Average common stock price responses to convertible preferred stock calls are significantly negative only when firms employ underwriters to assure conversion. Previous work reports similar results for convertible bond calls; we find that the stock price reaction does not depend upon the type of convertible security being called. The results support the idea that managers are more likely to have calls underwritten the more unfavorable their private information about firm value.

Common-stock prices fall a statistically significant 2 percent in response to underwritten convertible debt call announcements. We find that the significant negative price reaction is confined to underwritten calls — stock-price responses to non-underwritten calls average an insignificant −0.84 percent. The results support the idea that managers are more likely to use underwriters the more unfavorable the information they possess about future firm cash flows. An agency cost interpretation of underwritten calls is also consistent with the results, but is not supported by management ownership and corporate liquidity evidence.

We examine a variety of models in which the variance of a portfolio's excess return depends on a state variable generated by a first-order Markov process. A model in which the state is known to economic agents is estimated. It suggests that the mean excess return moves inversely with the level of risk. We then estimate a model in which agents are uncertain of the state. The estimates indicate that agents are consistently surprised by high-variance periods, so there is a negative correlation between movements in volatility and in excess returns.

Exchange rate volatility falls after a trade deal, driven by a decline in the systematic component of risk. The average trade deal increases trade by 50 percent over five years, reducing systematic risk by a third of a standard deviation across countries. We examine this connection in an Armington model where the structure of trade networks determines the risk in exchange rates. We estimate our model to current data and find i) that countries at the periphery of the world trade network benefit the most from lower trade barriers and ii) that a counterfactual experiment of a trade war between the US and China shows a global increase in currency risk, with effects concentrated among peripheral countries.

We directly measure banks’ monitoring of syndicated loans. Banks typically demand borrower information on at least a monthly basis. About 20% of loans involve active monitoring (i.e., site visits or third-party appraisals). Monitoring increases with the lead bank’s incentives and the value of information and is negatively associated with loan spreads and maturity. The monitoring captured by our measures can either complement or substitute for covenant-based monitoring, depending on whether the monitoring informs covenant compliance. Banks increase monitoring following deteriorations in borrower financial condition and credit line drawdowns. Finally, monitoring is positively related to future covenant violations and loan renegotiations.

Early life exposure to local financial institutions increases household financial inclusion and leads to long-term improvements in consumer credit outcomes. We identify the effect of local financial markets using Congressional legislation that led to unintended differences in financial market development across Native American reservations. Individuals from financially underdeveloped reservations enter consumer credit markets later, and upon reaching adulthood, have ten point lower credit scores and four percentage point more delinquent accounts. These effects are long-lived and depreciate slowly after individuals move to more developed areas. Formative exposures to local banking improve consumer credit behavior by increasing financial literacy and financial trust.

Private equity funds hold assets that are hard to value. Managers have incentives to distort reported valuations if these reports are used by investors to decide on commitments to subsequent funds. Using a large dataset of buyout and venture funds, we test for the presence of return manipulations. We find that some underperforming managers inflate reported returns during fundraising. However, those managers are less likely to raise a next fund, suggesting that investors can see through the manipulation. In contrast, top-performing funds appear to understate valuations. A simple theoretical framework rationalizes our empirical results as well as those of related papers.

This paper examines heterogeneity in the responsiveness to default options in a large state retirement plan, focusing on individuals’ decision-making approaches as well as their economic and demographic characteristics. Analyses of a survey of plan participants show that procrastination and the need for cognitive closure are important determinants of the likelihood of default. This paper also explores an important implication of defaulting—individuals who default are significantly more likely to subsequently express a desire to enroll in a different plan. The desire to change plans is also correlated with numerous economic and decision-making characteristics, including procrastination.

This paper conducts powerful new tests of whether debt can mitigate the effects of agency and information problems. We focus on emerging market firms for which pyramid ownership structures create potentially extreme managerial agency costs. Our tests incorporate both traditional financial statement data and new data on global debt contracts. Our analysis is mindful of the potential endogeneity between debt, ownership structure, and value, and it takes into account differences in the debt capacity of a firm's assets in place and future growth opportunities. The results indicate that the incremental benefit of debt is concentrated in firms with high expected managerial agency costs that are also most likely to have overinvestment problems resulting from high levels of assets in place or limited future growth opportunities. Subsequent internationally syndicated term loans are particularly effective at creating value for these firms. Our results support the recontracting hypothesis that equity holders value compliance with monitored covenants, particularly when firms are likely to overinvest.