Knowledge that Transforms

This paper reviews critical legal and policy issues created by cross-border banking insolvencies. These include (I) Insolvency principles, such as (1) criteria for intervention; (2) deposit insurance; (3) power to manage; (4) ability to maximize recoveries. Also included is (II) International legal complications. Critical issues in cross-border crisis management involve: (1) division of labor between home and host countries; (2) the availability of information; (3) the legal, regulatory and supervisory framework; (4) the law governing initiation of proceedings; (5) grounds for intervention; (6) deposit insurance; (7) legal powers of controlling authorities; (8) the potential financial and economic effects. We conclude with a few proposals for cooperation.

The crisis is not yet over; the housing market continues to deteriorate and there are spill-overs into other markets. Growth is declining, with potentially self re-enforcing mechanisms between financial markets and the real economy coming into play. A local problem became a global crisis because of poor risk management, lack of transparency and excessive leverage. Not only does the capital base need re-building, but also incentive schemes need reconsideration.

This paper describes several (European) regulatory initiatives undertaken following the financial crisis. There have been global responses, such as the FSF and BCBS 2008 Reports; numerous national initiatives, including a new Belgian network; and the European 2008 MOU, with nine common principles. The first concerns objectives; the rest cover three main topics, including: (1) crisis management framework; (2) co-ordination between authorities during crises; (3) choice of resolution policy. The MOU advocates the establishment of cross-border stability groups (CBSG). Finally we discuss the distinction between potential agreements on: (1) burden-sharing principles and (2) burden-sharing rules. Without the possibility of an effective enforcement policy, the former is preferable.

The article contributes to the literature on financial fragility, studying how macroeconomic shocks affect supply and demand in the corporate debt market. We take into account the effect of the competitive environment, as well as the risk level, measured by companies’ default rate. The model is estimated using data from the Harmonised BACH database of corporate accounts for large euro area countries on the 1993–2005 period, in order to carry out an illustrative stress testing exercise. We measure the impact of large macroeconomic shocks (a severe recession and a sharp increase in oil prices) on the equilibrium in the debt market.

In this paper, I shall briefly discuss five issues: (1) the ‘collective action’ problem, whereby bankers have an incentive to herd together; (2) the provision of central bank liquidity insurance; notably the time consistency and stigma concerns; (3) clarifying the objectives of central bank operations; (4) whether to ‘lean against the wind’ of credit cycles; (5) the macro-economic backdrop and preconditions for financial-system stabilisation.

Weak bank supervision could give banks the ability to shift risk from themselves to supervisors. We use cross-border bank mergers as a natural experiment to test changes in risk and the impact of supervision. We examine cross-border bank mergers and find that the supervisory structures of the partners’ countries influence changes in post-merger total risk. An acquirer from a country with strong supervision lowers total risk after a cross-border merger. However, total risk increases when the target bank is located in a country with relatively strong supervision. This result is consistent with strong host regulators limiting the risky activities of their local banks. Foreign-owned competitors could then engage in the risky projects, especially if the foreign banks’ supervisors are not strong. An acquirer entering a country with strong supervision appears to shift risk back to its home country. The results suggest that bank supervisors can reduce total banking risk in their countries by being strong.

Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) provides a more efficient mechanism for dealing with problem banks operating in more than one European country. In a PCA framework, a bank's losses are likely to be substantially reduced. This reduction in the losses to deposit insurance and governments will improve the problem of allocating those losses across the various insurance schemes and make it less likely that any deposit insurer will renege on its obligations in a cross-border banking crisis. This paper presents a stylized mechanism aimed at dealing with the cross-border agency problems that arise in supervising and resolving cross-border banking groups in the European Union (EU). The authors assume that PCA policies have been implemented by the national supervisors and explore the institutional changes needed in Europe if PCA is to be effective as an incentive compatible mechanism. The paper identifies these changes starting with enhancements in the availability of information on banking groups to supervisors. Next, the paper considers the collective decision making by supervisors with authority to make discretionary decisions within the PCA framework as soon as a bank of a cross-border banking group falls below the minimum capital standard. Finally, the paper analyzes the coordination measures that should be implemented if PCA requires the bank to be resolved.

While it is tempting to focus on new financial innovations in helping explain recent financial turmoil, more traditional causes should not be overlooked. As on many previous occasions, very rapid credit growth led to major increases in asset prices, which in turn encouraged consumption and investment decisions which could yet prove unsustainable. The natural “procyclicality” of the financial system could perhaps be contained through the introduction of a “new macrofinancial stability framework”. There are many practical impediments to realising such a suggestion, but there are also grounds for belief that these impediments could be removed.

The quality of statistical risk models is much lower than often assumed. Such models are useful for measuring the risk of frequent small events, such as in internal risk management, but not for systemically important events. Unfortunately, it is common to see unrealistic demands placed on risk models. Having a number representing risk seems to be more important than having a number which is correct. Here, it is demonstrated that even in what may be the easiest and most reliable modeling exercise, value-at-risk forecasts from the most commonly used risk models provide very inconsistent results.