How do corporate bond mutual funds manage liquidity to meet investor redemptions? We show that during tranquil market conditions, these funds tend to reduce liquid asset holdings to meet redemptions, temporarily increasing relative exposures to illiquid asset classes. When aggregate uncertainty rises, however, they tend to scale down their liquid and illiquid assets proportionally to preserve portfolio liquidity. This fund-level dynamic management of liquidity appears to affect the broad financial market: Redemptions from the corporate bond fund sector lead to more corporate bond selling during high-uncertainty periods, which generates price pressures and predicts strong return reversals.

This article provides a comprehensive examination of the time-series behavior of relationship banks around and during borrower distress. Relationship and outside loans have similar interest rates during distress and even 2 years prior to distress. Relative to outside loans in distress, relationship loans in distress have lower maturity. The fraction of bank lending given by relationship banks reduces during borrower distress. Overall, borrowers in distress do not derive benefits from relationship banks. These findings are inconsistent with models that suggest banks have an implicit commitment to help their borrowers in distress due to reputation concerns.

Using a sample of completed U.S. acquisition deals over the period 1984–2014, we find that acquirer organization capital as measured by capitalized selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses is associated with superior deal performance. We show that high organization-capital acquirers achieve significantly higher abnormal announcement period returns, and better post-merger operating and stock performance, than low organization-capital acquirers. Additional tests suggest a causal relation between acquirer organization capital and deal performance. We further show that post-merger, high organization-capital acquirers cut more on the cost of goods sold, invest more in SG&A expenses, and achieve greater asset turnover and innovative efficiency.

We compare chief executive officer (CEO) turnover in public and large private firms. Public firms have higher turnover rates and exhibit greater turnover–performance sensitivity (TPS) than private firms. When we control for pre-turnover performance, performance improvements are greater for private firms than for public firms. We investigate whether these differences are due to differences in quality of accounting information, the CEO candidate pool, CEO power, board structure, ownership structure, investor horizon, or certain unobservable differences between public and private firms. One factor contributing to public firms’ higher turnover rates and greater TPS appears to be investor myopia.

We study hedge fund performance evaluation under the stochastic discount factor framework of Farnsworth, Ferson, Jackson, and Todd (FFJT). To accommodate dynamic trading strategies and derivatives used by hedge funds, we extend FFJT’s approach by considering models with option and time-averaged risk factors and incorporating option returns in model estimation. A wide range of models yield similar conclusions on the performance of simulated long/short equity hedge funds. We apply these models to 2,315 actual long/short equity funds from the Lipper TASS database and find that a small portion of these funds can outperform the market.

Using a large sample of hedge fund manager characteristics, we provide one of the first comprehensive studies on the impact of manager characteristics, such as education and career concern, on hedge fund performances. We document differential ability among hedge fund managers in either generating risk-adjusted returns or running hedge funds as a business. In particular, we find that managers from higher-SAT (Scholastic Aptitude Test) undergraduate institutions tend to have higher raw and risk-adjusted returns, more inflows, and take fewer risks. Unlike mutual funds, we find a rather symmetric relation between hedge fund flows and past performance, and that hedge fund flows do not have a significant negative impact on future performance.

This article examines the pricing of a firm’s carbon risk in the corporate bond market. Contrary to the “carbon risk premium” hypothesis, bonds of more carbon-intensive firms earn significantly lower returns. This effect cannot be explained by a comprehensive list of bond characteristics and exposure to known risk factors. Investigating sources of the low carbon alpha, we find the underperformance of bonds issued by carbon-intensive firms cannot be fully explained by divestment from institutional investors. Instead, our evidence is most consistent with investor underreaction to the predictability of carbon intensity for firm cash-flow news, creditworthiness, and environmental incidents.

We conduct the first broad-based international study on bank-level failures covering 92 countries over 2000–2014, investigating national cultural variables as failure determinants. We find individualism and masculinity are positively associated with bank failure, but they operate through different channels. Managers in individualist countries assume more portfolio risk, while governments in masculine countries allow banks to operate with less liquidity and less often bail out troubled institutions. Findings are robust to accounting for endogeneity, different techniques and measures, and additional controls. Results have implications for prudential policies, including regulation, supervision, and bailout strategies, that may partially mitigate some negative effects of culture.

We compare innovation strategies of public and private firms based on a large sample over the period 1997–2008. We find that public firms’ patents rely more on existing knowledge, are more exploitative, and are less likely in new technology classes, while private firms’ patents are broader in scope and more exploratory. We investigate whether these strategies are due to differences in firm information environments, CEO risk preferences, firm life cycles, corporate acquisition policies, or investment horizons between these two groups of firms. Our evidence suggests that the shorter investment horizon associated with public equity markets is a key explanatory factor.

This study examines the informational content of options trading on acquirer announcement returns. We show that implied volatility spread predicts positively on the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), and implied volatility skew predicts negatively on the CAR. The predictability is much stronger around actual merger and acquisition (M&A) announcement days, as compared with pseudo-event days. The prediction is weaker if pre-M&A stock price has incorporated part of the information, but stronger if the acquirer’s options trading is more liquid. Finally, we find that a higher relative trading volume of options to stock predicts higher absolute CARs. The relation also exists among the target firms.