Knowledge that Transforms

The Paris Bourse (currently Euronext Paris) refined its trading system to include electronic call auctions at market closings in 1996 for its less-liquid Continuous B stocks and in 1998 for its more actively traded Continuous A stocks. This paper analyzes the effects of the innovation on market quality. Our empirical analysis of price behavior for two samples of firms (50 B stocks and 50 A stocks) for two different calendar dates (1996 and 1998) indicates that introduction of the closing calls has lowered execution costs for individual participants and sharpened price discovery for the broad market. We further observe that market quality is improved at market openings, albeit to a lesser extent. We suggest that a positive spillover effect explains the closing call's more pervasive impact.

This paper provides new evidence of how macroeconomic conditions affect capital structure choice. We model firms’ target capital structures as a function of macroeconomic conditions and firm-specific variables. We split our sample based on a measure of financial constraints. Target leverage is counter-cyclical for the relatively unconstrained sample, but pro-cyclical for the relatively constrained sample. Macroeconomic conditions are significant for issue choice for unconstrained firms but less so for constrained firms. Our results support the hypothesis that unconstrained firms time their issue choice to coincide with periods of favorable macroeconomic conditions, while constrained firms do not.

I develop a theory of stock-based compensation contracts for the chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms and confront the theoretical predictions with recent CEO compensation data. The model characterizes the optimal contract for a CEO whose reputation evolves as signals of the executive's ability are observed by shareholders. Using various proxies for CEO reputation, I show a positive and economically meaningful relationship between stock-based pay-sensitivities and CEO reputation. The findings are robust to controls for CEO age, firm size, the dollar variability of the stock returns, and industry effects.

This paper shows that the book-to-market (B/M) effect is greater for stocks with higher idiosyncratic return volatility, higher transaction costs, and lower investor sophistication, consistent with the market-mispricing explanation for the anomaly. The B/M effect for high volatility stocks exceeds that for the low volatility stocks in 20 of the 22 sample years. Also, volatility exhibits significant incremental power beyond transaction costs and investor sophistication measures in explaining cross-sectional variation in the B/M effect. These findings are consistent with the Shleifer and Vishny (1997) thesis that risk associated with the volatility of arbitrage returns deters arbitrage activity and is an important reason why the B/M effect exists.

We study asset prices in an economy where some investors categorize risky assets into different styles and move funds among these styles depending on their relative performance. In our economy, assets in the same style comove too much, assets in different styles comove too little, and reclassifying an asset into a new style raises its correlation with that style. We also predict that style returns exhibit a rich pattern of own- and cross-autocorrelations and that while asset-level momentum and value strategies are profitable, their style-level counterparts are even more so. We use the model to shed light on several style-related empirical anomalies.

In periods characterized by diminished public market financing, small biotechnology firms appear to be more likely to fund R&D through alliances with major corporations rather than with internal funds (raised through the capital markets). We consider 200 alliance agreements entered into by biotechnology firms between 1980 and 1995. Agreements signed during periods of limited external equity financing are more likely to assign the bulk of the control to the larger corporate partner, and are significantly less successful than other alliances. These agreements are also disproportionately likely to be renegotiated if financial market conditions subsequently improve.

We analyze whether board structure and director independence in closed-end investment companies are related to shareholder interests in ways that are consistent with boards being effective monitors. We report that funds with relatively low expense ratios, one measure of board effectiveness, have smaller boards, a higher proportion of board members who are legally considered independent, relatively low director compensation, and charter provisions that specify remedial action if discounts become large. Evidence from our analysis of major fund restructuring decisions, including share repurchases, open-ending proposals and right offerings, is largely consistent with the expense ratio analysis. Overall, board characteristics that we identify with effective board independence are associated with lower expense ratios and value-enhancing restructurings.

We find that dual-class firms experience less underpricing than single-class firms and explore several hypotheses which explain this phenomenon. Compared to single-class firms, dual-class companies have slightly higher post-IPO institutional ownership and experience fewer control events. Although dual-class firms achieve a lower underpricing cost, they trade at lower prices relative to earnings and sales than single-class IPOs. This pricing differential, combined with evidence that dual-class managers earn higher compensation and that dual-class shares are common among media and entertainment industry IPOs, suggests that dual-class ownership structures protect private control benefits.