Knowledge that Transforms

This paper introduces collateral rehypothecation, a widespread practice in derivatives, swaps, and repo markets, in a general equilibrium model with default. Rehypothecation frees up collateral because it allows lenders to resell or repledge assets pledged by borrowers. The risk that lenders will not return the asset, however, limits gains from rehypothecation. Still, when markets are contractually incomplete or decentralized, rehypothecation can achieve a superior use of scarce collateral. These results have implications for the repo market and suggest that limits to rehypothecation can cause price fragmentation.

Do targeted macroprudential measures impact non-targeted sectors too? We investigate the compositional changes in the supply of credit by Swiss banks, exploiting their differential exposure to the activation in 2013 of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) which targeted banks’ exposure to residential mortgages. We find that the additional capital requirements resulting from the activation of the CCyB are associated with higher growth in banks’ commercial lending. While banks are lending more to all types of businesses, the new macroprudential policy benefits smaller and riskier businesses the most. However, the interest rates and other costs of obtaining credit for these firms rise as well.

Liquidity shocks transmitted through interbank connections contributed to bank distress during the Great Depression. New data on interbank connections reveal that banks were vulnerable to closures of their correspondents and their respondents. Further, banks were less responsive to network liquidity risk in their management of cash and capital buffers after the Federal Reserve was established, suggesting that banks expected the Fed to reduce that risk. The Fed's presence weakened incentives for the most systemically important banks to maintain capital and cash buffers against liquidity risk, and thereby likely contributed to the banking system's vulnerability to contagion during the Depression.

We survey more than 200 private equity (PE) managers from firms with $1.9 trillion of assets under management (AUM) about their portfolio performance, decision-making and activities during the Covid-19 pandemic. Given that PE managers have significant incentives to maximize value, their actions during the pandemic should indicate what they perceive as being important for both the preservation and creation of value. PE managers believe that 40% of their portfolio companies are moderately negatively affected and 10% are very negatively affected by the pandemic. The private equity managers—both investment and operating partners—are actively engaged in the operations, governance, and financing in all of their current portfolio companies. These activities are more intensively pursued in those companies that have been more severely affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result of the pandemic, they expect the performance of their existing funds to decline. They are more pessimistic about that decline than the venture capitalists (VCs) surveyed in Gompers et al. (2021). Despite the pandemic, private equity managers are seeking new investments. Rather than focusing on cost cutting, PE investors place a much greater weight on revenue growth for value creation. Relative to the 2012 survey results reported in Gompers, Kaplan, and Mukharlyamov (2016), they appear to give a larger equity stake to management teams and target somewhat lower returns.

How does management insulation from shareholder pressure influence banks’ resilience to crises? To address this question, we develop a measure of management insulation based on legal provisions. Unlike the existing alternatives, our measure considers the interactions between different provisions. We use this measure to study the relationship between management insulation and bank failure during the 2007–09 financial crisis. We find that banks in which managers were more insulated from shareholders in 2003 were less likely to be both bailed out in 2008/09 and targeted by activist shareholders. By contrast, alternative measures of management insulation fail to predict both bailouts and shareholder activism.

Some regulators grant contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) the status of “going-concern” capital. Theory, however, suggests that CoCos can induce debt overhang, thereby amplifying the leverage ratchet effect. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence consistent with this theory. Our results suggest that banks with more volatile assets (riskier banks) (i) are less likely to issue CoCos, (ii) conditional on having CoCos outstanding are less likely to issue equity, and (iii) prefer issuing equity over CoCos. Since riskier banks suffer from more debt overhang it is more costly for them to issue CoCos.

This paper studies the effects of the bank capital requirements imposed by the European authorities in October 2011 on loan collateral and personal guarantees usage to enhance capital ratios. We use detailed information on the loan contracts granted by a representative Spanish bank and several subsidiaries to nonfinancial corporations around that date. We document that personal guarantees usage increases more than that of collateral, especially at subsidiaries with lower capital ratios. However, although the former type of guarantees demonstrably disciplined firms in their risk-taking before 2011, their subsequent overuse may have blunted their impact and may have even undermined firm performance and investment.

We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stable, because high leverage makes deviations from a cartel agreement more attractive. Given that cartels have a large economic footprint, their study is also relevant for the capital structure literature, which has largely ignored the role of anti-competitive behavior.

The COVID-19 pandemic caused a global health and economic crisis to which governments responded with massive policy interventions. Using Brazil as a testing ground, we investigate the influence of the pandemic and ensuing policy interventions on local credit markets. First, we find that the pandemic has a significantly negative impact on local credit. Second, using a novel manually collected database on the staggered municipal government policy interventions, we show heterogenous effects of interventions: positive effects of soft interventions (e.g., social distancing and mass gathering restrictions) and late reopening, and negative effects of hard interventions (e.g., closure of non-essential services) and early reopening. Third, we find that state-owned banks grant more local credit than privately owned banks during the COVID-19 crisis but this difference is less pronounced than it was in the 2008 Financial Crisis. We confirm our results using pre-pandemic local political preference as instrument for policy interventions and orthogonalized policy intervention indicators, and in placebo tests.

We develop a model of liquidity shortages that incorporates a general equilibrium feature of liquidity: when banks hold more liquidity, other agents in the economy hold less of it and will supply less in times of crisis. We show that the private holdings of liquidity at banks are inefficient, with the direction of the bias being determined by the characteristics of the suppliers of liquidity to banks. Minimum liquidity requirements for banks may reduce welfare; in such cases interest rate policies that stimulate the ex-post supply of liquidity can restore efficiency. Overall, our results show that optimal liquidity policies critically depend on a financial institution’s (marginal) source of liquidity and will hence differ across institutions of different types.