Knowledge that Transforms

We develop a continuous‐time model of liquidity provision in which hedgers can trade multiple risky assets with arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs have constant relative risk‐aversion (CRRA) utility, while hedgers' asset demand is independent of wealth. An increase in hedgers' risk aversion can make arbitrageurs endogenously more risk‐averse. Because arbitrageurs generate endogenous risk, an increase in their wealth or a reduction in their CRRA coefficient can raise risk premia despite Sharpe ratios declining. Arbitrageur wealth is a priced risk factor because assets held by arbitrageurs offer high expected returns but suffer the most when wealth drops. Aggregate illiquidity, which declines in wealth, captures that factor.

A single macroeconomic factor based on growth in the capital share of aggregate income exhibits significant explanatory power for expected returns across a range of equity characteristic portfolios and nonequity asset classes, with risk price estimates that are of the same sign and similar in magnitude. Positive exposure to capital share risk earns a positive risk premium, commensurate with recent asset pricing models in which redistributive shocks shift the share of income between the wealthy, who finance consumption primarily out of asset ownership, and workers, who finance consumption primarily out of wages and salaries.

This paper applies the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) to make rolling one‐minute‐ahead return forecasts using the entire cross‐section of lagged returns as candidate predictors. The LASSO increases both out‐of‐sample fit and forecast‐implied Sharpe ratios. This out‐of‐sample success comes from identifying predictors that are unexpected, short‐lived, and sparse. Although the LASSO uses a statistical rule rather than economic intuition to identify predictors, the predictors it identifies are nevertheless associated with economically meaningful events: the LASSO tends to identify as predictors stocks with news about fundamentals.

I uncover an economic source of exposure to global risk that drives international asset prices. Countries that are more central in the global trade network have lower interest rates and currency risk premia. To explain these findings, I present a general equilibrium model in which central countries' consumption growth is more exposed to global consumption growth shocks. This causes the currencies of central countries to appreciate in bad times, resulting in lower interest rates and currency risk premia. Empirically, central countries' consumption growth covaries more with world consumption growth, further validating the proposed mechanism.

We analyze the contribution to price discovery of market and limit orders by high‐frequency traders (HFTs) and non‐HFTs. While market orders have a larger individual price impact, limit orders are far more numerous. This results in price discovery occurring predominantly through limit orders. HFTs submit the bulk of limit orders and these limit orders provide most of the price discovery. Submissions of limit orders and their contribution to price discovery fall with volatility due to changes in HFTs’ behavior. Consistent with adverse selection arising from faster reactions to public information, HFTs’ informational advantage is partially explained by public information.

In one of the greatest extensions of property rights in human history, common law countries began giving rights to married women in the 1850s. Before this “women's liberation,” the doctrine of coverture strongly incentivized parents of daughters to hold real estate, rather than financial assets such as money, stocks, or bonds. We exploit the staggered nature of coverture's demise across U.S. states to show that women's rights led to shifts in household portfolios, a positive shock to the supply of credit, and a reallocation of labor toward nonagriculture and capital‐intensive industries. Investor protection thus deepened financial markets, aiding industrialization.

Recent work suggests that sentiment traders shift from safer to more speculative stocks when sentiment increases. Exploiting these cross‐sectional patterns and changes in share ownership, we find that sentiment metrics capture institutional rather than individual investors’ demand shocks. We investigate the underlying economic mechanisms and find that common institutional investment styles (e.g., risk management, momentum trading) explain a significant portion of the relation between institutions and sentiment.

Building on theoretical asset pricing literature, we examine the role of market risk and the size, book‐to‐market (BTM), and volatility anomalies in the cross‐section of unlevered equity returns. Compared with levered (stock) returns, unlevered market beta plays a more important role in explaining the cross‐section of unlevered equity returns, even after controlling for size and BTM. The size effect is weakened, while the value premium and the volatility puzzle virtually disappear for unlevered returns. We show that leverage induces heteroskedasticity in returns. Unlevering returns removes this pattern, which is otherwise difficult to address by controlling for leverage in regressions.

This note corrects an error in the proof of Proposition 2 of “Risk Reduction in Large Portfolios: Why Imposing the Wrong Constraint Helps” that appeared in the Journal of Finance , August 2003.

Deposit insurance reduces liquidity risk but can increase insolvency risk by encouraging reckless behavior. Several U.S. states installed deposit insurance laws before the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and those laws applied only to some depository institutions within those states. These experiments present a unique testing ground for investigating the effect of deposit insurance. We show that deposit insurance removed market discipline constraining uninsured banks. Taking advantage of World War I's rise in world agricultural prices, insured banks increased their insolvency risk and competed aggressively for deposits. When prices fell after the war, the insurance systems collapsed and suffered high losses.