Knowledge that Transforms

Economic policy uncertainty affects decisions of households, businesses, policy makers and financial intermediaries. We first examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty on aggregate bank credit growth. Then we analyze commercial bank entity level data to gauge the effects of policy uncertainty on financial intermediaries’ lending. We exploit the cross-sectional heterogeneity to back out indirect evidence of its effects on businesses and households. We ask (i) whether, conditional on standard macroeconomic controls, economic policy uncertainty affected bank level credit growth, and (ii) whether there is variation in the impact related to banks’ balance sheet conditions; that is, whether the effects are attributable to loan demand or, if impact varies with bank level financial constraints, loan supply. We find that policy uncertainty has a significant negative effect on bank credit growth. Since this impact varies meaningfully with some bank characteristics – particularly the overall capital-to-assets ratio and bank asset liquidity-loan supply factors at least partially (and significantly) help determine the influence of policy uncertainty. Because other studies have found important macroeconomic effects of bank lending growth on the macroeconomy, our findings are consistent with the possibility that high economic policy uncertainty may have slowed the U.S. economic recovery from the Great Recession by restraining overall credit growth through the bank lending channel.

Contingent capital (coco) automatically recapitalizes the banking system during financial crises if the trigger mechanism is properly designed. We propose a dual trigger mechanism based on: (1) aggregate systemic risk in the banking system, measured using CATFIN, and (2) the individual bank’s contribution to overall systemic risk, measured using delta CoVaR. The dual trigger is highly correlated with system-wide insolvency risk and prices systemic risk. We set different triggers for banks, insurance companies and broker-dealers. Using the 99% cut-off, systemic coco issued by Lehman and Bear Stearns would have been triggered in November 2007, months prior to their actual demise.

This paper studies the reaction of the Euro's value against major currencies to sovereign rating announcements from Moody's, S&P and Fitch CRAs during the Eurozone debt crisis in 2010–2012 based on event study methodology combined with GARCH models. We also analyze how the yields of French, Italian, German and Spanish government long-term bonds were affected by CRA announcements. Our results reveal that CRA downgrades, watchlist and outlook announcements had no impact on the value of the Euro currency but increased exchange rate volatility. At the same time, downgrades as well as negative outlook announcements increased the yields of French, Italian, and Spanish bonds and even affected the German bond's yields. This shows that the monetary union has led to a breakdown of the consequences of the rating shocks between currency value and sovereign bond yields. The reason is that part of the rating shock is absorbed by an internal repricing of sovereign bonds.

This paper investigates the effectiveness of nine non-interest rate policies on house prices and housing credit using data from 57 economies and periods of up to three decades. We find that introductions or reductions in the maximum debt-service-to-income ratio, and increases in housing-related taxes, have significant negative effects on housing credit, with a typical tightening action lowering the real credit growth rate by 4–6 percentage points and by 3–4 percentage points, respectively, over the subsequent four quarters. Increases in housing-related taxes moderate house price growth, with a typical increase slowing real house price appreciation by 3–4 percentage points over the same horizon.

This paper examines the determinants of CDS spreads and potential spillover effects for Eurozone countries during the recent financial crisis in the EU. We employ a Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) model which combines the advantages of traditional VAR modelling with those of a panel-data approach. In addition to variables that proxy for global and financial market spread determinants we also employ variables that proxy for behavioral determinants. We find that the determinants of CDS variance are neither uniform nor stable during different periods and different countries. For instance, as we move from 2008 to 2014 the impact of the slope of the term structure on CDS spread variance is increasing for peripheral countries such as Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Ireland, and decreasing for core countries such as Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium and Austria. Other findings indicate that investor sentiment was an important CDS spread determinant during the subprime crisis, along with other factors, while spillover effects run from larger peripheral economies such as Spain and Italy to core countries; spillover effects from Portugal, Greece, and Ireland are of minor importance.

We examine deals between listed firms and promoters who have been secretly hired to increase their stock prices. This behavior by the secret promoter is illegal (and leads to prosecution) but the actions of the hiring firm are legal. We use data from these prosecutions to analyze the behavior and motivations of the hiring firms. We find that secret promotion leads to an initial increase in the price and trading volume of the firms on the date that the secret promotion started. Subsequently, however, we find that this increase in price is reversed when regulators (e.g. SEC or NASD) take action against these promoters for not disclosing their relationships with the hiring firms. We find that the main motives behind these relationships are to maximize the private benefits of the firm’s managers and owners through pumping the share prices and subsequently dumping their shareholdings.

This paper discusses the role of risk communication in macroprudential oversight and of visualization in risk communication. Beyond the increase in data availability and precision, the transition from firm-centric to system-wide supervision imposes vast data needs. Moreover, in addition to internal communication as in any organization, broad and effective external communication of timely information related to systemic risks is a key mandate of macroprudential supervisors. This further stresses the importance of simple representations of complex data. The present paper focuses on the background and theory of information visualization and visual analytics, as well as techniques within these fields, as potential means for risk communication. We define the task of visualization in risk communication, discuss the structure of macroprudential data, and review visualization techniques applied to systemic risk. We conclude that two essential, yet rare, features for supporting the analysis of big data and communication of risks are analytical visualizations and interactive interfaces. For visualizing the so-called macroprudential data cube, we provide the VisRisk platform with three modules: plots, maps and networks. While VisRisk is herein illustrated with five web-based interactive visualizations of systemic risk indicators and models, the platform enables and is open to the visualization of any data from the macroprudential data cube.

I compare the performance of three measures of institution-level systemic risk exposure — Exposure CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016), systemic expected shortfall (Acharya et al., 2016), and Granger causality (Billio et al., 2012). I modify Exposure CoVaR to allow for forecasting, and estimate the ability of each measure to forecast the performance of financial institutions during systemic crisis periods in 1998 (LTCM) and 2008 (Lehman Brothers). I find that Exposure CoVaR forecasts the within-crisis performance of financial institutions, and provides useful forecasts of future systemic risk exposures. Systemic expected shortfall and Granger causality do not forecast the performance of financial institutions reliably during crises. I also find, using cross-sectional regressions, that foreign equity exposure and securitization income determine systemic risk exposure during the 1998 and 2008 crises, respectively; financial institution size determines systemic risk exposure during both crisis periods; and executive compensation does not determine systemic risk exposure.

This paper asks whether a single resolution authority for multinational banks is desirable. Such an authority was recently established within the European Monetary Union, where the resolution power for large banks was transferred to a Single Resolution Board. To address this issue, we consider the risk incentives of a multinational bank in the presence of different resolution frameworks and determine the welfare-efficient structure which prevents banks from excessive risk-taking. We argue that a single resolution authority is not always welfare-efficient, because it is the heterogeneity of bank resolution power which induces multinational banks to behave prudently. In severe solvency crises, the multinational authority should have the resolution power, whereas in less severe crises national resolution authorities are more efficient in avoiding excessive risk-taking on the part of multinational banks.

We quantify the linkages among banks’ equity performance and indicators of sovereign stress by using panel GMM to estimate a three-equation system that examines the impact of sovereign stress, as reflected in both sovereign spreads and sovereign ratings, on bank share prices. We use data for a panel of five euro-area stressed countries. Our findings indicate that a recursive relationship between sovereigns and banks operated during the euro-area crisis. Specifically, for the five crisis countries considered shocks to sovereign spreads fed-through to sovereign ratings, which affected commercial banks’ equity-prices. Our results also point to the importance of using levels of equity prices – rather than rates of return – in measuring banks’ performance. The use of levels allows us to derive the determinants of long-run equity prices.