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Does the geographic expansion of banks reduce risk?

Journal of Financial Economics 2016 120(2), 346-362
We develop a new identification strategy to evaluate the impact of the geographic expansion of a bank holding company (BHC) across US metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) on BHC risk. For the average BHC, the instrumental variable results suggest that geographic expansion materially reduces risk. Geographic diversification does not affect loan quality. The results are consistent with arguments that geographic expansion lowers risk by reducing exposure to idiosyncratic local risks and inconsistent with arguments that expansion, on net, increases risk by reducing the ability of BHCs to monitor loans and manage risks.

The cross section of expected holding period returns and their dynamics: A present value approach

Journal of Financial Economics 2015 116(3), 505-525 open access
We provide a tractable model of firm-level expected holding period returns using two firm fundamentals—book-to-market ratio and return on equity—and study the cross-sectional properties of the model-implied expected returns. We find that firm-level expected returns and expected profitability are time-varying but highly persistent and that forecasts of holding period returns strongly predict the cross section of future returns up to three years ahead. We show a highly significant predictive pooled regression slope for future quarterly returns of 0.86. The popular factor-based expected return models have either an insignificant or a significantly negative association with future returns. In supplemental analyses, we show that these forecasts are also informative of the time series variation in aggregate conditions. For a representative firm, the slope of the conditional expected return curve is more positive in good times, when expected short-run returns are relatively low, and the model-implied forecaster of aggregate returns exhibits modest predictive ability. Collectively, we provide a simple, theoretically motivated, and practically useful approach to estimating multi-period-ahead expected returns.

Disagreement of disagreement

Journal of Financial Economics 2026 185, 104379 open access
We show that leading investor disagreement proxies have near-zero cross-correlation – making disagreement pricing inferences challenging. We develop a frictionless model that generates overpricing from latent disagreement, jointly rationalizes major proxies, and generates new testable predictions. Equilibrium interrelationships motivate a new disagreement measure, DIS, which is more predictive of returns cross-sectionally than major proxies and more consistently predictive across macroeconomic regimes. We provide evidence that the friction-based channel of Miller (1977) and a frictionless mechanism coexist and are empirically separable. DIS also provides a micro-founded, disagreement-based account of the IVOL puzzle, absorbing IVOL’s predictability while revealing its regime and friction dependence.

On the information content of credit ratings and market-based measures of default risk

Journal of Financial Economics 2022 146(1), 172-204
We examine the ability of ratings and market-based measures to predict defaults. Although market-based measures are more accurate at horizons up to one year, ratings complement market-based measures and are not redundant in predicting defaults across horizons. Market-based measures differ from ratings in that they respond to both cash-flow and discount-rate news, while ratings respond primarily to cash-flow news, which is more informative of future defaults. Ratings ignore transitory shocks to credit risk, while market-based measures do not. Rating agencies respond to transitory shocks with watches rather than downgrades. Ratings are more informative during expansions and for speculative grade firms.

Dynamic interventions and informational linkages

Journal of Financial Economics 2020 135(1), 1-15
We model a dynamic economy with strategic complementarity among investors and study how endogenous government interventions mitigate coordination failures. We establish equilibrium existence and uniqueness, and we show that one intervention can affect another through altering the public information structure. A stronger initial intervention helps subsequent interventions through increasing the likelihood of positive news, but also leads to negative conditional updates. Our results suggest optimal policy should emphasize initial interventions when coordination outcomes tend to correlate. Neglecting informational externalities of initial interventions results in over- or under-interventions. Moreover, saving smaller funds disproportionally more can generate greater informational benefits at smaller costs.

The role of executive cash bonuses in providing individual and team incentives

Journal of Financial Economics 2019 133(2), 441-471
Given CEOs’ substantial equity portfolios, much recent literature on CEO incentives regards cash-based bonus plans as largely irrelevant, begging the question of why nearly all CEO compensation plans include such bonuses. We develop a new measure of bonus plan incentives and show that performance sensitivities are much greater than prior estimates. We also test hypotheses regarding the role of bonuses in providing executives with individualized and team incentives. We find little evidence supporting the individualized incentives hypotheses but find consistent evidence that bonus plans appear to be used to encourage mutual monitoring and to facilitate coordination across the top management team as a whole.

Creative destruction and firm-specific performance heterogeneity☆

Journal of Financial Economics 2008 89(1), 109-135
Traditional U.S. industries with higher firm-specific stock return and fundamentals performance heterogeneity use information technology (IT) more intensively and post faster productivity growth in the late 20th century. We argue that this mechanically reflects a wave of Schumpeter's creative destruction disrupting a wide swath of industries, with successful IT adopters unpredictably undermining established firms. This validates endogenous growth theory models of creative destruction and suggests intensified creative destruction as explaining findings associating greater firm-specific performance variation with higher per capita GDPs, economy growth rates, accounting standards, financial system development, and property right protection.

Short interest, institutional ownership, and stock returns

Journal of Financial Economics 2005 78(2), 243-276
Stocks are short-sale constrained when there is a strong demand to sell short and a limited supply of shares to borrow. Using data on both short interest (a proxy for demand) and institutional ownership (a proxy for supply) we find that constrained stocks underperform during the period 1988–2002 by a significant 215 basis points per month on an equally weighted basis, although by only an insignificant 39 basis points per month on a value-weighted basis. For the overwhelming majority of stocks, short interest and institutional ownership levels make short selling constraints unlikely.

Managerial succession and firm performance

Journal of Financial Economics 2004 74(2), 237-275
We examine CEO turnover and firm financial performance. Accounting measures of performance relative to other firms deteriorate prior to CEO turnover and improve thereafter. The degree of improvement is positively related to the level of institutional shareholdings, the presence of an outsider-dominated board, and the appointment of an outsider (rather than an insider) CEO. Turnover announcements are associated with significantly positive average abnormal stock returns, which are in turn significantly positively related to subsequent changes in accounting measures of performance. This suggests that investors view turnover announcements as good news presaging performance improvements.

Dating the integration of world equity markets

Journal of Financial Economics 2002 65(2), 203-247
Regulatory changes that appear comprehensive will have little impact on the functioning of a developing market if they fail to lead to foreign portfolio inflows. We specify a reduced-form model for a number of financial time series and search for a common, endogenous break in the data generating process. We also estimate a confidence interval for the break. Our endogenous break dates are accurately estimated but do not always correspond closely to dates of official capital market reforms. Indeed, the endogenous dates are usually later than official dates, highlighting the important distinction between market liberalization and market integration.