wealth‐dependent relative risk aversion. Large‐scale problems with many assets, including the Nasdaq, SP500, bonds, and cash, are also examined.

ABSTRACT Prior research has documented positive abnormal stock returns around the announcements of repurchase programs; several explanations of these returns have been suggested, including signaling, free cash flow, and wealth redistributions. This study analyzes abnormal stock, bond, and firm returns around repurchase announcements to examine these hypotheses. We find evidence consistent with both signaling and wealth redistribution. The loss to bondholders is a function of the size of the repurchase, and the risk of the firm's debt. We also find that bond ratings are twice as likely to be downgraded as upgraded after the announcement of the repurchase program.

We examine the impact of differing levels of pretrade transparency on the quotation behavior of Nasdaq market makers. We find that market makers are more likely to quote on odd ticks, and to actively narrow the spread, when they can do so anonymously by posting limit orders on Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs). From a public policy perspective, our findings suggest that making the level of pretrade transparency on Nasdaq more opaque by allowing anonymous quotes could improve price competition and narrow spreads further.