Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT We solve the portfolio problem of a long‐run investor when the term structure is Gaussian and when the investor has access to nominal bonds and stock. We apply our method to a three‐factor model that captures the failure of the expectations hypothesis. We extend this model to account for time‐varying expected inflation, and estimate the model with both inflation and term structure data. The estimates imply that the bond portfolio of a long‐run investor looks very different from the portfolio of a mean‐variance optimizer. In particular, time‐varying term premia generate large hedging demands for long‐term bonds.

ABSTRACT While reformers have argued that multiple directorships for executives can destroy value, we investigate firms with executives that accept an outside directorship and find negative announcement returns only when the executive's firm has greater agency problems. When fewer agency concerns exist, additional directorships relate to increased firm value. Announcement returns are also higher when executives accept an outside directorship in a financial, high‐growth, or related‐industry firm. Our results suggest that outside directorships for executives can enhance firm value, which has important implications for firms employing executives nominated for outside boards and for policy recommendations restricting the number of directorships.

ABSTRACT Bloomfield and Hales (2002) find strong evidence that experimental market subjects are influenced by trends and patterns in a manner supportive of the shifting regimes model of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) . We subject the model to further empirical scrutiny using the football wagering market as our price laboratory. Sports betting markets have several advantages over traditional capital markets as an empirical setting, and commonalities with traditional markets allow for useful insights. We find scant evidence that investors behave in accordance with the model.

ABSTRACT Previous studies have found that the proportion of equity in total new debt and equity issues is negatively correlated with future equity market returns. Researchers have interpreted this finding as evidence that corporate managers are able to predict the systematic component of their stock returns and to issue equity when the market is overvalued. In this article we show that the predictive power of the share of equity in total new issues stems from pseudo‐market timing and not from any abnormal ability of managers to time the equity markets.

ABSTRACT Despite the dramatic reduction in explicit barriers to international investment activity over the last 60 years, the impact of financial globalization has been surprisingly limited. I argue that country attributes are still critical to financial decision‐making because of “twin agency problems” that arise because rulers of sovereign states and corporate insiders pursue their own interests at the expense of outside investors. When these twin agency problems are significant, diffuse ownership is inefficient and corporate insiders must co‐invest with other investors, retaining substantial equity. The resulting ownership concentration limits economic growth, financial development, and the ability of a country to take advantage of financial globalization.

ABSTRACT We examine how mutual funds from 26 developed and developing countries allocate their investment between domestic and foreign equity markets and what factors determine their asset allocations worldwide. We find robust evidence that these funds, in aggregate, allocate a disproportionately larger fraction of investment to domestic stocks. Results indicate that the stock market development and familiarity variables have significant, but asymmetric, effects on the domestic bias (domestic investors overweighting the local markets) and foreign bias (foreign investors under or overweighting the overseas markets), and that economic development, capital controls, and withholding tax variables have significant effects only on the foreign bias.

ABSTRACT A commonly held view in corporate finance is that firms are less leveraged than they should be, given the potentially large tax benefits of debt. In this paper, I study the effect of firms' leverage on default probabilities as represented by the firms' ratings. Using an instrumental variable approach, I find that the leverage's effect on ratings is three times stronger than it is if the endogeneity of leverage is ignored. This stronger effect results in a higher impact of leverage on the ex ante costs of financial distress, which can offset the current estimates of the tax benefits of debt.

ABSTRACT We examine whether mutual funds change their names to take advantage of current hot investment styles, and what effects these name changes have on inflows to the funds, and to the funds' subsequent returns. We find that the year after a fund changes its name to reflect a current hot style, the fund experiences an average cumulative abnormal flow of 28%, with no improvement in performance. The increase in flows is similar across funds whose holdings match the style implied by their new name and those whose holdings do not, suggesting that investors are irrationally influenced by cosmetic effects.

ABSTRACT A mutual fund manager is more likely to buy (or sell) a particular stock in any quarter if other managers in the same city are buying (or selling) that same stock. This pattern shows up even when the fund manager and the stock in question are located far apart, so it is distinct from anything having to do with local preference. The evidence can be interpreted in terms of an epidemic model in which investors spread information about stocks to one another by word of mouth.

ABSTRACT We show in this article that bank failures can be contagious. Unlike earlier work where contagion stems from depositor panics or contractual links between banks, we argue that bank failures can shrink the common pool of liquidity, creating, or exacerbating aggregate liquidity shortages. This could lead to a contagion of failures and a total meltdown of the system. Given the costs of a meltdown, there is a possible role for government intervention. Unfortunately, liquidity and solvency problems interact and can cause each other, making it hard to determine the cause of a crisis. We propose a robust sequence of intervention.