I examine the link between political uncertainty and firm investment using U.S. gubernatorial elections as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in uncertainty. Investment declines 5% before all elections and up to 15% for subsamples of firms particularly susceptible to political uncertainty. I use term limits as an instrumental variable (IV) for election closeness. Because close elections are related to economic downturns, I find that the effect of close elections on investment is understated by more than half by ordinary least squares (OLS). Post-election rebounds in investment depend on whether an incumbent is re-elected. Finally, I provide evidence that firms delay equity and debt issuances tied to investments before elections.

We find that shocks to the equity capital ratio of financial intermediaries—Primary Dealer counterparties of the New York Federal Reserve—possess significant explanatory power for cross-sectional variation in expected returns. This is true not only for commonly studied equity and government bond market portfolios, but also for other more sophisticated asset classes such as corporate and sovereign bonds, derivatives, commodities, and currencies. Our intermediary capital risk factor is strongly procyclical, implying countercyclical intermediary leverage. The price of risk for intermediary capital shocks is consistently positive and of similar magnitude when estimated separately for individual asset classes, suggesting that financial intermediaries are marginal investors in many markets and hence key to understanding asset prices.

Multi-market banks reallocate capital when local credit demand increases after natural disasters. Using property damage as an instrument for lending growth, we find credit in unaffected but connected markets declines by a little less than 50 cents per dollar of additional lending in shocked areas. However, banks shield their core markets because most of the decline comes from loans in areas where banks do not own branches. Moreover, banks increase sales of more-liquid loans and they bid up the rate on deposits in the connected markets. These actions help lessen the impact of the demand shock on credit supply.

We construct a text-based measure of uncertainty starting in 1890 using front-page articles of the Wall Street Journal. News implied volatility (NVIX) peaks during stock market crashes, times of policy-related uncertainty, world wars, and financial crises. In US postwar data, periods when NVIX is high are followed by periods of above average stock returns, even after controlling for contemporaneous and forward-looking measures of stock market volatility. News coverage related to wars and government policy explains most of the time variation in risk premia our measure identifies. Over the longer 1890–2009 sample that includes the Great Depression and two world wars, high NVIX predicts high future returns in normal times and rises just before transitions into economic disasters. The evidence is consistent with recent theories emphasizing time variation in rare disaster risk as a source of aggregate asset prices fluctuations.

The simultaneous occurrence of jumps in several stocks can be associated with major financial news, triggers short-term predictability in stock returns, is correlated with sudden spikes of the variance risk premium, and determines a persistent increase (decrease) of stock variances and correlations when they come along with bad (good) news. These systemic events and their implications can be easily overlooked by traditional univariate jump statistics applied to stock indices. They are instead revealed in a clearly cut way by using a novel test procedure applied to individual assets, which is particularly effective on high-volume stocks.

We study pricing and non-pricing features of loan contracts to gauge how the credit market evaluates a firm’s customer-base profile and supply-chain relations. Higher customer concentration increases interest rate spreads and the number of restrictive covenants featured in newly initiated as well as renegotiated bank loans. Customer concentration also abbreviates the maturity of those loans as well as the relationship between firms and their banks. These effects are intensified by customers’ financial distress, the level of relationship-specific investments, and the use of trade credit in customer–supplier relations. Our evidence shows that a deeper exposure to a small set of large customers bears negative consequences for a firm’s relations with its creditors, revealing limits to integration along the supply chain.

We investigate whether firms in close customer–supplier relationships are better able to identify and implement tax avoidance strategies via supply chains. Consistent with our prediction, we find that both principal customers and their dependent suppliers avoid more taxes than other firms. Further analysis suggests that principal customers and dependent suppliers likely engage in tax strategies involving shifting profits to tax haven subsidiaries. Moreover, tax benefits appear to explain both principal customer firms’ and dependent supplier firms’ organizational decisions. Overall, our study provides evidence of the importance of tax avoidance as a source of gains from these relationships.

Private equity (PE) performance is persistent, with PE firms consistently producing high (or low) net-of-fees returns. We use a new variance decomposition model to isolate three components of persistence. We find high long-term persistence: the spread in expected net-of-fee future returns between top and bottom quartile PE firms is 7–8 percentage points annually. This spread is estimated controlling for spurious persistence, which arises mechanically from the overlap of contemporaneous funds. Performance is noisy, however, making it difficult for investors to identify the PE funds with top quartile expected future performance and leaving little investable persistence.

We investigate systematic changes in corporate effective tax rates over the past 25 years and find that effective tax rates have decreased significantly. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the decline in effective tax rates is not concentrated in multinational firms; effective tax rates have declined at approximately the same rate for both multinational and domestic firms. Moreover, within multinational firms, both foreign and domestic effective rates have decreased. Finally, changes in firm characteristics and declining foreign statutory tax rates explain little of the overall decrease in effective rates.

The neoclassical theory of investment has mainly been tested with physical investment, but we show that it also helps explain intangible investment. At the firm level, Tobin’s q explains physical and intangible investment roughly equally well, and it explains total investment even better. Compared with physical capital, intangible capital adjusts more slowly to changes in investment opportunities. The classic q theory performs better in firms and years with more intangible capital: Total and even physical investment are better explained by Tobin’s q and are less sensitive to cash flow. At the macro level, Tobin’s q explains intangible investment many times better than physical investment. We propose a simple, new Tobin’s q proxy that accounts for intangible capital, and we show that it is a superior proxy for both physical and intangible investment opportunities.