Knowledge that Transforms

We use the near-collapse of the Norwegian banking system during the period 1988–1991 to measure the impact of bank distress announcements on the stock prices of firms maintaining a relationship with a distressed bank. Although banks experienced large and permanent downward revisions in their equity value during the event period, firms maintaining relationships with these banks faced only small and temporary changes, on average, in stock price. Firms with access to unused liquid bank funds and firms that issued equity just prior to the crisis experience relatively high abnormal returns. Overall, the aggregate impact of bank distress appears small.

We evaluate the performance changes of 634 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) listed on China's two exchanges upon share issuing privatisation (SIP) in the period 1994–1998. We find that SIP is effective in improving SOEs’ earnings ability, real sales, and workers’ productivity but is not successful in improving profit returns and leverage after privatisation. We also find state ownership having negative impacts on firm performance and legal-person ownership having positive impacts on firm performance after SIP, which suggests that legal persons behave differently from the state government. Surprisingly, foreign ownership does not show uniformly strong, positive impacts on firm performance.

This paper examines systematic differences in earnings management across 31 countries. We propose an explanation for these differences based on the notion that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders. Thus, earnings management is expected to decrease in investor protection because strong protection limits insiders’ ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. Our findings are consistent with this prediction and suggest an endogenous link between corporate governance and the quality of reported earnings.

We examine theories of IPO underpricing using unique data from Israel where the allocation to subscribers is by equal proration. This enables us to simulate the return earned by uninformed investors. Consistent with Rock's (1986) theory of adverse selection, allocations were negatively related to underpricing. But uninformed investors earned a negative allocation-weighted initial return, although the average initial return was 12%. They could break even, however, by using publicly available information. The data also supports Welch's (1992) theory of information cascades: demand is either extremely high or there is undersubscription, with very few cases in between.

Using a sample of 70 former colonies, this paper assesses two theories regarding the historical determinants of financial development. The law and finance theory holds that legal traditions, brought by colonizers, differ in terms of protecting the rights of private investors vis-à-vis the state, with important implications for financial markets. The endowment theory argues that the disease environment encountered by colonizers influences the formation of long-lasting institutions that shape financial development. The empirical results provide evidence for both theories. However, initial endowments explain more of the cross-country variation in financial intermediary and stock market development.

This paper explores the potential marketing benefits of going public and of IPO underpricing. We examine the impact of IPO underpricing on website traffic, which is a direct measure of product market performance for internet firms. If underpricing attracts media attention and creates valuable publicity, we expect an increase in web traffic following the IPO. We find that web traffic growth in the month after the IPO is positively and significantly associated with initial returns, and the effect is economically significant. We also investigate media reaction to initial returns for a broader sample of IPOs. The results suggest that the marketing benefits of underpricing extend beyond the internet sector and the “hot issues” market of the late 1990s.

We develop a dynamic model of price competition in broker and dealer markets. With no payment for order flow, a zero-profit equilibrium exists. With payment for order flow, spreads widen to more than compensate for this payment; hence, there is no equilibrium in which market makers earn zero profits. While brokerage commissions for market orders can fall, the total transactions cost to submitting a market order remains positive. Consumer and social welfare are both lower in any equilibrium with payment for order flow; payment for order flow redistributes payoffs from traders who demand liquidity to those who supply it.

This paper documents, for 1947–2000, seasonalities in economic activity, stock and bond returns, and relationships among them. Evidence is consistent with an annual cycle view of economic activity and risk conditions. The power of lagged stock returns to forecast economic activity is greater for quarters ending in December and March. Mean excess returns on NYSE stocks in October through March account for 78–107% of their annual means and reflect a seasonal asymmetric return reversal tendency, which in turn explains low long-horizon variance ratios. Both market losses in April through September and subsequent returns in October through March are related, but with opposing signs, to October through March economic activity. The forecasting power of five variables is greatest for October through March. Tests of an asset-pricing model indicate that expected returns vary both cross-sectionally and over time. Implications for the debate between efficient markets and behavioral finance are discussed.

We value a firm that pays its cash flows to equity through share repurchases in a dynamic environment where personal taxes are paid on capital gains upon realization. The cost of capital is reduced by approximately 0.8% through the use of repurchases relative to dividends. We use the empirical distribution of pre-tax free cash flows in Fama and French (1999) to evaluate the tradeoffs between the costs of financial distress, the personal-tax advantages of equity, and the corporate-tax advantage to debt. The optimal capital structure is interior with a 3% bankruptcy cost.

We analyze the use of alternative trading systems in a large sample of institutional orders and the trades that constitute these orders. Proprietary data allow us to distinguish between orders and trades filled by day and after-hours crossing systems, electronic communication networks (ECNs), and traditional brokers. Controlling for variation in order and security characteristics, as well as endogeneity in the choice of trading venue, we find that realized execution costs are generally lower on alternative trading systems. Order handling rules and tick size changes implemented in 1997 appear to have reduced the cost advantage of trading on ECNs.