Knowledge that Transforms

Firms increasingly borrow via sustainability-linked loans (SLLs), contractually tying spreads to their ESG performance. SLLs vary widely in transparency of disclosure regarding sustainability-related contract details and tend to be issued to borrowers with superior ESG profiles. While high-transparency SLL borrowers maintain this performance, low-transparency SLL borrowers exhibit significantly deteriorating ESG performance after issuance. Both high- and low-transparency borrowers pay substantial fees to obtain SLLs. The results are consistent with high-transparency borrowers using SLLs to “certify” their preexisting ESG commitments, but low-transparency borrowers “greenwashing” with empty SLL labels. Evidence on drawdowns, renegotiations, and stock market reactions further supports these interpretations.

This paper provides empirical evidence of a well-known theoretical concern that market failures in two-sided markets are hard to identify and correct. We study the reactions of banks, merchants, and consumers to Dodd-Frank’s Durbin Amendment that lowered interchange fees on debit card transactions. Banks recouped a significant portion of their losses by charging consumers for products that they previously provided for free on the subsidized side of the two-sided market. The accelerated adoption of credit cards with higher interchange fees likely diminished—if not eliminated—merchants’ savings. These effects impede the regulation’s stated objective of enhancing consumers’ welfare through lower retail prices.

We study capital regulation in a dynamic model for bank deposits. Capital regulation addresses banks’ incentive for excessive leverage that dilutes depositors, but preserves some dilution to reduce bank defaults. We show theoretically that capital regulation is subject to a time inconsistency problem. In a model with non-maturing deposits where optimal withdrawals make deposits endogenously long-term, we find commitment to have important effects on the optimal level and cyclicality of capital adequacy. Our results call for a systematic framework that limits capital regulators’ discretion.

I show that prices impact analyst cash flow expectations and argue this impact can partially reconcile subjective beliefs data with asset pricing models in which investors have rational expectations and discount rate variation drives prices. Previous work argues that correlations of biased analyst cash flow expectations with prices and future returns contradict rational models and imply biased investor expectations distort prices. However, using two instrumental variables for price, I find increases in price unrelated to cash flow news raise analyst cash flow expectations. Based on this empirical finding, I propose a model with rational investors that matches key moments in beliefs data: analysts form biased cash flow expectations by learning from prices that contain discount rate variation. Thus, while stylized facts in beliefs data can be consistent with investors having biased expectations that distort prices, these facts can also be consistent with investors having rational expectations and analysts learning from prices.

We explore the extent to which aspirations – such as those forged in the course of social interactions – explain ‘puzzling’ behavioral patterns in investment decisions. We motivate an aspirational utility, reminiscent of Friedman and Savage (1948), where social considerations (e.g., status concerns) provide an economic foundation for aspirations. We show this utility can explain a range of observed investor behaviors, such as the demand for both right- and left-skewed assets; aspects of the disposition effect; and patterns in stock-market participation consistent with empirical observations. We corroborate our theoretical findings with two novel laboratory experimental studies, where we observed participants’ preference for skewness in risky lotteries shift as lab-induced aspirations shifted.

A central finding of the theoretical literature on bargaining is that parties’ attitudes towards delay influence bargaining outcomes. However, the ability to endure delays, resilience, is often private information and hard to measure in most real-world contexts. In the context of collective bargaining, we show firms actively attempt to become financially resilient in anticipation of labor negotiations. Firms adjust their financial resilience to respond to the passage of right-to-work laws (RWLs). Unions’ financial structure also responds to RWLs. Our findings suggest resilience is key to understanding the process through which collective bargaining determines wages.

After 1945, expected returns have started to dominate the variation in equity price movements, leaving little room for expected dividend growth. An increase in equity duration can help explain this change. Expected returns vary more for payouts further into the future. Furthermore, because expected returns are more persistent than growth rates, they are more important for longer-duration assets. We provide empirical support for this explanation across three datasets: dividend strips, the long time series for the aggregate market, and the cross-section of stocks. A simple present value model with time-varying duration can largely explain the post-1945 dominance of expected returns.

We demonstrate that off-exchange (wholesaler) executions provide significant cost savings to retail investors. Wholesaler concentration has raised regulatory concerns; however, we show that the largest wholesalers offer the lowest costs due to economies of scale. The entry of a new large wholesaler reduces incumbent scale economies, resulting in higher execution costs. Most retail brokers route to multiple wholesalers and actively monitor their performance, rewarding those offering lower execution costs with more volume. While retail investors benefit from the current landscape across all stocks, those trading small stocks benefit the most.

Using cross-country and German administrative data on robotization, we show that the impact of robots on firms and labor markets is limited. First, investment in robots is small and highly concentrated in a few industries, representing less than 0.3% of aggregate expenditures on equipment. Second, robotization does not grow as rapidly as Information Technology did in the past, and current growth is driven by gains in developing countries. Third, firms invest in robots when they face difficulties in finding workers and subsequently increase employment after the investment. The total employment effect in exposed industries and regions is negative but modest in magnitude. We discuss why the effects of robots are limited and demonstrate that other digital technologies have more potential for large economic impact.

Platform intermediation of goods and services has considerably transformed the U.S. economy. We use administrative data on U.S. tax returns to study the role of the gig economy on entrepreneurship. We find that gig workers are more likely to become entrepreneurs, particularly those who are lower income, younger, and benefit from flexibility. We track all newly created firms and show that gig workers start firms in similar industries as their gig experience, which are less likely to survive and demonstrate higher performance. Overall, our findings suggest on-the-job learning promotes entrepreneurial entry and shifts the types of firms started by entrepreneurs.