Knowledge that Transforms

Prior research suggests that executive option grants that do not quickly vest provide managers with better incentives to pursue long-term, instead of short-term, objectives. Previous research also suggests that the pursuit of long-term objectives could be undermined by the risk of early termination. We conjecture that these arguments jointly suggest that managers are better motivated to pursue innovation when they are given more incentive compensation with longer vesting periods for unexercised options and yet some protection from disruptive takeover threats. Our evidence for a sample of newly public firms is consistent with more innovative firms jointly choosing such a combination.

Limits to arbitrage arise because financial intermediaries may face funding constraints when mispricing worsens. Using a model with limits to arbitrage, where we allow arbitrageurs to secure capital even in case of underperformance, we show that arbitrageurs that are more protected from withdrawals have more mean-reverting and volatile returns. Using data on hedge fund performance, we find robust support for these hypotheses: Funds with contractual impediments to withdrawals, and funds with performance-insensitive outflows, recover more quickly after a bad year and have more volatile returns. Our evidence is consistent with the idea that some hedge funds overcome the limits to arbitrage.

For 2,695 US corporations from 1996 to 2009, we find that alignment in political orientation between the chief executive officer (CEO) and independent directors is associated with lower firm valuations, lower operating profitability, and increased internal agency conflicts such as a reduced likelihood of dismissing poorly performing CEOs, a lower CEO pay-performance sensitivity, and a greater likelihood of accounting fraud. Importantly, we show that our results are driven neither by the effects associated with various measures of similarity and diversity within the board nor the effects of local director labor market and political conditions on board structure. We provide evidence that our measure of individual political orientation reflects the person׳s political beliefs rather than opportunistic attempts to seek political favor. Overall, our results suggest that diversity in political beliefs among corporate board members is valuable.

Using the firm-level corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings of Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini, we find that firms score higher on CSR when they have Democratic rather than Republican founders, CEOs, and directors, and when they are headquartered in Democratic rather than Republican-leaning states. Democratic-leaning firms spend 20 million more on CSR than Republican-leaning firms (80 million more within the sample of S&P 500 firms), or roughly 10% of net income. We find no evidence that firms recover these expenditures through increased sales. Indeed, increases in firm CSR ratings are associated with negative future stock returns and declines in firm ROA, suggesting that any benefits to stakeholders from social responsibility come at the direct expense of firm value.

We study reputation incentives in the director labor market and find that directors with multiple directorships distribute their effort unequally based on the directorship's relative prestige. When directors experience an exogenous increase in a directorship's relative ranking, their board attendance rate increases and subsequent firm performance improves. Also, directors are less willing to relinquish their relatively more prestigious directorships, even when firm performance declines. Finally, forced Chief Executive Officer departure sensitivity to poor performance rises when a larger fraction of independent directors view the board as relatively more prestigious. We conclude that director reputation is a powerful incentive for independent directors.

We revisit the well-established puzzle that leverage is negatively correlated with measures of profitability. In contrast, we find that at times when firms are at or close to their optimal level of leverage, the cross-sectional correlation between profitability and leverage is positive. At other times, it is negative. These results are consistent with dynamic trade-off models in which infrequent capital structure rebalancing is optimal. The time series of market leverage and profitability in the quarters prior to rebalancing events match the patterns predicted by these models. Our results are not driven by investment layouts, market timing, payout, or mechanical mean reversion of leverage.

We argue that there is a connection between the interbank market for liquidity and the broader financial markets, which has its basis in demand for liquidity by banks. Tightness in the market for liquidity leads banks to engage in what we term “liquidity pull-back,” which involves selling financial assets either by banks directly or by levered investors. Empirical tests on the stock market are supportive. Tighter interbank markets are associated with relatively more volume in more liquid stocks; selling pressure, especially in more liquid stocks; and transitory negative returns. We control for market-wide uncertainty and in the process also contribute to the literature on portfolio rebalancing. Our general point is that money matters in financial markets.