Knowledge that Transforms

Homeowners at risk of default face a debt overhang that reduces their incentive to invest in their property: in expectation, some value created by investments in the property will go to the lender. This agency conflict affects housing investments. Homeowners at risk of default cut back substantially on home improvements and mortgage principal payments, even when they appear financially unconstrained. Meanwhile, they do not reduce spending on assets that they may retain in default, including home appliances, furniture, and vehicles. These findings highlight an important financial friction that has stifled housing investment since the Great Recession.

Firm location affects firm risk through local factor prices. We find more procyclical factor prices such as wages and real estate prices in areas with more cyclical economies, namely, high “local beta” areas. While procyclical wages provide a natural hedge against aggregate shocks and reduce firm risk, procyclical prices of real estate, which are part of firm assets, increase firm risk. We confirm that firms located in higher local beta areas have lower industry‐adjusted returns and conditional betas, and show that the effect is stronger among firms with low real estate holdings. A production‐based equilibrium model explains these empirical findings.

We examine changes in the scope of the sell‐side analyst industry and whether these changes impact information dissemination and the quality of analysts’ reports. Our findings suggest that changes in the number of analysts covering an industry impact analyst competition and have significant spillover effects on other analysts’ forecast accuracy, bias, report informativeness, and effort. These spillover industry effects are incremental to the effects of firm level changes in analyst coverage. Overall, a more significant sell‐side analyst industry presence has positive externalities that can result in better functioning capital markets.

Using hand‐collected biographical information on financial analysts from 1983 to 2011, we find that analysts making forecasts on firms in industries related to their preanalyst experience have better forecast accuracy, evoke stronger market reactions to earning revisions, and are more likely to be named Institutional Investor all‐stars. Plausibly exogenous losses of analysts with related industry experience have real financial market implications—changes in firms’ information asymmetry and price reactions are significantly larger than those of other analysts. Overall, industry expertise acquired from preanalyst work experience is valuable to analysts, consistent with the emphasis placed on their industry knowledge by institutional investors.

We present evidence that restrictions to the set of feasible financial contracts affect buyer‐supplier relationships and the organizational form of the firm. We exploit a regulation that restricted the maturity of the trade credit contracts that a large retailer could sign with some of its small suppliers. Using a within‐product difference‐in‐differences identification strategy, we find that the restriction reduces the likelihood of trade by 11%. The retailer also responds by internalizing procurement to its own subsidiaries and reducing overall purchases. Finally, we find that relational contracts can mitigate the inability to extend long trade credit terms.

Why do negative credit events lead to long‐term borrowing constraints? Exploiting banking regulations in Peru and utilizing currency movements, we show that consumers who face a credit rating downgrade due to bad luck experience a three‐year reduction in financing. Consumers respond to the shock by paying down their most troubled loans, but nonetheless end up more likely to exit the credit market. For a set of borrowers who experience severe delinquency, we find that the associated credit reporting downgrade itself accounts for 25% to 65% of their observed decline in borrowing at various horizons over the following several years.

I relate the downward‐sloping term structure of currency carry returns to compensation for currency exposures to macroeconomic risk embedded in the joint dynamics of U.S. consumption, inflation, nominal interest rate, and their stochastic variance. The interest rate and inflation shocks play a prominent role. Higher yield currencies exhibit higher multiperiod exposures to these shocks. The prices of these risk exposures are positive and sizeable across all investment horizons. The interest rate shock is qualitatively similar to the long‐run risk of Bansal and Yaron.

I study the incentives of the collateral managers who selected securities for ABS CDOs—securitizations that figured prominently in the financial crisis. Specialized managers without other businesses that could suffer negative reputational consequences invested in low‐quality securities underwritten by the CDO's arranger. These securities performed significantly worse than observationally similar securities. Managers investing in these securities were rewarded with additional collateral management assignments. Diversified managers who did assemble CDOs suffered negative reputational consequences during the crisis: institutional investors withdrew from their mutual funds. Overall, the results are consistent with a quid pro quo between collateral managers and CDO underwriters.

We model fund turnover in the presence of time‐varying profit opportunities. Our model predicts a positive relation between an active fund's turnover and its subsequent benchmark‐adjusted return. We find such a relation for equity mutual funds. This time‐series relation between turnover and performance is stronger than the cross‐sectional relation, as the model predicts. Also as predicted, the turnover‐performance relation is stronger for funds trading less‐liquid stocks and funds likely to possess greater skill. Turnover is correlated across funds. The common component of turnover is positively correlated with proxies for stock mispricing. Turnover of similar funds helps predict a fund's performance.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, growth stocks (i.e., low book‐to‐market stocks) do not have substantially higher future cash‐flow growth rates than value stocks, in both rebalanced and buy‐and‐hold portfolios. Efficiency growth, survivorship and look‐back biases, and the rebalancing effect help explain the results. These findings suggest that duration alone is unlikely to explain the value premium.