Knowledge that Transforms

We study the effects of idiosyncratic uncertainty on asset prices, investment, and welfare. We consider an economy with two main components: under-diversification and endogenous, countercyclical idiosyncratic risk. The equilibrium is subject to underinvestment and excessive aggregate risk-taking. Inefficiencies stem from an idiosyncratic risk externality, as firms do not internalize the effect of their investment decisions on the risk borne by others. Risk externalities depend on an idiosyncratic risk premium and a variance risk premium. We assess their magnitude empirically. The optimal allocation can be implemented through financial regulation using a tax benefit on debt and risk-weighted capital requirements.

Optimal stock investment decisions rely on assessments of the distribution of expected returns. Using a representative sample, we find over half the US population cannot answer simple questions on expected stock returns. Respondents who are unable to make any return prediction, who cannot answer questions on the distribution of expected returns, or who reveal unlikely distributional beliefs participate less in the stock market and have smaller stock investments. However, overoptimistic investors are more likely to participate in the stock market and have larger stock investments. These results persist after controlling for financial literacy, intelligence, education, and demographics. People who are ignorant about stock return distribution are more likely to invest in equities if they have higher levels of trust. Therefore, trust can substitute for cognition as a factor positively associated with individuals’ propensity to invest.

How are financial markets pricing the monetary policy outlook? We use surveys to decompose excess returns on money market instruments into expectation errors and term premia. Excess returns are primarily driven by expectation errors, whereas term premia are negligible. Investors face challenges when learning about the Federal Reserve’s response to large, but infrequent, negative shocks in real-time. Rather than reflecting risk compensation, excess returns stem from investors underestimating how much the central bank eases policy in response to such rare shocks. We show, for the US and internationally, that expectation errors imply excess return predictability from past stock returns.

We develop a general equilibrium model in which households’ mortgage leverage is determined by supply and demand forces, where the price of credit impacts the quantity of leverage households choose. Mortgages are supplied by financial intermediaries, who offer households a menu of mortgage contracts whose pricing varies with intermediaries’ equity capital. In the model, growth in the demand for safe assets that replicates the falling interest rates in the 2000s causes an empirically realistic boom in household borrowing, debt-financed consumption, and house prices. This boom results in a larger bust in asset prices and household borrowing in future financial crises.

We study the effects of a price transparency shock in the Brazilian equity lending market, an over-the-counter market. Previously, the available loan fee benchmark was the mean loan fee of the past 15 trading days. On March 1, 2011, this interval was reduced to three days, significantly improving short-sellers’ ability to predict current loan fees. We find that after the benchmark change, loan fees fell, lending volume increased, total lending revenue remained stable, high-cost lenders lost market share, and price efficiency increased. Our results suggest implementing price benchmarks in OTC markets can improve market quality.

We study security issuers’ decisions on whether to pool assets when facing counterparties endowed with market power, as is common in over-the-counter markets. Our analysis reveals how buyers’ market power may render the pooling of assets suboptimal — both privately and socially — in particular, when the potential gains from trade are large. Pooling assets then reduces the elasticity of trade volume in the relevant part of the payoff distribution, exacerbating the inefficient rationing associated with the exercise of buyers’ market power. Our analysis provides insight on the determinants of asset-backed securities issuance, including regulatory reforms affecting financial institutions’ liquidity.

We examine how product life cycle affects investment and financing by estimating an industry equilibrium model that embeds product portfolio characteristics. In the model, firms trade off higher profitability of newer products versus product introduction costs. Using product-level data, we find that the product dimension is critical in quantitatively explaining cash flow dynamics, corporate policies, and industry structure. We show that product introductions and capital investment are complements and that product dynamics incentivize preserving more debt capacity. Our estimates reveal that product life cycle is more pronounced for firms with smaller and more concentrated product portfolios as well as those with high product variety.

We present a new model of asset prices in which a representative agent has extrapolative beliefs about stock market returns and Epstein-Zin preferences. The model quantitatively explains facts about asset prices, return expectations, and cash-flow expectations. When the agent’s beliefs about stock market returns are calibrated to survey expectations of investors, the model generates excess volatility and predictability of stock market returns, a high equity premium, a low and stable risk-free rate, and a low correlation between stock market returns and consumption growth. Moreover, the model has implications for expectations about future cash flows that are consistent with empirical findings.

We estimate risk-free interest rates unaffected by convenience yields on safe assets. We infer them from risky asset prices without relying on any specific model of risk. We obtain interest rates and implied convenience yields with maturities up to three years at a minutely frequency. Our estimated convenience yield on Treasuries equals about 40 basis points, is larger below three months maturity, and quadruples during the financial crisis. In high-frequency event studies, conventional and unconventional monetary stimulus reduces our rates more than the corresponding Treasury yields, thus broadly affecting rates even outside the narrow confines of the fixed-income market.

We use supervisory loan-level data to document that small firms (SMEs) obtain shorter maturity credit lines than large firms, post more collateral, have higher utilization rates, and pay higher spreads. We rationalize these facts as the equilibrium outcome of a trade-off between lender commitment and discretion. Using the COVID recession, we test the prediction that SMEs are subject to greater lender discretion. Consistent with this hypothesis, SMEs did not draw down whereas large firms did, even in response to similar demand shocks. PPP recipients reduced non-PPP loan balances, indicating the program bolstered their liquidity and alleviated the shortfall.