Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract Exploring bank-level data from a small open economy, we present evidence that global funding conditions limit the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy in terms of shaping both the volume and the riskiness of bank lending. We show that more favorable global funding conditions associated with a local currency appreciation encourage banks to increase lending, leverage up, take more risks, and thus insulate themselves from lean-against-the-wind domestic monetary policy. These results support the existence of a risk-taking channel of currency appreciation at the bank level.

Abstract We use the EBA capital exercise of 2011 as a quasinatural experiment to investigate how capital requirements affect various measures of bank solvency risk. We show that, while regulatory measures of solvency improve, nonregulatory measures indicate a deterioration in bank solvency in response to higher capital requirements. The decline in bank solvency is driven by a permanent reduction in banks’ market value of equity. This finding is consistent with a reduction in bank profitability, rather than a repricing of bank equity due to a reduction of implicit and explicit too-big-too-fail guarantees. We then discuss alternative policies to improve bank solvency.

Abstract Conventional collateral requirements for derivatives are conservative, but not explicitly designed to buffer systemic risk. I explore collateral adequacy against systemic risk in the Canadian futures market during the 2008 crisis. I find that conventional collateral levels adequately absorb systemic risk, even allowing for an implausibly high level of stress, and that systemic risk spillovers do not exceed the effect of an approximately 1% downward stock price move. I also document that the largest systemic risk contributors are buffered relatively less than the rest, and that there is a large cross-country difference in the behavior of U.S. and Canadian institutions.

Abstract Firms with higher R&D intensity subsequently experience higher stock returns in international stock markets, highlighting the role of intangible investments in international asset pricing. The R&D effect is stronger in countries where growth option risk is more likely priced, but is unrelated to country characteristics representing market sentiments and limits-of-arbitrage. Moreover, we find that R&D intensity is associated with higher future operating performance, return volatility, and default likelihood. Our evidence suggests that the cross sectional relation between R&D intensity and stock returns is more likely attributable to risk premium than to mispricing.

Abstract This article documents novel large-sample evidence on the informational role of interfirm ownership networks in bank lending. Using comprehensive loan-level data in China, we find that banks’ internal loan ratings at issuance predict subsequent delinquent events more accurately when borrowers are connected to banks’ existing customers via ownership networks. In post-issuance monitoring for delinquent loans, banks with access to ownership networks manage to downgrade their initial ratings before late payments. These findings suggest that ownership networks facilitate the transmission of private information for bank lending. Moreover, ownership networks are more important for transmitting information related to small and medium enterprises.

Abstract Hedge fund activists transfer relevant prior work experience to their activism campaigns. Categorizing activists based on past employment at investment banks (generalists), private equity or special situations partnerships (specialists), or other firms (nonfinancial experts), we relate activists’ prior work experience to their choices and outcomes. Both generalists with codifiable skills and specialists with tacit skills contribute to successful outcomes, but differences in these skills lead to differences in activism processes. Activist choices, market responses, target firm responses, and procedural aspects of activism vary with activist identity. Our analysis examines activists’ heterogeneous skills and highlights their importance in shaping activist interventions.

Abstract We use a threshold-based design to study ex post discretion in lenders’ contractual enforcement of covenant violations. At preset thresholds, lenders enforce contractual breaches only infrequently, but this enforcement is associated with material consequences (e.g., fees and renegotiations). Enforcement varies significantly over time and peaks when credit conditions are tightest, indicating that enforcement is procyclical. Costly coordination reduces enforcement: Syndicates with ex ante restrictive voting requirements enforce at lower rates. Consistent with theories of lender competition and implicit contracting, enforcement rates are lower for borrowers with access to alternative sources of financing and well-reputed lead arrangers.

Abstract We examine whether superior understanding of technological innovation is a source of mutual fund managers’ ability to garner positive abnormal returns. Consistent with our hypothesis, the inter-quintile annual net Carhart alpha spread for mutual funds sorted on changes in the technological similarity (TS) of their portfolio holdings is 282 basis points. Moreover, because changes in TS are largely orthogonal to other predictors of mutual fund success (e.g., industry concentration, active share, fund R 2 , and lag fund alpha), changes in TS can be combined with other measures to help identify the best performing funds.

Abstract Blockholder disclosure thresholds shape incentives for hedge fund activism, which are jointly determined with real investment and managerial behavior. Uninformed investors value lower thresholds (greater transparency) when the cost of trading against an informed activist outweighs the benefits of the activist’s disciplining of management. Conversely, activists may desire disclosure thresholds if the threat of their participation discourages managerial malfeasance, which is their source of profits. Hedge fund activism can be excessive: If market opacity sufficiently harms uninformed investors, the costs of reduced real investment outweigh the social benefits from managerial disciplining, and society benefits from lower thresholds.

Abstract Firms with high levels of organization capital (OK), a firm-specific production factor provided by key employees, are known to be risky and earn high stock returns. We argue that fragility of OK (i.e., its sensitivity to potential disruptions) is an independently important dimension of this risk. We proxy for fragility by the size of the top management team and show that firms with small teams outperform firms with big teams by 5% annually. The return spread increases in the level of OK and correlates with the outside options of top executives. Further supporting our interpretation, shocks to team composition from unexpected deaths of chief executive officers cause larger value losses in smaller teams.