Knowledge that Transforms

This paper investigates whether Japanese banks had been following herd behavior in the domestic loan market from 1975 through 2000. Applying the technique developed by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny [Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.V., 1992. The impact of institutional trading on stock prices, J. Finan. Econ. 32, 23–43] to the data from loans outstanding to different types of borrowers, we obtain evidence indicative of the existence of herding. City banks in Japan had been following a cyclical pattern of herding with one of the peaks around the bubble period in the late 1980s. Adjusting further for herding resulting from rational behavior, evidence indicative of the existence of irrational herding was observed only in the bubble period. Our estimate indicates that a total of some 5 trillion yen of loan increase by city banks during the period of 1987–1989 can be attributed to irrational herd behavior. The results imply that irrational bank behavior in the late 1980s might have contributed to the problems Japanese banks had with non-performing loans. We also obtained evidence for herding among regional banks and among geographically proximate banks.

When information is costly, a seller may wish to prevent prospective buyers from acquiring information, for the cost of information acquisition ultimately is borne by the seller. A seller can achieve the desired prevention through posted-price selling, by offering prospective buyers a discount. No such prevention is possible in the case of an auction. We establish the result that the seller prefers posted-price selling when the cost of information acquisition is high and auctions when it is low. We view corporate bonds as an instance of the former case, and government bonds as an instance of the latter.

The competition between a central securities depository (CSD) and a custodian bank is analyzed in a Stackelberg model. Investor banks decide whether to use the services of the CSD or of the custodian bank, depending on the prices and their preferences for their inhomogeneous services. Since the custodian bank uses services provided by the CSD as input, the CSD can raise its rival's costs. The CSD's equilibrium market share is higher than socially optimal, unless the CSD is not allowed to charge negative prices. This result has important policy implications that are related to a discussion currently taking place in the securities settlement industry.

We assess dealer behavior in the specials market for US Treasury securities by comparing dealer participation in the Federal Reserve's securities loan auctions with prices in the private market. Dealer behavior is generally consistent with the law of one price and apparent violations can largely be explained by institutional differences between the private market and the Fed's program. However, for auctions that are effectively noncompetitive, dealers regularly pass up true arbitrage opportunities and frequently overpay to borrow securities. Dealers apparently do not realize that certain auctions are noncompetitive, even though the information needed to discern this fact is publicly available in advance.

This paper analyzes banks' choice between lending to firms individually and sharing lending with other banks, when firms and banks are subject to moral hazard and monitoring is essential. Multiple-bank lending is optimal whenever the benefit of greater diversification in terms of higher monitoring dominates the costs of free-riding and duplication of efforts. The model predicts a greater use of multiple-bank lending when banks are small relative to investment projects, firms are less profitable, and poor financial integration, regulation and inefficient judicial systems increase monitoring costs. These results are consistent with empirical observations concerning small business lending and loan syndication.

This paper shows that the liberalization of capital inflows may undermine bank stability in emerging markets. After financial liberalization, uninformed international investors rationally provide large amounts of funds at low cost. This enables insolvent banks to accumulate bad loans. In equilibrium, when a substantial amount of losses may have been accumulated, solvent banks do not find it any longer optimal to issue debt at the interest rate that would compensate investors for risk. Investors anticipate this and stop holding bank debt. When the market for bank liabilities breaks down, insolvent banks default. I show that, because of wasteful investment, the liberalization of capital inflows may decrease aggregate welfare.

How do banks react to increased competition? Recent banking theory significantly disagrees regarding the impact of competition on bank orientation—i.e., the choice of relationship-based versus transactional banking. We empirically investigate the impact of interbank competition on bank branch orientation. We employ a unique data set containing detailed information on bank–firm relationships. We find that bank branches facing stiff local competition engage considerably more in relationship-based lending. Our results illustrate that competition and relationships are not necessarily inimical.