Knowledge that Transforms

We provide evidence of a link between firm dividend policy and stock market liquidity. In the cross section, owners of less (more) liquid common stock are more (less) likely to receive cash dividends. Predictions of the proportion of dividend payers based on 1963–1977 cross-sectional estimates account for most of the declining propensity of firms to pay dividends as documented by Fama and French (2001). Furthermore, historic liquidity is an important determinant of dividend initiations and omissions. Finally, we show that sensitivity of firm value to aggregate liquidity declines after dividend initiations, suggesting that investors view stock market liquidity and dividends as substitutes.

We demonstrate analytically that cross-sectional variation in the effects of events, i.e., in true abnormal returns, necessarily produces event-induced variance increases, biasing popular tests for mean abnormal returns in short-horizon event studies. We show that unexplained cross-sectional variation in true abnormal returns plausibly produces nonproportional heteroskedasticity in cross-sectional regressions, biasing coefficient standard errors for both ordinary and weighted least squares. Simulations highlight the resulting biases, the necessity of using tests robust to cross-sectional variation, and the power of robust tests, including regression-based tests for nonzero mean abnormal returns, which may increase power by conditioning on relevant explanatory variables.

This paper examines whether self-described market timing hedge funds have the ability to time the U.S. equity market. We propose a new measure for timing return and volatility jointly that relates fund returns to the squared Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio. Using a sample of 221 market timing funds during 1994–2005, we find evidence of timing ability at both the aggregate and fund levels. Timing ability appears relatively strong in bear and volatile market conditions. Our findings are robust to other explanations, including public information-based strategies, options trading, and illiquid holdings. Bootstrap analysis shows that the evidence is unlikely to be attributed to luck.

Policy risk, rather than information asymmetry, explains the cross-sectional underpricing of privatized initial public offerings. The issuer governments of high policy risk issues tend to retain a large equity stake and underprice more with underpricing increasing in retained equity. While the issuer government's retained equity is an observable signal for policy risk, we find that the quality of a country's bureaucratic machinery is a more intuitive and practical measure of policy risk. Policy risk also explains the absence of a systematic relation between the initial returns on privatized and private initial public offerings.

I study the dynamics of investor cash flows in socially responsible mutual funds. Consistent with anecdotal evidence of loyalty, the monthly volatility of investor cash flows is lower in socially responsible funds than in conventional funds. I find strong evidence that cash flows into socially responsible funds are more sensitive to lagged positive returns than cash flows into conventional funds, and weaker evidence that cash outflows from socially responsible funds are less sensitive to lagged negative returns. These results indicate that investors derive utility from the socially responsible attribute, especially when returns are positive.

This paper studies the interaction among financing, entry, and exit decisions of firms in a competitive industry subject to aggregate uncertainty. In contrast to Fries, Miller, and Perraudin (1997), I do not assume that a firm in default leaves the industry immediately. The implications on the optimal leverage ratios and equilibrium credit spreads are discussed. By incorporating the effect of competition, I show that the model results in significantly higher credit spreads than those predicted by traditional single firm models. Dynamic capital structure strategies in a competitive industry are also examined. The model renders a number of empirical predictions regarding leverage ratios and credit spreads of firms in a competitive industry.

The pricing of corporate debt is still a challenging and active research area in corporate finance. Starting with Merton (1974), many authors proposed a structural approach in which the value of the assets of the firm is modeled by a stochastic process, and all other variables are derived from this basic process. These structural models have become more complex over time in order to capture more realistic aspects of bankruptcy proceedings. The literature in this area emphasizes closed-form solutions that are derived by either partial differential equation methods or analytical pricing techniques. However, it is not always possible to build a comprehensive model with realistic model features and achieve a closed-form solution at the same time. In this paper, we develop a binomial lattice method that can be used to handle complex structural models such as ones that include Chapter 11 proceedings of the U.S. bankruptcy code. Although lattice methods have been widely used in the option pricing literature, they are relatively new in corporate debt pricing. In particular, the limited liability requirement of the equity holders needs to be handled carefully in this context. Our method can be used to solve the Leland (1994) model and its extension to the finite maturity case, the more complex model of Broadie, Chernov, and Sundaresan (2007), and others.

In recent years, a number of firms and banks have decided to “go dark,” i.e., deregister with the Securities and Exchange Commission and delist from the major exchanges despite having a large number of outside shareholders. This paper seeks to answer two important questions: Why do firms choose to go dark? What are the consequences for shareholders? We find that firms with fewer valuable growth opportunities, greater insider ownership, lower institutional ownership, higher leverage, and lower market momentum are more likely to go dark. Furthermore, the cost of regulatory compliance is a driving force behind the going dark phenomenon.

We examine the yield curve behavior and the relative performance of affine term structure models (ATSMs) using government bond yield data from Canada, Germany, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. We find strong predictability of forward rates for excess bond returns and reject the expectations hypothesis in all five countries. A three-factor model is sufficient to capture movements in the yield curve of Canada, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S., but may not be enough for Germany. An exhaustive comparison among ATSMs with no more than three factors reveals that the three-factor essential affine model (A 1 (3) E ), with only one factor affecting the volatility of the short rate but with all three factors affecting the price of risk, performs best in all five countries. Simulations provide inconclusive evidence on whether this best affine model can successfully generate the rich yield curve behavior observed in the data.

We find that in allocating initial public offerings (IPOs), underwriters favor institutions they have previously worked with. Regular investors benefit more than casual investors in IPOs through greater participation in underpriced issues. Relationship participation is more important in the distribution of IPOs with stronger demand, IPOs of less liquid firms, and deals by less reputable underwriters. Overall, our results are consistent with book-building theories of IPOs. Interestingly, for 1999–2000 we find that regular investors receive even more underpriced IPOs relative to previous years while we do not find evidence that they provide additional services in IPOs.