Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate why new, high-risk technologies can attract excessive and often unprofitable investment. We develop an equilibrium model in which rational, risk-averse agents overinvest in a risky technology, possibly to the point that its expected return is negative. Overinvestment results from relative wealth concerns which arise endogenously from the imperfect tradability of future endowments. Competition over future consumption leads to an indirect utility for wealth with “keeping up with the Joneses” properties that can induce herding. Because overinvestment increases with the risk of the technology, our model can explain why new, risky technological innovations may promote investment bubbles.

This paper tests a generalized version of the expectations hypothesis in the market for commercial paper. Our main data set, which is new to the literature, consists of daily yield indexes constructed from the market yields for nearly all commercial paper issued by US corporations between 1998 and 2004. We show that term premia for commercial paper often rise dramatically at year-end. However, once we control for these year-end effects, we find considerable support for the generalized expectations hypothesis in the market for commercial paper.

We examine the relation between disclosure frequency and earnings management, and the impact of this relation on post-issue performance, for a sample of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We contend that firms with extensive disclosure are less likely to face information problems, leading to less earnings management and better post-issue performance. Our results confirm that disclosure frequency is inversely related to earnings management and positively associated with post-issue performance. We also find that transparency-reducing disclosure is concentrated in firms that substantially, but temporarily, increase disclosure prior to the offering. Such firms exhibit more earnings management and poorer post-SEO stock performance, on average.

This paper shows that classified boards destroy value by entrenching management and reducing director effectiveness. First, I show that classified boards are associated with a significant reduction in firm value and that this holds even among complex firms, although such firms are often regarded as most likely to benefit from staggered board elections. I then examine how classified boards entrench management by focusing on CEO turnover, executive compensation, proxy contests, and shareholder proposals. My results indicate that classified boards significantly insulate management from market discipline, thus suggesting that the observed reduction in value is due to managerial entrenchment and diminished board accountability.

US corporations hold significant amounts of cash on their balance sheets. This paper develops and tests the hypothesis that the magnitude of US multinational cash holdings are, in part, a consequence of the tax costs associated with repatriating foreign income. Consistent with this hypothesis, firms facing higher repatriation taxes hold higher levels of cash, hold this cash abroad, and hold this cash in affiliates that trigger high tax costs when repatriating earnings. In addition, less financially constrained firms and those that are more technology intensive exhibit a higher sensitivity of affiliate cash holdings to repatriation tax burdens.

While standard real options models assume that agents possess a constant rate of time preference, there is substantial evidence that agents are impatient about choices in the short term but are patient when choosing between long-term alternatives. We extend the real options framework to model the investment-timing decisions of entrepreneurs with time-inconsistent preferences. The impact on investment-timing depends on such factors as whether entrepreneurs are sophisticated or naive in their expectations regarding their future time-inconsistent behavior, and whether the payoff from investment occurs all at once or over time. The model is extended to the case of a competitive equilibrium.

We investigate whether the returns of industry portfolios predict stock market movements. In the US, a significant number of industry returns, including retail, services, commercial real estate, metal, and petroleum, forecast the stock market by up to two months. Moreover, the propensity of an industry to predict the market is correlated with its propensity to forecast various indicators of economic activity. The eight largest non-US stock markets show remarkably similar patterns. These findings suggest that stock markets react with a delay to information contained in industry returns about their fundamentals and that information diffuses only gradually across markets.

A conflict of interest exists when a party to a transaction can gain by taking actions that are detrimental to its counterparty. This paper examines the growing empirical literature on the economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions. Economic analysis shows that, although conflicts of interest are omnipresent when contracting is costly and parties are imperfectly informed, there are important factors that mitigate their impact and, strikingly, it is possible for customers of financial institutions to benefit from the existence of such conflicts. The empirical literature reaches conclusions that differ across types of conflicts of interest but are overall more ambivalent and certainly more benign than the conclusions drawn by journalists and politicians from mostly anecdotal evidence.

We develop and implement a method for maximum likelihood estimation in closed-form of stochastic volatility models. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we compare a full likelihood procedure, where an option price is inverted into the unobservable volatility state, to an approximate likelihood procedure where the volatility state is replaced by proxies based on the implied volatility of a short-dated at-the-money option. The approximation results in a small loss of accuracy relative to the standard errors due to sampling noise. We apply this method to market prices of index options for several stochastic volatility models, and compare the characteristics of the estimated models. The evidence for a general CEV model, which nests both the affine Heston model and a GARCHmodel, suggests that the elasticity of variance of volatility lies between that assumed by the two nested models.

Prior work suggests that if a firm shares a larger proportion of its growth opportunities with rivals, an inability to fully invest in these opportunities leads to predatory behavior on the part of rivals and losses in market share. We examine whether firms manage this predation risk. We find inter- and intra-industry evidence that the extent of the interdependence of a firm's investment opportunities with rivals is positively associated with its use of derivatives and the size of its cash holdings. Moreover, an analysis of investment behavior provides evidence that if this interdependence is high, the management of predation risk provides strategic benefits. Our results indicate that predation risk is an important determinant of corporate financial policy choices and investment behavior.