I hypothesize that risk taking is greater in stock thrifts than in mutual thrifts because the residual and fixed claims are separable. I find that stock thrifts exhibit greater profit variability during the 1982–1988 period and that conversions from mutual to stock ownership are associated with increased investment in risky assets and increased profit variability. These findings illustrate the relation between the structure of residual claims, incentives, and firm performance as well as the unintended consequences resulting from changes in thrift regulations.

I analyze the investment and funding strategies of two thrifts, one stock owned and one mutually owned, from 1983 to 1988. Despite their similarities prior to 1983, the stock thrift implemented a riskier financial strategy and did so only after converting to stock ownership. Although this strategy ultimately led to its failure, the stock thrift still made significant payouts to its controlling shareholders. This case study illustrates in stark terms the relation between organizational form and risk shifting in the thrift industry.

This paper argues that corporations may use convertible bonds as an indirect way to get equity into their capital structures when adverse-selection problems make a conventional stock issue unattractive. Unlike other theories of convertible bond issuance, the model here highlights: 1) the importance of call provisions on convertibles and 2) the significance of costs of financial distress to the information content of a convertible issue.

In 111 publicly traded firms that either file for bankruptcy or privately restructure their debt between 1979 and 1985, bank lenders frequently become major stockholders or appoint new directors. On average, only 46% of incumbent directors remain when bankruptcy or debt restructuring ends. Directors who resign hold significantly fewer seats on other boards following their departure. Common-stock ownership becomes more concentrated with large blockholders and less with corporate insiders. Few firms are acquired. Collectively, these results suggest that corporate default leads to significant changes in the ownership of firms' residual claims and in the allocation of rights to manage corporate resources.

This study investigates senior management turnover in financially distressed firms. In any given year, 52% of sampled firms experience turnover if they are either in default on their debt, bankrupt, or privately restructuring their debt to avoid bankruptcy. A significant number of changes are initiated by firms' bank lenders. Following their resignation from these firms, managers are not subsequently employed by another exchange-listed firm for at least three years. Results are consistent with managers experiencing large personal costs when their firms default.

This paper models and characterizes investment incentive problems associated with debt financing. The decision problem of residual claimants is explicity formulated and their investment policies are characterized. The paper also analyzes the use of conversion features and warrants to control distortionary incentives. These claims reverse the convex shape of levered equity over the upper range of the firm's earnings, and this mitigates the incentive to take risk. It is shown that, under certain conditions, such claims can be constructed to restore net present value maximizing incentives and simultaneously meet the financing requirements of the firm.

This paper demonstrates that warrant valuation and exercise strategy differ fundamentally from call option valuation. Simultaneous exercise of warrants is shown to be suboptimal and a monopolist owning all warrants can achieve a higher value. Unless warrants are perfectly divisible, no satisfactory equilibrium exists for the valuation and exercise of widely held warrants. The problems encountered appear to be quite general and stem from necessary assumptions about future corporate dividend policy and capital structure. Such assumptions are necessary for any model of corporate security valuation.

The expected market return is a number frequently required for the solution of many investment and corporate finance problems, but by comparison with other financial variables, there has been little research on estimating this expected return. Current practice for estimating the expected market return adds the historical average realized excess market returns to the current observed interest rate. While this model explicitly reflects the dependence of the market return on the interest rate, it fails to account for the effect of changes in the level of market risk. Three models of equilibrium expected market returns which reflect this dependence are analyzed in this paper. Estimation procedures which incorporate the prior restriction that equilibrium expected excess returns on the market must be positive are derived and applied to return data for the period 1926–1978. The principal conclusions from this exploratory investigation are: (1) in estimating models of the expected market return, the non-negativity restriction of the expected excess return should be explicity included as part of the specification: (2) estimators which use realized returns should be adjusted for heteroscedasticity.

This article re-examines the magnitude of stockholder gains from merger. To measure stockholder gains we employ four alternative two-factor market-industry models in combination with a matched non-merging control group. The four two-factor models are based on either the capital asset pricing model or Black's (1972) zero-beta model combined with two alternative industry factors. The four models are shown to produce generally consistent results. However, the results from a two-factor model are sometimes different from the results of a simpler one-factor model. Also, the introduction of a third factor, the non-merging control group, is shown to have a substantial impact on performance measurement.

A general formula is derived for the price of a security whose value under specified conditions is a known function of the value of another security. Although the formula can be derived using the arbitrage technique of Black and Scholes, the alternative approach of continuous-time portfolio strategies is used instead. This alternative derivation allows the resolution of some controversies surrounding the Black and Scholes methodology. Specifically, it is demonstrated that the derived pricing formula must be continuous with continuous first derivatives, and that there is not a ‘pre-selection bias’ in the choice of independent variables used in the formula. Finally, the alternative derivation provides a direct proof of the Modigliani-Miller theorem even when there is a positive probability of bankruptcy.