Differences among bidder type-specific outcomes of asset sales are theoretically related to differences in bidders’ valuations and participation. The lead application to quantify these relations is takeover auctions: bidders are classified into strategic and financial, and bids are available. I structurally estimate valuations from all bids. The positive difference in premiums between strategic and financial acquirers is driven by the difference in dispersions of valuations (e.g., strategic bidders’ synergies are more dispersed) and the set of auction participants. The difference in average valuations is relatively unimportant. My approach can help explain outcomes of asset sales, even in settings with limited bidder data.

This paper investigates how jump risks are priced in currency markets. We find that currencies whose changes are more sensitive to negative market jumps provide significantly higher expected returns. The positive risk premium constitutes compensation for the extreme losses during periods of market turmoil. Using the empirical findings, we propose a jump modified carry trade strategy, which has approximately two-percentage-point (per annum) higher returns than the regular carry trade strategy. These findings result from the fact that negative jump betas are significantly related to the riskiness of currencies and business conditions.

Benchmark models that exogenously specify equity dynamics cannot explain the large spread in prices between put options written on individual banks and options written on the bank index during the financial crisis. However, theory requires that asset dynamics be specified exogenously and that endogenously determined equity dynamics exhibit a “leverage effect” that increases put prices by fattening the left tail of the distribution. The leverage effect is larger for puts on individual stocks than for puts on the index, thus increasing the basket-index spread. Time-series and cross-sectional variation in the leverage effect explains option prices well.

This paper examines how competition among suppliers affects their willingness to provide trade credit financing. Trade credit extended by a supplier to a cash constrained retailer allows the latter to increase cash purchases from its other suppliers, leading to a free rider problem. A supplier that represents a smaller share of the retailer’s purchases internalizes a smaller part of the benefit from increased spending by the retailer and, as a result, extends less trade credit relative to its sales. In consequence, retailers with dispersed suppliers obtain less trade credit than those whose suppliers are more concentrated. The free rider problem is especially detrimental to a trade creditor when the free-riding suppliers are its product market competitors, leading to a negative relation between product substitutability among suppliers to a given retailer and trade credit that the former provide to the latter. We test the model using both simulated and real data. The estimated relations are consistent with the model’s predictions and are statistically and economically significant.

This paper uses proprietary data from a leading intermediary to explain the magnitude and determinants of transaction costs in the secondary market for private equity stakes. Most transactions occur at a discount to net asset value. Buyers average an annualized public market equivalent of 1.023 compared with 0.976 for sellers, implying that buyers outperform sellers by a market-adjusted 5 percentage points annually. Both the cross-sectional pattern of transaction costs and the identity of sellers and buyers suggest that the market is one in which relatively flexible buyers earn returns by supplying liquidity to investors wishing to exit.

Elevated levels of government debt raise concerns about their effects on long-term growth prospects. Using the cross-section of US stock returns, we show that (i) high-R&D firms are more exposed to government debt and pay higher expected returns than low-R&D firms, and (ii) higher levels of the debt-to-GDP ratio predict higher risk premiums for high-R&D firms. Furthermore, rises in the cost of capital for innovation-intensive firms predict declines in subsequent productivity and economic growth. We propose a production-based asset pricing model with endogenous innovation and fiscal policy shocks that can rationalize key aspects of the empirical evidence. Our study highlights a novel and distinct risk channel shaping the link between government debt and future growth.