We present an analytical solution for a pure exchange economy featuring a continuum of agents with disagreement, time-varying information quality, and reference-dependent preferences. Our general equilibrium model exhibits stationary dynamics. By examining the implications of the model, we find that the commonly studied asset pricing channels of disagreement have limited quantitative significance. On the other hand, variations in information quality, which affect disagreement levels, lead to substantial excess stock price volatility. This finding contributes significantly to explaining the equity premium and sheds light on empirical relationships between forecast dispersion and asset prices, the upward sloping real yield curve, and long-term yield movements.

Management companies assign some portfolio managers to run funds within a single investment objective (i.e., specialists), and others to run funds across several investment objectives (i.e., generalists). Our results show that funds achieve higher performance when they appoint superior pickers as specialists and market timers as generalists. We argue that these decisions are the result of a better match of manager mandates with the way information is collected and processed in each investment strategy. Overall our results are consistent with decision-making in fund families that add value to their investors by aiming to optimally assign or reassign portfolio managers.

We study the incentive effects of granting levered or unlevered stock to a risk-averse manager. The stock is granted by risk-neutral shareholders who choose leverage and compensation level. The manager applies costly effort and selects the level of volatility, both of which affect expected return. The results are driven by the attempt of the risk-neutral shareholders to maximize the value of their claims net of the compensation package. We consider a dynamic setting and find that levered stock is optimal for high-type managers, firms with high momentum, large firms, and firms for which additional volatility only implies a modest increase in expected return.

We explore the extent to which aspirations – such as those forged in the course of social interactions – explain ‘puzzling’ behavioral patterns in investment decisions. We motivate an aspirational utility, reminiscent of Friedman and Savage (1948), where social considerations (e.g., status concerns) provide an economic foundation for aspirations. We show this utility can explain a range of observed investor behaviors, such as the demand for both right- and left-skewed assets; aspects of the disposition effect; and patterns in stock-market participation consistent with empirical observations. We corroborate our theoretical findings with two novel laboratory experimental studies, where we observed participants’ preference for skewness in risky lotteries shift as lab-induced aspirations shifted.