Knowledge that Transforms

Using historical price records for Bordeaux Premiers Crus, we examine the impact of aging on wine prices and the long-term investment performance of fine wine. In line with the predictions of an illustrative model, young maturing wines from high-quality vintages provide the highest financial returns. Past maturity, famous châteaus deliver growing non-pecuniary benefits to their owners. Using an arithmetic repeat-sales regression over 1900–2012, we estimate a real financial return to wine investment (net of storage costs) of 4.1%, which exceeds bonds, art, and stamps. Returns to wine and equities are positively correlated. Finally, we find evidence of in-sample return predictability.

This paper examines the outcomes and characteristics of corporate acquisitions from the perspective of stakeholder-shareholder agency conflicts. Using state variation in labor protections, we find that acquirers with strong labor rights experience lower announcement returns. Combined acquirer and target announcement returns are also lower in the presence of strong labor rights. Our findings remain statistically and economically significant after we control for a range of deal, firm, industry and state characteristics and explore various channels for the labor rights effect. Overall, the evidence indicates that employee-shareholder conflicts of interest reduce shareholder gains from acquisitions.

We examine the illiquidity premium in stock markets across 45 countries and present two findings. First, the average illiquidity return premium across countries is positive and significant, after controlling for other pricing factors. The premium is measured by monthly return series on illiquid-minus-liquid stocks or by the coefficient of stock illiquidity estimated from cross section Fama-MacBeth regressions. Second, a commonality exists across countries in the illiquidity return premium, controlling for common global return factors and variation in global illiquidity. This commonality is different from commonality in illiquidity itself and is greater in globally integrated markets.

We study how cultural norms and enforcement policies influence illicit corporate activities. Using confidential Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit data, we show that corporations with owners from countries with higher corruption norms evade more tax in the U.S. This effect is strong for small corporations and decreases as the size of the corporation increases. In the mid-2000s, the United States implemented several enforcement measures to increase tax compliance. We find that these enforcement efforts were less effective in reducing tax evasion by corporations whose owners are from corrupt countries. This suggests that cultural norms can be a challenge to legal enforcement.

We develop a model where some investors are uncertain whether others are trading on informative signals or noise. Uncertainty about others leads to a nonlinear price that reacts asymmetrically to news. We incorporate this uncertainty into a dynamic setting where traders gradually learn about others and show that it generates empirically relevant return dynamics: expected returns are stochastic but predictable, and volatility exhibits clustering and the “leverage” effect. The model nests both the rational expectations (RE) and differences of opinions (DO) approaches and highlights a link between disagreement about fundamentals and uncertainty about other traders.

Unregulated US corporations dramatically increased their debt usage over the past century. Aggregate leverage—low and stable before 1945—more than tripled between 1945 and 1970 from 11% to 35%, eventually reaching 47% by the early 1990s. The median firm in 1946 had no debt, but by 1970 had a leverage ratio of 31%. This increase occurred in all unregulated industries and affected firms of all sizes. Changing firm characteristics are unable to account for this increase. Rather, changes in government borrowing, macroeconomic uncertainty, and financial sector development play a more prominent role. Despite this increase among unregulated firms, a combination of stable debt usage among regulated firms and a decrease in the fraction of aggregate assets held by regulated firms over this period resulted in a relatively stable economy-wide leverage ratio during the 20th century.

We find that several factors explain an individual investor׳s style, i.e., the value versus growth orientation of the investor׳s stock portfolio. First, we find that an investor׳s style has a biological basis and is partially ingrained in an investor from birth. Second, we show that an investor׳s hedging demands as well as behavioral biases explain investment style. Finally, an investor׳s style is explained by life course theory in that experiences, both earlier and later in life, are related to investment style. Investors with adverse macroeconomic experiences (e.g., growing up during the Great Depression or entering the labor market during an economic recession) or who grow up in a lower socioeconomic status rearing environment have a stronger value orientation several decades later. Our research contributes a new perspective to the long-standing value and growth debate in finance.

We test if issuers of asset- and mortgage-backed securities receive rating favors from agencies with which they maintain strong business relationships. Controlling for issuer fixed effects and a large set of credit risk determinants, we show that agencies publish better ratings for those issuers that provide them with more bilateral securitization business. Such rating favors are larger for very complex structured debt deals and for deals issued during the credit boom period. Our analysis is based on a new deal-level rating statistic that accounts for the full distribution of tranche ratings below the AAA cut-off point of a structured debt deal.

Rating agencies consult with local government officials several days prior to official announcements of sovereign debt rating changes, making information leakage likely. Using cross-country data from 1988 to 2012, we find evidence of information leakage. In particular, we find statistically and economically significant negative daily abnormal stock index returns prior to downgrade announcements. These effects are more pronounced in countries with lower institutional quality, and they persist during times with no downgrade rumors and no concurrent bad news in general. A mild post-announcement reversal consistent with overreaction to pre-event downgrade rumors highlights the adverse effects of such leakage and, thus, should be a policy concern for capital market regulators.