We introduce a new measure of emerging market sovereign credit risk: the local currency credit spread, defined as the spread of local currency bonds over the synthetic local currency risk‐free rate constructed using cross‐currency swaps. We find that local currency credit spreads are positive and sizable. Compared with credit spreads on foreign‐currency‐denominated debt, local currency credit spreads have lower means, lower cross‐country correlations, and lower sensitivity to global risk factors. We discuss several major sources of credit spread differentials, including positively correlated credit and currency risk, selective default, capital controls, and various financial market frictions.

We study the impact of the U.S. money market fund reform implemented in October 2016 on global banks' funding supply and business activities. We show that the reform induced a large negative wholesale funding shock for global banks. In contrast to the conventional bank lending channel, the primary response of global banks to the reform was a cutback in arbitrage positions that relied on unsecured funding, rather than a reduction in loan provision. We discuss the role of postcrisis liquidity regulations and unconventional monetary policy in explaining our findings, and implications for banks' business models and deposit competition.

We find that deviations from the covered interest rate parity (CIP) condition imply large, persistent, and systematic arbitrage opportunities in one of the largest asset markets in the world. Contrary to the common view, these deviations for major currencies are not explained away by credit risk or transaction costs. They are particularly strong for forward contracts that appear on banks' balance sheets at the end of the quarter, pointing to a causal effect of banking regulation on asset prices. The CIP deviations also appear significantly correlated with other fixed income spreads and with nominal interest rates.

We document that governments whose local currency debt provides them with greater hedging benefits actually borrow more in foreign currency. We introduce two features into a government's debt portfolio choice problem to explain this finding: risk‐averse lenders and lack of monetary policy commitment. A government without commitment chooses excessively countercyclical inflation ex post, which leads risk‐averse lenders to require a risk premium ex ante. This makes local currency debt too expensive from the government's perspective and thereby discourages the government from borrowing in its own currency.