Knowledge that Transforms

I study how arbitrage affects liquidity by analyzing several billion trades in the American Depositary Receipt (ADR) market from 2001 to 2016. Price deviations persist, on average, for 12 min, and mainly arise because of price pressure. Impulse response functions estimated at 1 min intervals indicate that a positive shock to arbitrage—simultaneous trades of the ADR and the home-market share in the opposite direction—decreases deviations and bid-ask spreads. I confirm these findings by exploiting institutional details that create exogenous variation in the impediments to arbitrage across days. Overall, these results suggest that arbitrage decreases price pressure and provides liquidity.

We build an asset-pricing model with dynamic strategic competition to explain the strong joint fluctuations in aggregate discount rates, competition intensity, profitability, and asset prices. Product market competition endogenously intensifies as discount rates rise, because firms compete more aggressively for current cash flows by undercutting each other as the value of future cooperation decreases. In industries with a lower turnover rate of market leaders, firms’ profit margins tend to be higher yet more exposed to discount-rate fluctuations, thereby generating the gross profitability premium. We exploit large tariff cuts to identify exogenous variation in market structure to test the core mechanism directly.

Enhanced stock liquidity increases a firm’s propensity to hold cash. This is surprising given the view that improved stock liquidity reduces financial constraints. We propose that firms have a repurchase motive for holding cash. Higher stock liquidity strengthens this incentive. Consistent with this, firms with more liquid stock increase cash holdings relatively more when restrictions to repurchases are eased. The effect of stock liquidity on cash holdings is not influenced by access to credit markets. Our findings suggest that the repurchase motive dominates the real investments motive with respect to the effect of stock liquidity on cash holdings.

We examine how adverse local experiences that are uninformative of future returns affect households’ investment behavior in the short term. Using data from a German online brokerage and a survey, we show that retail investors sharply reduce risk taking in response to nearby firm bankruptcies. Adjustments in risk taking occur through immediate and transitory increases in trading, and work through more pessimistic expectations about aggregate stock returns and increased risk aversion. Changes in background risks or wealth effects cannot explain our findings. Extrapolation from local experiences to aggregate expectations is inconsistent with optimal use of full or limited information.

We classify a large sample of banks according to the geographic diversification of their international syndicated loan portfolio. We show that diversified banks maintain higher loan supply during banking crises in borrower countries. Positive loan supply effects lead to higher firm investment and employment growth. Diversified banks are stabilizing due to their ability to raise additional funding during times of distress. Distinguishing banks by nationality reveals that diversified domestic banks are a stable source of funding, while foreign banks with little diversification are fickle. Findings suggest that declining financial integration makes countries more vulnerable to local financial shocks.

We introduce implied volatility duration (IVD) as a new measure for the timing of uncertainty resolution, with a high IVD corresponding to late resolution. Portfolio sorts on a large cross-section of stocks indicate that investors demand, on average, more than 5% return per year as a compensation for a late resolution of uncertainty. In a general equilibrium model, we show that “late” stocks can only have higher expected returns than “early” stocks if the investor exhibits a preference for early resolution of uncertainty. Our empirical analysis thus provides a purely market-based assessment of the timing preferences of the marginal investor.

This study examines whether personal liability for corporate malfeasance deters individuals from serving as independent directors. After the introduction of personal liability in India, we find that individuals are deterred from serving on corporate boards. We find stronger deterrence among firms with greater litigation and regulatory risk, higher monitoring costs, and weak monetary incentives. Expert directors are more likely to exit, resulting in 1.16% lower firm value. We further evaluate whether contemporaneous corporate governance reforms and market developments contribute to this deterrence. Overall, our results suggest that personal liability deters individuals with high reputational costs from serving as independent directors.

Using more than 50,000 firm-years from 1988 to 2015, we show that the empirical relation between a firm's Tobin's q and managerial ownership is systematically negative. When we restrict our sample to larger firms, as in the prior literature, we confirm earlier findings of an increasing and concave relation between q and managerial ownership. We show that cumulative past performance and liquidity can explain these seemingly contradictory results. Better performing firms have more liquid equity, which enables firms and insiders to more easily sell shares after the IPO, and they also have a higher Tobin's q.

Information production is key to the efficiency of financial markets. Does selling information separately improve its production? We investigate this question using MiFID II, a European regulation that unbundles research from transactions. We show that unbundling causes fewer research analysts to cover a firm. This decrease does not come from small- or mid-cap firms but is concentrated in large firms. Surprisingly, the reduction in analyst coverage is accompanied by a decrease in forecast error. Further analyses suggest that analyst competition enhancement could drive the results: inaccurate analysts drop out, and analysts who stay produce more accurate research.

We use staggered share repurchases legalization from 1985 to 2010 across the world to examine its impact on corporate behaviors. We find that share-repurchasing firms do not cut dividends as a substitution. The cash for repurchasing shares comes more from internal cash than external debt issuance, leading to reductions in capital expenditures and R&D expenses. While this strategy boosts stock prices, it results in lower long-run Tobin's Q, profitability, growth, and innovation, accompanied by lower insider ownership. Tax benefits and paying out temporary earnings are two primary reasons that firms repurchase.