Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate the impact of lenders' information sharing on firms' performance in the credit market using rich contract-level data from a U.S. credit bureau. The staggered entry of lenders into the bureau offers a natural experiment to identify the effect of lenders' improved access to information. Consistent with the predictions of Padilla and Pagano, 1997, Padilla and Pagano, 2000 and Pagano and Jappelli (1993), we find that information sharing reduces contract delinquencies and defaults, especially when firms are informationally opaque. The results also reveal that information sharing does not reduce the use of guarantees, that is, it may not loosen lending standards.

When corporate payout is taxed, internal equity (retained earnings) is cheaper than external equity (share issues). If there are no perfect substitutes for equity finance, payout taxes may therefore have an effect on the investment of firms. High taxes will favor investment by firms who can finance internally. Using an international panel with many changes in payout taxes, we show that this prediction holds well. Payout taxes have a large impact on the dynamics of corporate investment and growth. Investment is “locked in” in profitable firms when payout is heavily taxed. Thus, apart from any level effects, payout taxes change the allocation of capital.

Several papers use a fractional specification (net inflow/ assets under management) to infer a convex relation between flow and past performance. However, heterogeneous linear response functions combined with the pooled analysis commonly used in these studies can yield false convexity estimates. We show that such heterogeneity obtains in practice. Along these same lines, the paper also finds that several previously unexamined implications of a convex flow-performance relation fail to hold. Moreover, convexity with fractional flows (which we confirm) largely disappears in a conditional analysis that controls for heterogeneity. Market shares offer an alternative specification for flow that is more resilient to heterogeneity. Using this alternative specification, we again find no evidence of convexity in the flow-performance relation. We conclude that the widely held belief that the flow response function is convex is due solely to misspecification of the empirical model. The flow-return relation is linear.

We demonstrate that legislation has a simple, yet previously undetected, impact on stock prices. Exploiting the voting record of legislators whose constituents are the affected industries, we show that the votes of these “interested” legislators capture important information seemingly ignored by the market. A long-short portfolio based on these legislators' views earns abnormal returns of over 90 basis points per month following the passage of legislation. Industries that we classify as beneficiaries of legislation experience significantly more positive earnings surprises and positive analyst revisions in the months following passage of the bill, as well as significantly higher future sales and profitability. We show that the more complex the legislation, the more difficulty the market has in assessing the impact of these bills. Further, the more concentrated the legislator's interest in the industry, the more informative are her votes for future returns.

We show that the commonly observed correlation between institutional investor ownership and the success of mergers is partly driven by active stock picking. Several mutual fund stock selection skill measures strongly predict the post-merger performance of corporate acquirers even after controlling for possible shareholder monitoring. These findings are stronger for funds with characteristics more indicative of active stock picking. Moreover, firms held by funds with higher stock selection skills are more likely to subsequently become acquirers, suggesting that the mutual fund skill set includes the ability to identify acquirers with value-enhancing acquisition opportunities.

This paper considers the term structure of interest rates implied by a production-based asset pricing model in which the fundamental drivers are investment in equipment and structures as well as inflation. The model matches the average yield curve up to five-year maturity almost perfectly. Longer term yields are roughly as volatile as in the data. The model also generates time-varying bond risk premiums. In particular, when running Fama-Bliss regressions of excess returns on forward premiums, the model produces slope coefficients of roughly half the size of the empirical counterparts. Closed-form expressions highlight the importance of the capital depreciation rates for interest rate dynamics.

Using 636 large acquisition attempts that are accompanied by a negative stock price reaction at their announcement (“value-reducing acquisition attempts”) from 1990 to 2010, we find that, in deciding whether to abandon a value-reducing acquisition attempt, managers' sensitivity to the firm's stock price reaction at the announcement is influenced by the level and the tone of media attention to the proposed transaction. We interpret the results to imply that managers have reputational capital at risk in making corporate capital allocation decisions and that the level and tone of media attention heighten the impact of a value-reducing acquisition on the managers' reputational capital. To the extent that value-reducing acquisition attempts are more likely to be abandoned, the media can play a role in aligning managers' and shareholders' interests.

The paper investigates the term structure of interest rates imposed by equilibrium in a production economy consisting of participants with heterogeneous preferences. Consumption is restricted to an arbitrary number of discrete times. The paper contains an exact solution to market equilibrium and provides an explicit constructive algorithm for determining the state price density process. The convergence of the algorithm is proven. Interest rates and their behavior are given as a function of economic variables.

This paper implements strategies that use macroeconomic variables to select European equity mutual funds, including Pan-European, country, and sector funds. We find that several macro-variables are useful in locating funds with future outperformance and that country-specific mutual funds provide the best opportunities for fund rotation strategies using macroeconomic information. Specifically, our baseline long-only strategies that exploit time-varying predictability provide four-factor alphas of 12–13% per year over the 1993–2008 period. Our study provides new evidence on the skills of local versus Pan-European asset managers, as well as how macroeconomic information can be used to locate and time these local fund manager skills.

This paper demonstrates that intangible assets play an important role in financial policy. Using a proprietary database of consumer brand evaluation, I show that positive consumer attitude toward a firm's products alleviates financial frictions and provides additional net debt capacity, as measured by higher leverage and lower cash holdings. Brand perception affects financial policy through reducing overall firm riskiness, as strong consumer evaluations translate into lower future cash flow volatility as well as higher credit ratings for potentially volatile firms. The impact of brand is stronger among small firms, contradicting a number of reverse causality and omitted variables explanations.